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By analyzing personal diaries, memoirs, and recollections, this work aims to 
establish and classify motivational factors that triggered survival mechanisms and 
resistance to physical and psychological stress during the first year of Nazi Germany’s 
blockade of Leningrad from June 22, 1941 to August 9, 1942. Survival in extreme 
settings—the psychological pressure of anticipated air raids, bombings, the five-month-
long near-total absence of nutrition and semi-starvation that continued for the next 2 
years coupled with unusually severe winter and the absence of basic living needs—
greatly depended on the psycho-emotional endurance of each individual.  
In a city of nearly 3- million inhabitants, mass starvation claimed over one million 
lives. One million of those who were starving managed to survive; only 557,760 of them 
lived through all 872 days of the siege.1 Leningraders’ survival tactics were the 
manifestation of individual and collective behavior. This thesis defines five major sources 
that motivated the behavior: patriotism (with the collective as its integral part), family, 
religion, an exclusive focus on the self, and culture. The thematic chapters are tentatively 
arranged in descending order from the most significant and widespread stimulus to the 
less common and less frequent stimuli.     
KEY WORDS: Leningrad, Siege, Blockade, blokadniki, Hunger, Starvation, Diaries, 
Distrofiia, USSR, Soviet Union, Nazi, Germany, Great Patriotic War, World War II, 
Second World War, Operation Barbarossa.  
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We triumphed over them, morally triumphed – we, besieged by them! 
Ol’ga Berggol’ts 
 
Humanity has known wars, natural disasters, and epidemics. It has also known 
hunger. But as noted by David Glantz, “in terms of drama, symbolism and sheer human 
suffering, the Battle for Leningrad has no peer either in the Great Patriotic War or in any 
other modern war.”2 The siege lasted for nearly 900 days and resulted in 1–1.2 million 
civilian and 980,000 military deaths. Roughly 600,000 people died in its first year alone. 
Death touched every family, with some families perishing altogether. Three pathogenic 
factors – prolonged starvation, bitter cold,3 and the psychological trauma brought about 
by the bombings, darkness, and extreme privation – impacted residents’ physical and 
mental health. Starvation and severe hypothermia were the two main causes of death in 
the first year of the siege. Bread was the only food available on a regular basis. By the 
second half of November 1941, half of the bread was made of non-food additives 
(oilcake, malt, wallpaper dust, bran, boltings, cellulose, starch glue, etc.) rather than 
flour. In November and December 1941, rationing allowed the military 500 grams of 
                                                 
2 David Glantz, The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944: 900 Days of Terror (London: Cassel, 2004), 
p. 232. The war between Nazi Germany and the USSR (June 22, 1941—May 9, 1945) is termed the Great 
Patriotic War (Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina) in the Soviet/Russian historiography.  
 
3 The winter of 1941‒42 was the coldest and longest winter in the history of St. Petersburg--
Leningrad. Starting on October 11, 1941, the average daily temperature fell below 0°C. In the winter 
months of December, January, and February, the temperature fluctuated between 25--35°C below (-13--
31°F) (some diarists wrote of days when it went down to -40°). Only after April 7, 1942, it began to 
steadily rise. Snow depth that winter was more than 50 cm. Thus, winter lasted 178 days or six months. But 
even in May, there were 4 days of frost. On May 7, 1942, the maximum daily temperature was +0.9°C 






bread, workers – 250 grams, and civilians and dependents – 125 grams.4  The caloric 
intake of workers was 707 calories, civilians and dependents – 405 calories per diem.5    
Mass starvation resulted in distrofiia or acute starvation.6 Despite the enormous 
death toll, one million of those who starved from two to five months7 managed to 
survive, thus, illustrating the tremendous adaptive capacity of the human body. 
According to archival records, 557,760 people lived through all 872 days of the siege.8 
The survival greatly depended on the psychological resilience of each individual.   
The Nazis showered the city with 150,000 artillery shells and 107,000 
incendiaries, causing damage that in 1945 was estimated to be over 38 billion roubles 
(approximately $110.8 billion in today’s U.S. dollars).9 Almost every building was 
damaged, and the six main districts had entire blocks reduced to rubble. Hundreds of 
plants, factories, schools, and hospitals were damaged or completely destroyed. The 
museums, galleries, cathedrals, and theaters were pilfered and the structures – vandalized. 
                                                 
4 TsVMA. F.13. D.12314. L.10. Glantz, The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944, p. 83.  N.L. 
Volkovskii, ed., Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh rassekrechennykh arkhivov (St.Petersburg: Poligon, 
2005), p. 663. 
 
5 Vladimir Simonenko, Svetlana Magaeva, “Osnovy vyzhivaniia v blokadnom Leningrade s 
pozitsii sanogeneza” (Klinicheskaia meditsina, 2014, #2), p. 6. 
 
6 Distrofiia or the condition caused by starvation was termed “alimentary dystrophy” during the 
siege by the medical specialists of Leningrad. (It was also often referred to as “the Leningrad disease”). 
According to Professor Mashanskii, director of the city’s health department, 85-90% of Leningraders 
suffered from it. Mediki i blokada: Vzgliad skvoz’ gody. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel’stva 
ochevidtsev, dokumental’nye materialy. Kniga 2 (St.Petersburg: Mezhdunarodnaia assotsiatsiia 
blokadnikov goroda-geroia Leningrada, 1997), p. 22. Also in TsGA SPb, F. 2076, op. 4. D. 65, L. 32. 
 
7 The length of starvation varied depending on whether a person remained in the city or was 
evacuated. 
 
8 TsGA SPb, f. 9156, op. 6, d. 35, l. 131.  
 
9 The calculations of material losses were done by the Extraordinary State Commission (ESC) 
formed on November 2, 1942 and investigated war crimes against the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. 
Rouble-dollar exchange rate from 1937 to 1950 was approximately 5:1. Accordingly, the value of the 





One hundred eighty-seven historic buildings were severely damaged.10 Human losses 
surpassed those of the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad, and their number is 
roughly close to “the total number of American military who died in all wars between 
1776 and 1975.”11  
The first siege winter, the “mortal time,” divided Leningraders’ lives into ‘before’ 
and ‘after.’ I would break down the Leningrad blockade into three periods. The first, 
from the start of the war on June 22, 1941 to the end of October 1941, can be 
characterized as the total mobilization of the population’s resources for the fight for 
survival. The second, from November 1941 to June 1942, saw the residents making sense 
of and adapting to their new reality of daily suffering and death, and redefining their 
conception of what was acceptable. The third – beginning in the summer of 1942 and 
lasting until the end of the siege in January 1944 – was a period of comparative 
“normalcy.” Measuring everything against the first winter of horrors, Leningraders 
resolved to lead relatively routine lives, despite the bombings, persistent hunger, and 
awareness that they were surrounded by the Nazis.  
Drawing from personal (diaries, recollections, memoirs) and state records, this 
thesis will focus on the individuals’ motivations that incited their determination to cheat 
death during the first most brutal year of the siege, the “mortal time”12 as Leningraders 
                                                 
10 900 geroicheskikh dnei: sbornik dokumentov i materialov o geroicheskoi bor’be 
trudiashchikhsia Leningrada v 1941-1944 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), pp. 399-401. 
 
11 Alexis Peri, The War Within: Diaries from the Siege of Leningrad (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2017), p. 4. John Barber asserts that the city’s demographic calamity was the utmost 
“ever experienced by one city in the history of mankind.” John Barber and Andrei Dzeniskevich, eds., Life 
and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941-44 (Basingstoke-Hampshire-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2005), p. 1. 
 





themselves described it. What strategies did they use to resist the physical and mental 
deterioration? What was the role of state agencies in Leningraders’ daily lives?  How 
were personal narratives incorporated into the official one? To what extent did the 
residents internalize the tenets of Soviet ideology in their interpretations of reality? How 
did the new policies impact Leningraders and how the latter responded to them? Why 
was the city never relinquished? In defining the factors that ensured the survival of 
Leningrad and its population, the thesis will also trace how the residents’ fight for their 
own lives and the city defense overlapped.  
German Plans and the Encirclement of Leningrad 
Nazi Germany’s war against the USSR was launched on June 22, 1941. German 
forces quickly advanced into Soviet territory. As a major port and industrial center, 
Leningrad was one of the three main objectives of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa (see 
Figure 1). Hitler anticipated that “with assistance from the Finns and Army Group 
Center, the capture of Leningrad would precede that of Moscow.”13 If a swift capture of 
the city failed, it was to be “razed to the ground.”14 On September 8, 1941, Army Group 
North and Finnish troops completed the land encirclement of Leningrad commencing the 
start of the Leningrad Blockade. While the Germans and their allies blockaded a number 
                                                 
13 Robert Kirchubel, Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North (Oxford: Osprey, 2005), 
p. 71. 
 
14 Martin Bormann’s Minutes of a Meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters (July 16, 1941). German text: 
Aktenvermerk vom 16. Juli 1941, in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen 
Militärgerichtshof. Nürnberg 14. November 1945 - 1. Oktober 1946. Volume XXXVIII, Amtlicher Text – 
Deutsche Ausgabe, Urkunden und anderes Beweismaterial. Nuremberg 1949. Reprint: Munich, Delphin 
Verlag, 1989. Document 221-L, pp. 86-94. Source: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-





of cities during the World War II, “compared to London and Berlin, both besieged by air, 
there was no regular contact or mobility between Leningrad and its environs.”15 
 
 
Figure 1. Operation Barbarossa Plan16 
With the encirclement came daily shelling and bombing, and historian Georgii 
Kniazev noted in his diary on September 8, 1941: “It looks like Leningrad will not sleep 
today. On the seventy-ninth day of the war, the bombardment of Leningrad began. 
Perhaps, there will be many more of such restless nights in the future. The cup of woe 
                                                 
15 Peri, The War Within, p. 5. 
 






will have to be drunk to the very bottom.”17 Although the Nazis continued their attacks, 
unlike besieged Odessa or Sevastopol’, Leningrad was never conquered. It was the first 
major strategic defeat of the Nazi Army in Operation Barbarossa. 
In early September 1941, Professor Wilhelm Ziegelmeyer, an expert from the 
Munich Institute of Nutrition, was summoned to Wehrmacht headquarters. The OKW 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, High Command of the Army) asked him to calculate 
what would happen to the blockaded city without proper nutrition.18 Based on the data 
provided to him regarding Leningrad’s population, available provisions, and rations, 
Ziegelmeyer determined that for the residents of Leningrad “it was physically impossible 
to live on such a ration for any extended period of time,”19 and concluded that it made no 
practical sense to “risk the lives of our troops. The Leningraders will die anyway.”20 As 
dire as this prognosis was, in reality, the scientist of mass starvation miscalculated: due to 
the huge influx of refugees and the military, Leningrad was worse off than the German 
intelligence (and Ziegelmeyer) presumed.  
On September 22, 1941, Hitler declared: “Saint-Petersburg must be erased from 
the face of the Earth. […] In this war – conducted for the right to live – we are not 
interested in having this large city’s population even partially saved.” 21 By September 
                                                 
17 Georgiĭ Kniazev, entry for September 8, 1941. In Granin and Adamovich, Blokadnaia kniga, 
Chast’ 2 (Moskva: ID Komsomol’skaia Pravda, Direkt-Media, 2015), p. 86. 
 
18 Koval’chuk, Leningrad i Bol’shaia Zemlia (Leningrad: Nauka), 1975.  p. 83. Götz Aly and 
Suzanne Heim, Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 244-245. Michael Jones, Leningrad: State of Siege (New York: 
Basic Books, 2008), p. 39. 
 
19 Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, p. 245. 
 
20 Jones, Leningrad, p. 40.  
 
21 GA RF, F. 7445, Op. 2, D. 166, L. 312-314 (State Archive of the Russian Federation. 




26, 1941, the southern front line had been pushed to only 4 kilometers from the Kirov 
plant and only 16 kilometers from the Winter Palace (both shaded in red on Figure 2). In 
the north, the Finns stopped 30 kilometers from Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus.  
 
 
Figure 2. Siege borderlines as of September 21, 194122 
 
Authorities and Residents 
When Leningrad was encircled, approximately 2.5 million civilians were trapped 
within the blockade ring, along with Soviet military units of the 42nd, 55th, and 23rd 
Armies, and the Baltic fleet corps.23 The 8th Army and units of the Baltic fleet’s coastal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trials and numbered USSR-113.) (Nurnbergskii protsess nad glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi 






23 As reported by the City Registrar’s Office, on January 1, 1941, the population of Leningrad was 
2,992,000. (TsGA SPb. F.4965. Op.8. D.738. L.7) Together with two city’s districts of Kolpino and 
Kronshtadt, over 3 million people resided in Leningrad, Kolpino, and Kronshtadt before the war. From that 
number - by October 1, 1941, -- up to 290,000 draftees left the city to serve at the front and 581,461 people 




guard defended the seaside base at Oranienbaum that had been cut off from Leningrad 
and surrounded on the landward side. The 54th Army was outside of the encirclement.  
According to the last state-wide census of 1939,24 the population of Leningrad’s 
15 urban districts was 3,015,188 and comprised 45.5% men (1,372,928) and 54.5% 
(1,642,260) women. Children and youth under 19 “accounted for 37.2% of Leningrad 
population (44.9% for the USSR), and people over 50 for 13.8% (13% for the USSR).”25 
Just like the rest of the USSR, Leningrad was multiethnic. Ethnic Russians constituted 
86.99 % (2,775,979) of all residents. The four other main nationalities living in the city 
were Jewish (6.32% or 201,542), Ukrainian (1.71% or 54,660), Belorussian (1.01% or 
32,353), and Tatar (0.99% or 29,850). The other 3.97% of the population consisted of 
over ninety other ethnicities and ranged in numbers from 0.65% (Poles) to 0.001% 
(Kurds, Chukchas, Japanese, Selkup, and others).26 With the start of the war, the male 
population in the city declined, and, according to the records of the ration cards issued in 
                                                                                                                                                 
P.n.18. D.11. L.3-8)) were ordered to evacuate (TsGA SPb. F.7179. Op.53. D.58. L.30-32). But the city 
also housed around 500,000 soldiers; and more than 300,000 refugees from Karelia, the Baltics, Ukraine, 
and Leningrad region entered the city. (The exact number of refugees varies in the state records. Authors of 
Nepokorёnnyi Leningrad: Kratkiĭ ocherk istorii goroda v period Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny (Leningrad: 
Nauka, 1985), p. 125 estimate the number to be 100,000. But referring to the State Evacuation Committee 
report of 1942, Svetlana Magaeva asserts that by April 15, 1942, 324,382 refugees were evacuated from the 
city. If there were 324,382 refugees evacuating from the city, they must have gotten into the city 
somehow.) After basic calculations, we can deduce that no less than 2.9 million were trapped in the 
besieged city.   
 
24 The demography and structure of the city have barely changed in 1941 from the one in 1939. 
Nadezhda Cherepenina, “Demographic Situation and Healthcare on the Eve of War,” in Barber and 
Dzeniskevich, eds. Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44, p. 25. 
 
25 Id., p. 14. 
 





July 1941, the percentage of dependents (children, youth, pensioners, and disabled) 
equaled 45.8%.27  
Isolated from the rest of the country, the prospect of Leningrad’s survival was 
dire: delivery of goods to the blockaded city by land was impossible. Responsible for 
regulating life in the besieged city, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front (MCLF)28 
– headed by Andrei Zhdanov, Aleksei Kuznetsov, Pёtr Popkov – resolved that 
communication must be re-established with the mainland at any cost and in the shortest 
time possible. However, there were only two ways to do so: via Lake Ladoga and by air 
see Figure 3). On August 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO – 
Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony)29 passed a decree “On cargo transportation for 
Leningrad,” which included a detailed list of objectives.30  
The setting up of an “air bridge” began in the first half of September 1941. Flights 
to Leningrad on this route were dangerous, not only because of constant Luftwaffe 
assaults but also because of the extreme weather. The cargo transported by these flights 
                                                 
27 Nadezhda Cherepenina, “Demographic Situation and Healthcare on the Eve of War,” in Barber 
and Dzeniskevich, eds. Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44, p. 26. 
 
28 The Military Council of the Leningrad Front (MC LF) had similar function to the GKO only on 
a regional level (evacuation, military organization, supply, training, defense installations, communications, 
utilities, information, crime control, industrial and food production, etc.) The military councils included the 
city’s leaders (usually the party members), who were assigned military ranks. The decisions of the Military 
Council of the Leningrad Front that regulated life within the besieged city (e.g., food supply, deliveries, 
repairs) were signed by the Gorkom VKP(b)’s secretaries – Zhdanov and Kuznetsov. 
 
29 Established on June 30, 1941, in order to mobilize all material, military, and human resources to 
repel the Nazis, this Supreme state agency oversaw all state, party, military, economic, and industrial 
organizations by determining the timing and supplying of industries and military, providing adequate 
training for military, specialists, and personnel, population mobilization and evacuation, relocating 
industries, militarizing peace-time economy, rebuilding damaged areas, etc. GKO comprised of I.V. Stalin, 
V. M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesenskii, L.M. Kaganovich, 
and A.I. Mikoian. After the Great Patriotic War on September 4, 1945, GKO was terminated by the 
decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR. 
 
30 Koval’chuk, Leningrad i Bol’shaia Zemlia, p. 59. Dzeniskevich, Koval’chuk, Sobolev, 





included supplies, food, and military equipment. Flights out of Leningrad focused on 
evacuation. Selected civilians (mainly specialists, scientists, and artists), manufacturing 
equipment, science organizations, valuables, artifacts, and museum collections were 
ferried out. However, the authorities and the military knew that the aircraft carriers and 
pilots would, at best, play only a supporting role sustaining the city. 
 
 
Figure 3. Ice roads, water routes, borders, and breaking of the siege31   
 
 
The navigation of Lake Ladoga presented its own challenges and risks. Before the 
war, ship transport over the lake had utilized near-shore routes that were now controlled 
by Nazi troops. Its undeveloped southern coast had no port facilities or wharfs, and the 
                                                 





supply of boats that could navigate the lake was limited. Nevertheless, the dredging of the 
lake and construction of moorings on the western bank of the Shlissel’burg Bay 
commenced. By the end of September 1941, multiple warehouses, two berths in the 
Osinovets and Gol’sman harbours, a dam in the Bay of Mor’e, and a narrow-gauge 
railway connecting the wharves with the main railway had been constructed.32 
Missions freighting cargo across Lake Ladoga began on September 12, 1941. 
Despite the weather and navigation conditions, the lack of barges or suitable ships, the 
length and complexity of the voyage, and the constant air raids, the Doroga Zhizni – the 
“Road of Life,” as it came to be known33 – was the only reliable link between the 
besieged city and the mainland until March 1943. 
In addition to all other issues, Leningrad required quick and well-planned 
evacuation. Besides a trove of defense industry plants and cultural treasures, the city was 
also a home to over 800,000 children.34 The Evacuation Commission formed on June 27, 
1941, made removal of the city’s 311,387 children a priority.35 The evacuation of 
equipment and defense specialists, scientists, research industries, museums, and art 
collections began on July 14, 1941. The city also planned the forced removal of criminals 
and residents of Finnish and German descent, based on the belief that they might 
                                                 
32 Koval’chuk, Leningrad i Bol’shaia Zemlia, p. 63. 
 
33 The term “Road of Life” came to be a common reference after the siege. During the siege, 
Leningraders called it the Ice Road or even the “Road of Death.” 
 
34 As of June 22, 1941, there were 848,067 children under the age of 17 in the city. Liudmila 
Gazieva, “Bor’ba za spasenie detei v blokadnom Leningrade v 1941-1943 gg.” (avtoreferat dissertatsii 
kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Sankt-Peterburg. gos. un-t, 2011), p. 16. Nadezhda Cherepenina quotes that 
number to be 433,600 in September 1941. Cherepenina, “Assessing the Scale of Famine and Death in the 
Besieged City,” in Barber, Dzeniskevich, eds. Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44, p. 36. 
 





destabilize the situation in the city.36 This was in addition to the 157,000 refugees from 
Estonia, Karelia, Latvia, and the Leningrad region who had been evacuated before the 
siege.37  
During the initial mass departure, many Leningraders refused to leave. Their 
reasons were varied. Some did not believe that the situation would worsen. Some either 
did not want to leave their homes or were emotionally attached to the city. Some thought 
they would be useful to the city’s defense if they stayed. The residents were asking 
themselves: “Should we leave? Where? How? Why? What are the prospects for the 
future? How will we manage in places unknown, separated from husbands and sons who 
remain behind?”38 In an attempt to hasten flight from the city, the District Council held 
meetings for women, at which officials answered questions regarding evacuation. But 
these mostly proved unsuccessful. Indeed, even threats to take away food ration cards fell 
on deaf ears: “‘Let them! We’ll manage without the cards.’ ‘We’ll take away your 
passports and apartments.’ ‘So what? We are still not going to go anywhere.’”39 This 
refusal proved to be detrimental to the city and its residents.40 
                                                 
36 TsGA. SPb. F. 7179. Op. 53. D. 58. L. 30-32; TsGA SPb. F. 4793. Op. 2. D. 6. L. 13-14. The 
actual number of those evacuated was less than ordered. As far as I know, the topic of the forced 
evacuation of the Germans and Finns is not thoroughly researched. Nikita Lomagin mentions it in his 
Neizvestnaia blokada (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel’skiĭ Dom “Neva,” 2002), p. 291. I.V. Cherkiz’ianova 
conducts research and regularly publishes articles on the Leningrad Germans in the war years. (I.e. 
“Leningradskie nemtsy v gody voiny: sobytiia 1941‒42 gg.” In Nemtsy v Sankt-Peterburge. Biograficheskii 
aspect. XVIII-XX vv. Vypusk 7. Sankt-Peterburg: Kunstkamera, 2013.) As for the prison population in the 
besieged city, it was very limited. As of July 1, 1942, there were 2,996 convicts and 3,201detained under 
investigation. Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada, p. 565.  
 
37 TsGA SPb. F. 330. Op. 1. D. 10. L. 3. 
 
38 Russian National Library (RNB), Manuscript Department (OR). F. 1015. D. 57. L. 48. 
 
39 Id. L. 45.  
 





Besides the supply problems and the evacuation, city authorities faced many other 
challenges. German bombing and shelling destroyed the telecommunication 
infrastructure. To restore telephone and telegraph lines, underwater cables had to be laid 
through the Shlissel’burg Bay, and attempts to do so began in September 1941. Three 
unsuccessful endeavors were made before the connection with the rest of the USSR was 
re-established on October 29, 1941.  
City administration also had to confront the disruption in fuel and electricity 
distribution, water outage, damage to the city’s heating and sewage systems, while at the 
same time providing safety and first-aid training, organizing fire brigades, constructing 
air-raid shelters, and converting factories and plants to war production. In order to fortify 
the city, 500,000 Leningraders dug and built “pillboxes, dragon’s teeth, and anti-tank 
ditches” in the first weeks of the war; women41 and teenagers erected concentric defense 
rings.42 After announcing the formation of opolchenie,43 the authorities were able to form 
ten divisions (the number of those signed up for military duty varies from 160,000 to 
290,000).44 By July 5, the city’s factories had converted to military production making 
                                                 
41 Alexis Peri asserted that even “expectant mothers” were among those preparing fortifications. 
(Peri, The War Within, p. 23.) Indeed, Lengorispolkom mandated “all capable residents of both genders 
(between the ages of 16 and 50 for men and 16 to 45 for women)” to labor duty. It also listed those who 
were released from such obligation, which included “women in the final 8 weeks of pregnancy or 8 weeks 
after childbirth, and breastfeeding mothers.” Hours of duty varied depending on the full-time occupancy 
and employment, but could not exceed 7 consecutive days with a 4-day break after that. (TsaSPb. F. 7384. 
Op. 18. D. 1420. L. 128-130.)     
 
42 Alan Wykes, The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1968), pp. 54-56. 
 
43 People’s Militia; national irregular troops formed from the population at the times of national 
emergencies. 
 
44 Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 
pp.146-147; Anna Reid, Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944 (New York: Walker & 
company, 2011), pp. 75-90; Wykes, The Siege of Leningrad, p. 57, Leon Goure, The Siege of Leningrad 





mortars, tanks, armored cars, flame-throwers, grenades, and anti-tank mines.45 The 
administration was responsible for job placement and training, propaganda (publications, 
posters, lectures, exhibitions), suppressing crime, setting objectives for scientific research 
in the fields of food production, medicine, engineering, and technology, as well as 
establishing and operating the stolovye (communal cafeterias that fed the city's residents), 
the hospitals, and the orphanages. The combined magnitude and importance of these 
responsibilities required an efficient approach.  
Inside the Circle of the Siege 
Cut off from the rest of the country, Leningraders were anxious to receive any 
news on events at the front or outside the city. Information was scarce and fragmented.46 
One of the diarists joked that there were “only three sources of information available: 
OZhS47 (“one woman said”), OMS48 (“one man said”), and OVS49 (“one soldier said”). 
Those are our newspapers.”50 Lack of official news incited the spread of tales passed 
through the grapevine (“sarafannoe radio”). They ranged from optimistic (on ration 
increase) to utterly absurd (on Stalin firing Popkov or a separate peace treaty with 
Germany). Despite the uncertainty, panicky moods were not predominant. Those who 
                                                 
45 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p.146. 
 
46 See Glantz, The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944. Goure, The Siege of Leningrad. Reid, 
Leningrad.  
 
47 Odna Zhenshchina Skazala. 
 
48 Odin Muzhchina Skazal. 
 
49 Odin Voennyi Skazal. 
 
50 V.G. Kuliabko, entry for September 29, 1941, in Valeriĭ David, ed., Budni Podviga: blokadnaia 
zhizn’ leningradtsev v dnevnikakh, risunkakh, dokumentakh, 8 sentiabria 1941 – 27 ianvaria 1944 (Sankt-
Peterburg: LIK, 2006), p. 24. Also in RNB OR, F. 163, ed.hr. 31, l. 38, 39. (Sinakevich O.V. entry for 





spread rumors were despised. Teacher Vasiutina expressed her resentment: “All these 
endless rumors make your head spin. They claim accuracy and reliability, and then in an 
hour prove to be belligerent lies. I think reaction to them should be harsh as it is certain 
that enemies are trying to cause panic.”51 And factory planner Osipova stated with 
disgust:  
Those snitchers whispering that we’ll be captured are revolting. They make me 
want to constantly repeat everywhere – we’ll prevail, we’ll take charge... You can 
hear people riding the tram talk about our troops’ retreat, living hardships, 
shortages, and they fear that Leningrad will be taken. I wanted to get up and 
throw them out of the tram for such talk and alarmism.52 
 
In a diary entry dated September 13, 1941, Hermitage employee Maria Konoplёva 
wrote how in the new reality of the siege everyone “sorely wanted to hear an update on 
the situation at the front” but “the radio kept repeating the ‘standard’ phrases” that lacked 
any details.53 After the war when the motives behind such “bland” information reports 
became clear, she remarked on her September 13th entry: “Then, in the beginning of the 
war, we did not realize that radio announcements were restrained for a reason and that it 
could not have been any different.”54 Archival records reveal that on January 3, 1942 all 
Leningrad departments in charge of press releases and publications received orders to 
omit specific data (organization, location, relocation, quantity, photo records, tactical 
strategies, cases of defection, death toll, maps), information on the economy, industrial 
production, evacuation, food supplies, and statistical data on population (including 
                                                 
51 Evgeniia K. Vasiutina, entry for September 4, 1941. TsGALI SPb. F. 522. Op. 1. D. 39. L. 36. 
 
52 N.P. Osipova. Diary. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 89. L. 3, 5. 
 
53 Mariia Sergeevna Konoplёva, entry for September 13, 1941, in V blokirovannom Leningrade: 
Dnevnik, 22 iunia – 19 ianvaria 1943. RNB OR, F. 368, ed.hr. 1, l. 80. 
 





gender and age) with some exceptions.55 These measures were taken in order to minimize 
German intelligence, prevent information leaks, and reduce defeatism.56 Although this 
withholding of information created tension and anxiety, it serves a good example of the 
lesser of two evils principle: if people found out about the disasters at the front and the 
numbers of the Red Army soldiers taken prisoner, the chance of panic would have been 
much higher.     
On November 17, 1941, intelligence officers from the 18th Army (which had been 
monitoring the state of affairs in Leningrad) reported to the OKW that the “Food supply 
situation has worsened. [...] Supply of gas, water, and electricity has been cut off in the 
14th district. There is no public transportation. Heating is problematic. There is no more 
coal. Distribution of firewood to the civil population has been discontinued in mid-
October.”57  Soon after, on December 10, 1941, Einsatzgruppe A58 reported that food 
rationing portions were meager and noted the first deaths from starvation.59 However, 
notwithstanding the city’s insufficient food and supplies, it continued to survive and 
resist: administrative organizations and some publishing houses, hospitals, daycares, 
theaters, museums, public library, scientific institutions, and factories remained operative. 
                                                 
55 TsGA SPb. F. R-359. Op. 1. D. 1 L .1-5. 
 
56 “Given the city’s encirclement and the adversary’s immediate proximity, daily air raids and 
shelling, any detailed publication material could provide the enemy – directly or indirectly – with useful 
information and prove extremely detrimental to the army, city front, and its defense.” (From the report to 
the Secretary of Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b) A. I. Makhanov by Artamonov, Head of 
LenOblGorLit (Leningrad Regional Municipal Literature). TsGA SPb. F. R-359. Op. 1. D. 2. L.27) 
 
57 Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada, pp. 618-620. 
 
58 The Einsatzgruppen were special SS mobile formations tasked with carrying out the mass 
murder of Jews, communist functionaries, and others deemed unfit to live by the Nazis. Einsatzgruppe A 
was one of the bloodiest Nazi mobile killing squads. It was active in the Baltic countries and the western 
region of Leningrad under the command of Brigadefuhrer Franz Walther Stahlecker.  
 





Ziegelmeyer, not seeing the results that he predicted, reviewed his calculations, 
looking for a reason that could explain the city’s survival.  But he had taken everything 
into account: rationing, bread quality, air temperature, and psychological stress. He 
remained convinced that 125, 150, or 200 grams of bread daily without any other 
nutrition was insufficient to physiologically sustain a human body in freezing cold 
weather. But the residents of Leningrad continued to live, move, and work in apparent 
defiance of the laws of science. After the war, while he was working as a senior nutrition 
specialist in the Soviet-occupied zone, Ziegelmeyer met Aleksei Bezzubov, a Soviet food 
chemist who during the siege participated in a scientific research group that studied 
edible materials and implemented the technology of vitamin C production from pine 
needles.60 According to Bezzubov, Ziegelmeyer told him about his role in the siege and 
asked “How could you have survived? It is absolutely impossible! I am an experienced 
nutritionist, but it is a mystery to me how you managed to pull off such a miracle.”61 
On November 20, 1941, when the daily bread ration fell to a bare minimum (250 
grams for specialists and blue-collar workers and 125 grams for dependents), Leningrad 
was struck by mass hunger. Physicians who survived the siege reported that emaciation 
was “characterized by rapidly progressing weight loss, increasing muscular debility, 
weakening cardiac activity, slowing of the heartbeat, fatigue, appreciable loss of working 
capacity, flaccidity, a slowing of speech and movement, and depression.”62 Witness 
                                                 
60 Aleksei Bezzubov, “Vitaminy dlia blokadnogo Leningrada” (Khimiia i zhizn’, 1985, #1). F. 
7384. Op. 36. D. 68. L. 70. Avgustyniuk, in the entry for April 4, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb, F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 
1. L.34. 
 
61 Granin and Adamovich. Blokadnaia kniga, p. 62. Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, p. 
245.  
 





accounts describe apathy, “sleepwalking,” indifference, and detachment from reality. 
“We are no longer surprized or horrified, our nerves are numb.”63 People had  
empty, vacant eyes. The seal of hopelessness reflected on many faces. You no 
longer could either empathize or realize the entire depth of human sorrow. The 
never-ending sense of hunger that was gnawing on your innards inhibited your 
ability to be completely delicate, sensitive, and humane.64 
 
Malnutrition weakens the immune system, increasing the chance of contracting 
infectious diseases. But the clinical picture was different in Leningrad. The scientists 
concluded that the adaptation to mental and emotional stress (that preceded the physical 
starvation) increased the residents’ biological defense mechanisms.65 Leningrad is also 
the only example in all of histories of besieged cities that escaped epidemics of infectious 
diseases.66 During the first winter, distrofiia (starvation) and hypothermia were the 
prevailing causes of death, and reported cases of common pre-war diseases like chicken 
pox, scarlet fever, measles, and rubella were rare.67  
The use of innumerable food substitutes played a huge role in survival. Leningrad 
scientists conducted research and experiments on the possibility of extracting edible 
                                                 
63 From the siege diary of Stasia Antonevich. TsGALI SPb. F.97. Op.3. D.709. L.12. 
 
64 TsGALI SPb. F.97. Op.3. D.969. L.4. (M. Gol’zblat). 
 
65 TsGA SPb. F. 4965. Op. 3с. D. 45. Life and death, pp. 123-160. 
 
66 John Barber, who did comparative research on various famines (Ireland, India, China, Ethiopia, 
Bangladesh, Holland, Greece, and Soviet Union) stated that unlike in Leningrad, in other famines 
“infectious diseases accounted for most deaths.” The explanation is two-fold: unfavorable winter conditions 
and preventative measures initiated by the city authorities. Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., Life and Death, 
pp. 3, 7-8. Mediki i blokada: Vzgliad skvoz’ gody. Vospominaniia, fragment dnevnikov, svidetel’stva 
ochevidtsev, dokumental’nye materialy, Kniga 2, p. 50. 
 
67 Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., Life and death, p. 145. In 2016, Yoshinori Ohsumi received the 
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his research of the autophagy mechanisms (“self-eating” of the 
damaged cells and recycling of non-essential parts of the cell during starvation). He discovered that 
autophagy is triggered in response to various types of stress (including starvation) and is a “key cellular 
process capable of clearing invading microorganisms and toxic protein aggregates, and therefore plays an 






components from plants, industrial lubricants, organic matter, and even insects. The 
city’s food industry implemented the use of surrogates in the production of bread, meat, 
milk, confections, and canning products.68 Local publishers printed brochures compiled 
by the Botanical Institute of the Academy of Sciences with the list of edible items found 
in nature and households as well as recipes for making them.69 Due to the extreme 
physical pain associated with starvation, people consumed everything that even remotely 
resembled food: various pharmaceutical remedies, window cleaning liquid, shoe polish, 
leather goods, commercial grease, tree bark, sawdust, albumin glue, petroleum jelly, 
stearin candles, cats, dogs, sparrows, various plants, and so on. On November 30, 1941, 
factory worker Evdokimov wrote: “Hunger. Hunger! How can we manage to live through 
this? Those who survive will never forget these days and will always value life and know 
its worth. Child mortality is very high. Almost the entire population is swollen from 
hunger. Horses, cats, and dogs are disappearing from the streets.”70 
The siege – like any catastrophe – imposed its own rules and pushed people into 
doing things they would never otherwise have done. Faced with ethical decision making 
on daily basis, people became accustomed to making tough, even cruel, choices. As the 
residents’ emotions numbed, a degree of moral deterioration ensued. Realizing the 
adverse impact of hunger, diarists nevertheless often reproached themselves for certain 
actions. After unsuccessful attempts to control his temper, Aleksandr Avgustyniuk 
disappointedly wrote:  
                                                 
68 Anatolii Veselov, “Bor’ba s golodom v blokadnom Leningrade” (Otechestvennaya istoriia, 
2002, # 3), pp. 157-158. 
 
69 Gellerbakh, Koriakina, Nikitin, Pankova, Rozhevitz, Smetannikova, Troitskaia, Fedchenko, and 
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I scolded mom again. I realize that I am out of line but cannot help it, hunger is 
tormenting me. She has shriveled up and can barely move, and I am snapping at 
her... Why? It is upsetting that I cannot help her because I am helpless myself. 
That is why I nag, that is why I pick on her... I am responsible for my own 
actions.71  
 
While everyone struggled with the new reality, and attempted to reason and make sense 
of it through self-searching, Leningraders regarded such traumatic experiences as social 
or collective precisely because such experiences were not unique.72 But for the most part, 
moral norms were lowered or disregarded in relation to strangers.  
During a winter in which the temperature plunged below -35° C (-31° F), 
Leningraders had no heat, no water, and no electricity.73 Sewage was thrown out into the 
stairwells, streets, and into elevators. As the siege dragged on, people stopped caring 
about how they looked, and what they wore. Lev Khodorkov observed the change in the 
physical appearance of residents:  
There is not a single normal face on the street. Hunger manifests itself in a variety 
of ways: legs, arms, and face swell up; eyes water; complexion is grayish-green; 
arms, legs, body, and face thin down; eyes sink in; arms get ghastly slim; nose 
becomes pointy; some people’s faces darken and turn black. Those with a normal 
healthy complexion are looked back at.74 
  
                                                 
71 Aleksandr Ivanovich Avgustyniuk, entry for November 26, 1941, TsGAIPD SPb, F. 1000. Op. 
11. D. 1. L.9-10.  
 
72  Derek A. Summerfield argued that “war-affected populations” direct their attention “outward, 
to their devastated social world” and not inwards to the “mental processes.” He later observed that one of 
the major determinants of the outcome is a sociocultural factor. (“The Impact of War and Atrocity on 
Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma 
Projects” (Overseas Development Institute, London, 1996), p. 14. Online source: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97846/networkpaper014.pdf; “Cross-cultural Perspectives on the 
Medicalization of Human Suffering” in Gerald M. Rosen, ed., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and 
Controversies (New York: JohnWiley & Sons, 2004), p. 242.) 
 
73 As a result of German air raids. 
 





Money depreciated, and jewelry, art, and other valuables could be exchanged for 
“cigarettes, hunks of ersatz bread, jars of sour cabbage, dirty bits of rye bread” on one of 
the city’s black markets.75 
During the fall and winter of 1941‒42, German aviation and artillery targeted 
apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, industrial facilities, and other crowded places in 
the attempt to intimidate and eradicate the city’s population.76 The initial psychological 
impact was tremendous. A few diary entries speak of people dying from stress and fright 
during bombings. Poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts noted in her diary: 
[They are] hurling explosive metal at unarmed, defenseless people. It whistles 
while in flight so that everyone thinks ‘this one is going to get me’ dying [from 
terror] inside before it hits the ground. You die even though it missed. But in a 
minute there is this whistling again and again, and a person dies once more. 
And anew he holds his breath and then resurrects only to die again and again. 
How much longer will this go on for? Come on, kill! But do not intimidate me, 
do not dare to scare me with this damned whistling, do not torment me. Kill 
quietly. Kill at once but not several times a day. Oh, my Lord!... I feel like 
something inside me is dying. And when it actually does, perhaps then I shall 
cease to be afraid.77  
 
                                                 
75 Salisbury, The 900 Days, p. 440. 
 
76 See Appendix V, Photo 1 “OKW secret directive dated October 7, 1941 on the destruction of 
Moscow and Leningrad.” A secret directive on “The Future of the City of Petersburg,” numbered I-a 
1601/41, dated 22 September 1941, stated that “The Fuehrer has decided to wipe the city of Petersburg 
from the face of the earth,” that it is planned to blockade the city securely, to subject it to artillery 
bombardment of all calibers, and by means of constant bombing from the air to raze Leningrad to the 
ground. It is also decreed in the order that should there be a request for capitulation, such request should be 
turned down by the Germans. Finally, it is stated in this document that this directive emanates not only 
from the naval staff, but also from the OKW.” The Avalon Project: Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 
8, p. 113. Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/02-22-46.asp   Also see, Martin Bormann’s Minutes of a 
Meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters (July 16, 1941). Nuremberg Document 221-L. Source: 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2345 (Accessed on January 4, 2017.) 
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But on January 12, 1942, Einsatzgruppe A reported that even constant air raids 
and shelling had little to no effect on the residents.78 People had to get used to living in 
such conditions; sometimes at the expense of others. NKVD79 reports describe instances 
of stealing, marauding, black marketing, an occasional murder, and even trupoedstvo, the 
eating of corpses.80 With over 3,000 dying every day,81 in the months between November 
1941 and March 1942, death became a reality:  
Placing bodies of the deceased relatives wrapped up and sewn into sheets on sleds 
or pieces of plywood, Leningraders dragged them along Ligovskii Prospect to the 
Volkovskoe cemetery. There were no planks or coffins. Having no strength to 
hack out graves, people delivered bodies to the tall metal fence and left them 
there.82  
 
Unable to convey the scope of the human tragedy and emotional strain, diarists resorted 
to the repetition of certain words because using one word seemed insufficient: “Corpses 
are in the morgue, on the streets, in buildings, dormitories, and institutions. Anywhere 
and everywhere there are corpses, corpses, corpses. They clamor for revenge.”83 
According to Svetlana Magaeva, a senior researcher at the Institute of Pathology 
and Pathophysiology of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, who endured the 
                                                 
78 Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada, p. 659. 
 
79 The NKVD militsiia units were entrusted with the tasks related to the city’s order and security: 
participation in the internal defense of the city, organization of anti-landing defense, building internal and 
external defense lines, ensuring the evacuation of the population, fighting crime, imposing the curfew, 
security checks of the incoming transport, arranging mass burials, and so forth. The militsiia also provided 
protection and ensured the security of the NKVD USSR Military Auto Road #101 (the official designation 
of the “Road of Life”). See Appendix IV for more details. 
 
80 Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada, pp. 655, 750-797. 
 
81 TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21. Lur’e estimates 1,500 people daily in Lev Lur’e and 
Leonid Maliarov, Leningradskii front (St.Peterburg.: BKhV-Peterburg, 2012), p. 150. 
 
82 Recollections of Nina Moskalenko in Lur’e and Maliarov, Leningradskii front, p. 157. 
 





siege as a child, the city’s population should have been wiped out within a month as 
predicted by the Germans.84 Specialists indicated that there were two main components to 
survival: physiological and psychological. Scientific research on the “physiological and 
pathological stress verifies that the outcome of the near-total starvation depended on the 
nature of psycho-emotional tension that the blockaders experienced prior to the onset of 
famine.”85 While it is obvious that all residents experienced stress, its levels varied 
depending on the “individual predisposition of mental and emotional excitation, the 
activity of natural stress-limiting systems, and the ability of the organism to adapt to 
stress pressures.”86  This adaptability to the two pathogenic factors (emotional trauma and 
starvation) played the main role in blokadniki’s durability under conditions incompatible 
with life. The initial stressor (emotional trauma) produced the long-term adaptation effect 
and preceded the starvation phase by three months. Since this adaptation is possible with 
the intensification of protein synthesis, it allowed increasing resistance to the ensuing 
extreme starvation. If the physiological stressor (starvation) began immediately after the 
siege was laid, remaining alive over any extended period of time would have been 
impossible under conditions of protein deficiency.87 This conclusion drawn by medical 
specialists is verified historically: the survival of 557,760 Leningraders who lived 
through the entire siege is a compelling proof. 
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 On the whole, individual personality traits determined the severity of the 
emotional and mental impact. The doctors and clinical specialists who worked in the city 
during the blockade did not always see a connection between emaciation level and death. 
Moreover, at times there seemed to be an inverse correlation: people without signs of 
severe dystrophy who lost the motivation to live passed away, and those whose vital 
statistics appeared incompatible with life, but were making a wilful effort, survived.88 
According to Professor Mikhail Chernorutskii’s observations at the time of the siege, 
[T]he weakening of the will to live, depression, and giving up the routine of 
ordinary living [...] led to a sharp deterioration in the general condition of the 
patients. Conversely, a firm will to live, cheerfulness, optimism, and invariable 
pattern of organization in daily life and work (that seemed to defy the evident) 
sustained the weak body and gave it new strength.89 
 
Professor Aleksandr Miasnikov also noted that having been placed in the same 
environment people with highly sensitive personality traits – anxious, agitated, extremely 
emotional, and fearful – had an accelerated rate of developing distrofiia than those who 
were more pliable, calm, organized, and optimistic.90 Clearly, the determination was an 
essential and integral part of the survival in Leningrad.  
Historiography of the Leningrad Blockade 
As more archival records get declassified and new material (including diaries, 
memoirs, letters, and recollections) surfaces, it allows scholars to fill in the blind spots. 
The lack of accessible and reliable data in the past explains the limited scholarship on the 
siege of Leningrad in the west (as opposed to other significant events that took place on 
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the Eastern front, i.e. the Battle of Stalingrad or the Battle of Kursk), while the scholarly 
literature on the subject is abundant in Russia. Approaches, perceptions, and assessments 
of the siege vary drastically within international scholarly circles and depend on national 
historical interpretations, political affiliations, and time period.91  
Throughout the war and up until the end of the 1940s, the history of the siege in 
the USSR became known by means of various media publications as well as official (and 
trophy) records and materials presented at the Nuremberg Tribunal, when the Blockade 
of Leningrad received special attention. Documents produced at Nuremberg irrefutably 
established Nazi Germany’s objectives to destroy the city and starve Leningraders to 
death, rejecting an option of capitulation and forcing residents who attempt to flee back 
into the city under fire.92  
Up until the mid-1980s, the Soviet historiography of the Leningrad siege 
developed within the general frame of publications on the Great Patriotic War: the scope 
                                                 
91 Historiography of the war was greatly impacted by the Cold War and political clash between the 
capitalist West and the communist USSR. Thus in the Soviet era, the role of the “never-erring” cit/ state 
authorities was portrayed as a motivating force (i.e. A.P. Konstantinov, ed., Zhenshchiny goroda Lenina 
(Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1963) or Aleksandr Karasёv, Leningradtsy v gody blokady, 1941-1943 (Moskva: 
Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1959)), but with the break-down of the Soviet Union was revised and received 
objective criticism (i.e. Nikita Lomagin, Neizvestnaia blokada). And in the U.S., the Soviet authorities were 
– at to the large degree are still – viewed as the intimidating and terrorizing force. (See Leon Gour’s The 
Siege of Leningrad first published in 1962, where he asserted that government exerted control and almost 
total political conformism among civilians who “felt helpless to resist the controls imposed upon it” (Id., 
pp. 63, 80, 304-308), and Anna Reid’s The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944 of 2011 with a similar 
assessment of the authorities as inept, and the Soviets as  passive resisters submerged in the system-fostered 
“all-pervading culture of fear.”(Id., p. 96)) 
 
92 Franz Halder noted in his diary on July 8, 1941: “It is the Fuehrer's firm decision to level 
Moscow and Leningrad, and make them uninhabitable, so as to relieve us of the necessity of having to feed 
the populations through the winter. The cities will ‘be razed by Air Force. Tanks must not be used for the 
purpose. A national catastrophe which will deprive not only Bolshevism but also Muscovite nationalism of 
their centers.’” (The Private War Journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the 
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol. VI. Historical Division, SSUSA. 21 February, 1941 
– 31 July, 1941 (Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document No. 
N-16845-F, Copy 1), p. 212.) Online source: http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf  See General 
Jodl’s order on October 7, 1941 in Roderick Stackelberg and Sally Anne Winkle, The Nazi Germany 





of the tragedy in Leningrad was downplayed, issues of defeatism or state opposition were 
omitted, and the spread of individual memory about the blockade was curbed. The 
official state ideology endorsed and commemorated Leningraders’ “epic struggle” in the 
battle for the city, leaving behind such aspects of the survival as privation and 
criminality.93 (Although, such interpretation of the civilians’ struggle was not 
characteristic only of the Soviet propaganda. In comparing the siege and the London 
Blitz, Lisa Kirschenbaum asserted that “in both cases, the media worked to persuade 
individuals that their personal sorrows […] carried historic, if not epic, importance.”94 In 
both cases the stories of courage “transformed the everyday horrors of urban war into 
heroic legend.”95) But what was lost in the official narrative was the fact that the war 
itself was just as much of an individual experience as it was national.     
Collecting and preserving social memory began prior to the lifting of the siege. A 
number of state commissions oversaw collecting, sorting, publishing, and archiving of the 
documentation. Part of the commissions’ findings was a compilation of research records 
pertaining to the psychological impact of the blockade conducted by scientists from 
Bekhterev Psycho-Neurological Institute during the siege. Those conclusions and 
evaluations were used in Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad.96 The book examines 
historical-medical aspects relating to personality and behavior changes (including 
survival cannibalism) and the interrelation between alimentary dystrophy (distrofiia) and 
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psychiatric disorders. However, early post-war publications on the Leningrad Siege – 
especially personal memories of participants—were rare.97 
As state control was liberalized, Soviet historians began to explore previously 
shunned topics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, they published works that described 
the city’s ordeal. And while they avoided focusing specifically on the more sensitive 
topics (scope of starvation, mortality rate, the rise of criminal activity, defeatism, a 
breakdown of norms, and so on) their research attempted to shed light on the extent of 
political control, living conditions, and overall public mood. Published in 1958, Dmitri 
Pavlov’s book Leningrad 1941: The Blockade became a standard reference for domestic 
and foreign scholars.98 When in the late 1980s the “party rhetoric” became a thing of the 
past, Soviet scholars began to explore many of the controversial issues in national history 
and experiment with different methodological approaches.  
After the change of the political regime in the 1990s and the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian historical school began to shift away from the Soviet methodology 
towards the “totalitarian view”99 – largely influenced by the Western academia – of the 
Soviet period. According to Richard Bidlack, over 400 monographs and collective 
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volumes on the siege were published in Russia by the mid-1990s.100 Today, Russian 
historiography is represented by two main schools: revisionists and the school of 
resistance. The topic of the blockade remains central to many Russian historians 
(Gennadii Sobolev, Valentin Koval’chuk, Nikita Lomagin, Mikhail Shkarovskii, Sergei 
Iarov, and Vladimir Piankevich to name a few). The last two are prominent scholars who 
continuously use diary material in their historic research. Recently-deceased Iarov 
centered his studies on the moral aspects and ethics of the blockade. His publications 
describe daily life, the routine of those trapped in the city very carefully and with a lot of 
little details. Vladimir Piankevich’s monographs focus on the rumors that circulated in 
the city and its black market. Leading researcher of the St. Petersburg Central State 
Archives Mikhail Shkarovskii’s area of expertise belongs to one of the most sensitive and 
unexplored topics in all of the Soviet history – relations between the state power and the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  
Issues of political control, public mood, and the possibility of civil revolt is one of 
the central themes in Nikita Lomagin’s work.101 While Lomagin acknowledges that in the 
entire system of agencies responsible for political control the NKVD was the most 
effective, his findings permitted him to assert that for the first year in besieged Leningrad 
the NKVD’s work was less than satisfactory. At the onset of the war, the agency 
transferred half of its specialists to other departments in other cities. As a result of 
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personnel shortage and almost total isolation of the city, it faced serious problems.102 
Noting that problems of political control are not thoroughly researched by Russian 
historiography, Lomagin emphasizes that the analysis of this topic by western historians 
is also inadequate: 
The difference in methodological assessments of Stalinism and state institutions’ 
role that exercised control as well as the lack of accessibility to a wide variety of 
sources result in rather one-sided studies based upon the fragmented or 
mainstream material. Prevalent to this day, control of the state security over the 
society is viewed as ‘total’ and is typical of those who adhere to the totalitarian 
model.103 
 
German historiography on the siege of Leningrad is limited. As post-war 
Germany was “ideologically” split into two opposing camps, Western Germany (BRD) 
and Eastern Germany (DDR), it adhered to the principles of two different historical 
perspectives. Despite the availability of the rich and vast primary sources on the Nazi 
occupational policies in the Leningrad region as well as trophy documents of SD 
(Sicherheitsdienst, SS intelligent service) reports on the situation within the city (that 
came useful in the works by Leon Goure and Alexander Werth), there was hardly any 
research on the siege done in the BRD for almost fifty years after the war. With the onset 
of the Cold War, the U.S. initiated a full amnesty for Nazi war criminals in its attempt to 
legitimize West Germany.104 This allowed the reversal of the denazification policy and 
initiation of another one, later called Vergangenheitspolitik,105 which resulted in breaking 
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from the past and “a triumph of silence” that lasted well into the 1990s.106  Archival 
documents declassified and published during the 1960s and 1970s in the DDR 
indisputably established the criminal actions and intent of the Nazi government and army 
in Leningrad.107 In the BRD, historical science preferred to take the route of denial and 
distortion. Popular in the 1950s “soldier stories” told of the war in the East and depicted 
the Wehrmacht as a brave and blameless victim that fought a “clean war,” the SS and SD 
as criminals acting and plotting behind the army’s back, and the Soviets as despicable 
barbarians.108 One of the examples of Axis soldiers’ glorification who “fought with a firm 
belief that their cause was just” came forth in the memoirs of a former officer of Army 
Group North Werner Haupt.109 Within such warped rhetoric, the Siege of Leningrad was 
regarded as “common means of warfare” and hardly ever mentioned.110   
Nevertheless, Germany went through an enormous and very painful change in its 
historical assessment on how to write history about any aspect of the war, including the 
Holocaust. In 2002, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research published the volume 
Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-1944 and 
introduced documents that were six-dimensional in focus: the genocide committed 
against Soviet Jews, the mass deaths of the Soviet prisoners of war, starvation as a 
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strategy of war, war against partisans, punishments, and execution of hostages. It 
contained orders and communication reports between the German command staff of 
various levels depicting how the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of Leningraders 
was planned and implemented. Additionally, the content of the documents shows that the 
military was not only an active participant in the mass murder of Soviet civilians but also 
was fully aware of the extent of sufferings to which the Soviets were subjected. Thus, the 
authors debunked the myth of the Wehrmacht’s “clean hands” that former Nazi officers 
attempted to create exculpating German soldiers from the atrocities committed in the 
East. 
Three major works of American scholarship on the siege of Leningrad were 
written by people who had visited the city or had lived there at one point: Leon Goure, 
Alexander Werth, and Harrison Salisbury.111 Despite criticism expressed by some 
scholars for using the limited source base, to this day these books remain the most 
comprehensive and fundamental western works published on the topic.112   
With the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Anglo-
American historiography marked the beginning of a new trend in its interpretation of 
Stalinism (and the events of that period): the concept of resistance.113 This theory regards 
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Soviet citizens not as those who supported or those who opposed the regime, but as a 
force that continuously resisted the regime actively or passively. The opening of the 
Russian archives in the 1990s led to the research boom in the international academic 
community and branching out of macro-history: history of everyday life with a focus on 
individual strategies of daily resistance to the regime. The works of Michael Jones and 
Anna Reid follow this pattern.114  
Naturally, certain issues within the Siege of Leningrad take precedence, spark 
more interest, and are viewed and interpreted differently.115 However, comprehensive 
American scholarship on the blockade is still defined by the works of Goure, Salisbury, 
and Werth published decades ago, with Alexis Peri’s The War Within: Diaries from the 
Siege of Leningrad as a recent major publication that offers a glimpse of the human 
suffering by examining diaries of the besieged Leningraders.  
The practice of publishing war memoirs, biographies, and diaries was common in 
the USSR (although, some were “beautified” by censorship), and is still maintained in the 
Russian Federation. In the United States, there were limited publications and analyses of 
the siege diaries. Among the most well-known are Cynthia Simmons and Nina Perlina’s 
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Writing the Siege of Leningrad: Women's Diaries, Memoirs, and Documentary Prose 
published in 2002 and Anna Reid’s Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-
1944 of 2011. Currently, there are only two American scholars whose scholarly interests 
revolve around siege diaries – Jeffrey Hass and Alexis Peri. Hass’s main interest is in 
“the human capacity for action.”116 Some of his articles are devoted to the human 
behavior and survival tactics in the blockade. His book Fields of War and the Self: 
Meanings and Practices of Survival, Suffering, and the Self. The Story of the Blockade of 
Leningrad (1941-1944) is waiting to be published by Oxford University Press.  
Admittedly, the raw data and numerous researches available to German and 
Russian historians are abundant and easily accessible. Moreover, the Russian Academy 
of Sciences and other St. Petersburg institutions organize historical conferences devoted 
to the topic of the siege, which allows Russian specialists present their findings and 
engage in lengthy discussions.117 While these conferences are frequented by scholars 
from various countries, the subject of the siege itself remains less popular among western 
historians than other events of the World War II and its main focus revolves around the 
Soviet political regime. Linguistic barrier and geographic location (in addition to the 
bureaucratic procedures involved in getting to the archives) are the main limitations the 
scholars face. In the case of handwritten diaries, letters, and other documents, there is 
also an issue with deciphering them (written in cursive, some are difficult to decipher 
                                                 
116 http://socanth.richmond.edu/faculty/jhass/ “My interests ultimate relate to the human capacity 
for action, which means I study power, culture, and practice. Why do we do what we do, and do we act 
from compulsion or autonomous desire? How do social practices persist and change? This leads me to 
question just what "institutions" and "structures" are--social phenomena that too often are taken for 
granted.” 
 
117 I.e., Historical Research Conference for Students “War. Leningrad. Siege” (2017); International 
Scientific Conference “Imperative issues in the history of the siege” (2016); Conference “Leningrad and 
Leningraders during the Great Patriotic War” (2015); Scientific State Conference “The Great Patriotic War 




even for a native speaker), making the analysis extremely time-consuming. Despite vast 
research and material gathered by the Russian and Western scholars, there are no studies 
that aim at defining and singling out the main motivating factors that aided residents of 
the besieged city in reducing the enormous physiological and psychological stress caused 
by the bombings and instinctual need for food. Heavily relying on the primary sources, 
this thesis aims at making a valuable Russian-language scholarship accessible to the 
English-speaking world and attempts to bridge the two schools.  
Diarists & Personal Records as a Historical Source 
Over the past fifteen years, there has been keen interest among Russian and 
American historians and sociologists in the publication of siege diaries. While official 
records provide a frame of reference, there are real people behind every figure and event. 
Although hardly objective, personal histories nevertheless serve as a rich source of new 
perspectives that allow tracing commonalities and a better understanding of the daily 
struggles, public moods, and the psychology of survival. When Daniil Granin and Ales’ 
Adamovich published their Blokadnaia kniga in 1979, they used oral history 
(incorporating diary sources and interviews of the siege participants), thereby providing a 
new frame of reference. Their work presented the Leningrad epic through the 
experiences, actions, and struggles of those who lived it. This new material allowed a 
more balanced portrayal of both the city’s bravery and tragedy and went against the 
commonly publicized stereotype (“anguish – heroism – victory as a reward for valor”) 
that had left no place for complexities like honor, mercy, or overstepping moral norms. 
The authors summarized their research: 
People worked and helped the front; they saved others and supplied those in need. 




hospitals, infirmaries, and made sure factories and plants functioned. Essentially, 
each and every story was filled with recollections of hunger, cold, artillery fires, 
deaths, and as a result – emotional anguish that stemmed from sufferings. And 
yet, they also spoke of people’s undertakings and accomplishments, what they did 
and how they fought despite it all. These three sides of the besieged life were 
distinctly present in every single story.118 
 
Of the diaries consulted for this study, the breakdown of the authors’ professions 
is as follows: engineers (7) and teachers (8), blue-collar (12) and white-collar workers 
(9), scientists (6) and artists (17), students (36) and soldiers (6), writers (5) and journalists 
(2), NKVD and administration officials (11), professors (10) and doctors (10), 
housewives (2) and peasants (4). Varying in length, presentation, perception, and 
emotional expression, diaries were written by atheists and believers, ideologically “new” 
citizens and tsarist intelligentsiia, Communists and non-party members, men and women, 
elderly people and children. Belonging to all levels of society, these diarists (in a country 
of nearly total literacy) can be presumed to be fairly representative of the population that 
by the mid-30s comprised of two social classes (workers and peasants) and a stratum 
(intelligentsiia).  
There are a number of major benefits of diary sources. The first one is the 
minimization of ex-post facto event recall because they were written at the time of 
occurrence. Given that aside from consulting the photographic material available, 
witnessing the phenomenon under study is not possible, diaries allow an individual 
glimpse on things that official records would otherwise neglect as insignificant. Being 
subjective, individual writers evaluated the events through the prism of their own 
perception and reality, limited by personal experiences, education, values, intellectual 
abilities, social settings, habits, and skills, and therefore may contain a degree of 
                                                 





distortion, duplicity, or slyness. Some diaries present a dry statement of events, while 
others detail personal interpretations and emotional reactions. Although in the past 
emotions have been viewed as antipodean to rational action, recent studies argue that 
emotion and reason are interconnected with social, political, historical, religious, and 
cultural spheres.119 And while feelings, ideas, or emotions do not always equal real 
action, at times remaining hypothetical on paper, deep engagement and analysis of the 
personal writings can lead to revelations about the complex processes, norms, and values 
of a particular community within a specific time period.120  
A second benefit of private records pertains to daily local routines. They contain a 
wealth of information about households and communal practices, events, and conditions:  
The urban economy is deteriorating unbelievably fast: the electricity went out on 
December 2; water system failed in January; the radio fell silent on January 17; 
yesterday we boarded up the latrines because the sewage pipes froze. We get 
water from the tap in the yard of the building #2 and pour the dirty water out in 
the backyard. The newspapers have not been delivered for a while. We are living 
without knowing what is happening at the front.121  
 
Most scholars know that the city utilities and communications did not fail in all fifteen 
districts at the same time. Records like that of Polzikova-Rubets quoted above help in 
reconstructing the timeline and the full picture of such collapse. 
Keeping diaries presented a challenge to their writers. As engineer Khodorkov 
emphasized, behind “every short little entry” hides “much profound grief and deep 
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meaning.”122 Indeed, with all the activities throughout the day, people had to allocate 
time and find motivation to write, exhibiting strong organization and discipline skills. 
They had to sacrifice precious resources as it was too dark to write in the evenings, 
particularly in the fall and winter months (without electricity, kerosene and firewood 
were hard to come by and were needed for boiling water and heating). Additionally, a 
person had to have enough strength to write (some reported such weakness that they 
could not hold a pencil) in the freezing cold: water and ink froze inside the apartments 
where the temperature was often below zero, in which case records were often continued 
in pencil.123 
A number of diaries contain newspaper clippings, quotations from novels, poems, 
sketches, and drawings. Most are structured by date, with some having a number of 
entries during the day and recordings of the time. The majority of the diaries were kept 
by women, who constituted two-thirds of the city population and whose narratives tend to 
be more detailed and express deeper emotions. Fifty-nine of the 158 records examined 
were produced by male subjects, and ninety-nine by female subjects. Thirty-six were 
written by children (9-year-old and up) and teens. A number of records did not contain 
the full name of an individual, only initials. 
While all of the diaries are written in the Russian language, judging from the last 
names as well as data on the prominent diarists, their ethnic roots stem from Russian, 
Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Swiss, and German origin (although none explicitly states 
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his/her ethnicity). While nationality was an identity marker along with class, political 
history, and religious belief, it was a “neutral attribute.”124 Beginning in the 1930s, the 
idea of building socialism in “one single country” promoted Soviet patriotism, which 
emphasized that Russians (constituting the majority of the population and inhabiting the 
majority of the territory) were the backbone of the country.125 Although national 
languages were retained by the republics, the Russian language was reserved as the 
lingua franca and was taught at schools along with the indigenous ones.126 Thus, the 
Russian language and Russia “as the central area of human history” became primus inter 
pares.127 During the war, the notions of Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism fused, 
giving rise to national patriotism which united all people in their ‘fight against 
fascism.’128 Amending the official ideology, the state authorities generated and enabled 
such fusion in response to changing political and military conditions. It also provided an 
opportunity to address geocultural issues all Russian rulers grappled with: essential 
                                                 
124 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Tear off Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 92. Geoffrey Hosking, “The Second World War and 
Russian National Consciousness,” Past & Present, no. 175 (May, 2002), pp. 164-165. 
 
125 In 1937, Pravda stated: “Russian culture enriches the culture of other people. The Russian 
language has become the language of world revolution. […] Russian culture has become international.” As 
referenced in Astrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign 
Policy (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 177. 
 
126 Lenore A. Grenoble, Language Policy in the Soviet Union (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003), p. 204. See also Marc Leprêtre, “Language Policies in the Soviet Successor States: a 
Brief Assessment on Language, Linguistic Right, and National Identity” (Papeles del Este, No. 3, 2002). 
 
127 Erik Van Ree, “Stalin as Marxist: the Western roots of Stalin’s russification of Marxism,” in 
Sarah Davies, James Harris, eds. Stalin: A New History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 
160. 
 
128 Tuminez, Russian Nationalism since 1856, p. 179. Although, Tuminez opines that the 
nationalist strand that was more prominent under Stalin was statism. Alfred Rieber adds “Panslavism” to 
patriotism and nationalism. “Stalin as foreign policy-maker: avoiding war, 1927–1953,” in Sarah Davies, 





stability of the multicultural state, security of the “permeable frontiers,” and termination 
of ethnic marginality.129    
The motives for and purposes of keeping diaries or personal records varied. While 
the majority of the writers did not divulge their intentions, the memorial and 
informational-mnemonic functions are apparent. Some people kept accounts for 
themselves and/or their children: “[T]he purpose of chronicling is to keep records about 
myself and current events.”130 Some felt the urgency of the moment and the need to 
rationalize or excuse certain actions. Some did it for the therapeutic effect diary writing 
produced (as a way to distract oneself, ease emotional burden and anguish, compensate 
for the lack of communication with loved ones): “Talking to the self like this has a 
consoling, calming effect on the nerves.”131 Some attempted to compile information that 
could become a subject of analysis in the future (in other words, they wrote for history):  
My records are first-hand documents, perhaps, of less significance at times… 
Should I write about myself? If I am writing about others, about a dozen of 
subordinates whom I oversee, or about the war that I witness, then why should I 
exclude myself? In the circumstances, my status changes from being a subject to 
being an object. My future reader will have no extra sources of information about 
many details of our lives and our daily activities. I cannot observe other people’s 
private domestic settings in all of their intimate details. Here, in these notes, I 
shall mention my own experiences which are no longer my own and might be of 
interest. I am not writing recollections about the wartime. I am recording day by 
day, sometimes hour by hour, how we (I and people around me) endure this war. 
And even if these notes will not always be heroic, courageous, or utterly 
optimistic (as we have been accustomed to lately), they are authenticating life as it 
is within this small radius [area]. That is all.132  
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Some kept diaries prior to the war and continued doing so during the siege. Many diarists 
practiced self-imposed censorship (i.e. scratching out words, phrases, or sentences; using 
foreign terms). Thus, two of the diarists used languages other than Russian in their 
comments (which indicates that they were more comfortable saying some things in a 
foreign language).133 
Keeping records of daily life was also solicited by the city authorities for their 
future use as historical sources.134 However, out of 158 records examined in the writing 
of this thesis, there are only two that remark on this solicitation directly.135 Questioning 
whether she was writing what she “should,” school inspector Lidiia Zabolotskaia stated: 
“I am keeping the diary because I was asked to do so by the Raikom (District 
Committee), so that in the future I could help reconstruct the history of Leningrad’s 
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siege diaries and analyzed them. Mashnina E.V. “Vedenie dnevnikovykh zapisei kak element povsednevnoi 
kul’tury blokadnogo Leningrada,” in Dukh i kul’tura Leningrada v tylu Sovetskogo Soiuza v gody Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. (Sankt-Peterburg, 2010), pp. 165-170. Alexis Peri asserts that many 
“supporters and members of the party kept diaries at the bidding of local party officials.” Her findings had 
three subjects that kept solicited records (only one in addition to the two sources used in both Peri’s and 
this research). Peri, The War Within, p. 10. After their analysis, she concluded that they were “just as 
critical of local leaders and policies as journals from other collections.” Id., p. 14. This conclusion verifies 
the fact that “political correctness” was one of the least concerns on Leningraders’ list of priorities.The 
previously-held notions among Western scholars of the Soviet state’s pervasive control of personal 
writings, their uncommonness, and repression of individualism in the Soviet society of the 1930—40s were 
toppled by Jochen Hellbeck. In fact, diary keeping became particularly widespread during the Stalin era. 
Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 





defense.”136 This diarist tried to be more rational about what she penned but was often 
saddened by the fact that her records contained “more feelings than facts.” Although, she 
finally concluded that the author’s sincerity was imperative and that “the feelings of an 
ordinary Leningrader (and my feelings and thoughts are shared by the majority) are also 
interesting for history.”137 Indeed, retrospective journaling was hardly possible. To fill 
this void, the Kirov district party members advocated the creation of “collective” diaries 
of districts that would contain photographs and newspaper articles, being the places 
where “every Raikom member can enter anything he deems necessary and interesting.”138 
In the case of “collective” journals, it is possible to speak of self-imposed control and 
recording of a “cleaner” story (although such works were not analyzed for this thesis).  
When reading diaries penned in what may seem like the pompous language 
during the era of change, it is important to factor in that communist “ideology was a 
living tissue of meaning that was seriously reflected upon,” making a diary “a medium of 
self-reflection and transformation.”139 By assuming that Soviet subjects had absorbed 
propaganda and politics from around them and did not think much of this, we deny them 
the capacity for “self-understanding as well as self-interpretation of people who act and 
believe they know what they are doing.”140 If we imagine that “we know better and can 
tell them what their real ‘motives’ are or which real ‘trends’ they objectively represent – 
                                                 
136 Lidiia Karlovna Zabolotskaia, entry for January 22, 1943. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 
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137 Id. This wavering and hesitation indicate that the diarist did not receive any official instructions 
on how to chart her records besides the plea to record personal experiences and common daily life.  
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no matter what they themselves think – we have robbed them of the very faculty of 
speech, insofar as speech makes sense.” The Bolsheviks’ vision – which sought the 
development of political consciousness, active participation in building socialism, and 
identification with the revolution – called people who subscribed to these ideals for 
taking personal responsibility for every action, thus, transforming themselves into 
exemplary human beings and becoming “architects of their own future” through 
“understanding and personal conviction.”141 Unified by this idea, people saw themselves 
as subjects of history who were in charge of their own lives. Therefore, it is crucial to 
remember that personal narratives filled with Soviet values and propagandistic slogans or 
clichés did not necessarily intend to mislead: their authors perceived themselves as active 
participants and creators of history and often may not have distinguished between a 
public and a private sphere.142 After all, any social structure with its cultural and political 
dominion serves as a foundation for individual interpretations, judgment, and self-
identity. The diaries of youth and blue-collar workers, in particular, share common 
“forms of self-expression and ideals of self-realization, which point beyond the individual 
cases and suggest a wider cultural significance.”143 
A significant part of the siege diaries (published and unpublished) selected for this 
research are archived in the State Archives of Saint-Petersburg, the Museum of the 
Defense and Siege of Leningrad, and the Manuscript Department of the National Library 
of Russia, and can be easily accessed by non-Russian researchers. All of their material 
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142 This entanglement of individual and social histories is addressed in Lisa A. Kirschenbaum’s 
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was either donated by the diarists themselves,144 or, in a case of the authors’ death, by 
their family members and friends. Some were well-hidden and were found decades after 
the war when later residents renovated the apartments. Two were confiscated serving as 
evidence and until recently were a part of the Archive of the Administration of the 
Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region. A number of diaries 
and records still remain parts of family memorabilia. Diaries left by well-known people, 
that are extensive in presentation, emotional, articulate, and at times controversial, have 
mostly been published.145 Being aware that some of the personal writings published 
during the Soviet period were edited prior to their publications, the use of such sources 
was avoided here.  
Some memoirs, recollections, and autobiographies were also used in this research. 
Although they can verify certain events and add specifics to the knowledge of this 
historical period, depending on the time elapsed since the occurrence, accuracy can be 
compromised. Details might have been forgotten, distorted, or reinterpreted in 
accordance with newly held opinions. Granted, reaction to post-traumatic stress – which 
the siege undoubtedly inflicted – varies greatly from person to person: some may block 
traumatic memories, for some those details only sharpen with time.146 Witnesses’ 
                                                 
144 In 1943, the commission established for gathering materials and preparing a history of 
Leningrad’s defense urged those who kept journals to donate them. 
 
145 I am referring to such authors as Kniazev, Ostroumova-Lebedeva, Vyshinskii, Simonovich, 
Berggol’ts, Kapitsa, Bianki, Kostrovitskaia, Inber, Ginzburg, Shaporina, Ostrovskaia, and others. 
 
146 Esther Farbstein wrote a comparative study where she analyzed a diary and memoir written by 
Holocaust survivor Rabbi Yehoshua Moshe Aharonson. She noted that the accounts of daily life, 
sufferings, chronology, and mortality are similar and, at times, identical. Memoir tends to be lengthier and 
more emotionally charged. It also adds a theme of resistance, whereas the diary had no mention of such 
endeavors. “We should give the memoir literature the place it deserves – a loftier place than what was 
given it thus far – and rid ourselves of excessive suspicion, especially when additional tools may confirm a 




accounts, like any historical narrative, “shed light on certain parts ... [and] discuss certain 
aspects... None of these reports is complete or perfect, but all contribute to the 
advancement of knowledge.”147 All of these “human” documents with “their intimate 
details” (as noted by Kniazev) allow us to see the past and its people from the perspective 
of their own values as they were at the time rather than those of today. While personal 
sources allow tracing attitudes of the majority, assumptions and generalizations about the 
public’s moods based on the diary material alone should be avoided and have to be 
corroborated by other available data. 
Stories of the siege have many similarities, but they all differ in their description 
of a common tragedy. Unlike the official Soviet historical perspective, the diaries tell a 
story of human suffering, not heroism. It is not that their accounts lack heroic examples; 
rather, the system of values, norms, and morals to which civilized societies adhere simply 
became meaningless to those nearly 3 million people who were subjected to a sadistic 
social experiment in the attempt to destroy them “by an almost scientific method”148 in 
the city that was turned into an enormous starvation ghetto.149 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rabbi at the ‘Konin House of Bondage’” Source: Yad Vashem Studies Vol. XXVI, Jerusalem 1998, pp. 87-
128. Online: http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203134.pdf ) 
 
147 Id., p. 37. 
 
148 From the diary entry made by Joseph Goebbels on September 10, 1941. (Atrocities, Massacres, 
and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia. (Vol. 2), p. 409.). Jones, Leningrad, p. 40. 
 
149 The difference between Leningrad and other ghettos on the Nazi-occupied territories is the 
physical presence of the Nazi auxiliary police units and/or the Einsatzgruppen inside the city of Leningrad 
enabling them to perform mass executions. The extermination here was achieved by other means, mainly 
starvation. This method was also used in the Nazi treatment of the Jewish and Slavic civilians and prisoners 
of war in concentration camps. These crimes were committed under the administration of the Wehrmacht. 
“Recent historic studies have made it clear that Hitler had decided to starve all of Leningrad’s 3.5 million 
inhabitants to death (instead of having the Wehrmacht accept a capitulation of the city)...The siege of 
Leningrad is a stunning example of the unlimitedness of Nazi Germany’s drive to annihilate ‘the inferior 
races in the East’ in general.” Andreas Mink, Challenging “Wiedergutmachung”: The Slave Labour 
Negotiations of 1998-2001 (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2012), pp. 35-36. In 2008 







                                                                                                                                                 
time compensation payment), Germany has admitted for the first time a deliberate persecution of Jews who 
lived through the 900-day blockade, which allows to speak of the blockade operations in terms of genocide. 
Claims Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany: 2008/2009 Annual Report, p. 20. Online: 
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Patriotism, Duty, and Collaboration 
Soul belongs to God, heart – to a woman, duty – to Otechestvo,150 honor – to no 
one.151 
 
…The true patriotism, the only rational patriotism, is loyalty to the Nation ALL 
the time, loyalty to the Government when it deserves it.152 
 
Serving as a form of collective self-identification, the notion of patriotism is 
complex and varies from country to country and person to person. It can be deeply rooted 
or transform over time, taking “various forms in different contexts.”153 As an integral part 
of ethical and cultural education, patriotism is closely associated with the process of 
shaping opinions, beliefs, and world outlook, reinforcing such individual traits as duty, 
responsibility, and rejection of injustice.154 While genuine moral worth is typically 
attributed to actions from duty,155 the ideal Soviet person was to amalgamate all 
motivations of the act: combining socially necessitated action and personal desire to do 
what is right (with an understanding that his/her actions would benefit both society and 
build character). The Great Patriotic War and the siege of Leningrad in particular served 
                                                 
150 Otechestvo – homeland, Fatherland. 
 
151 From the 1804 Russian officers’ code of honour.  
 
152 Mark Twain, “The Czar's Soliloquy” (The North American Review, March 1905), p. 324. 
[emphasis in the original] 
 
153 Roger R. Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World 
War II (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2011), p. 15. 
 
154 Vadim Kozhinov, Grekh i sviatost’ russkoi istorii (Moskva: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006). Although 
patriotism can mobilize a person to work and act in the name of a nation or homeland, a degree of personal 
meaning has to be attached to the notion because, when choosing to fight or sacrifice oneself for the 
country, political motivation may not always be enough. 
 
155 The difference between acting from duty and in accordance with duty has been defined by 
Immanuel Kant in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Conducting oneself in accordance with 
duty instigates action that is motivated by personal desire, pleasure, or interest whereas, acting from duty 





as a litmus test for the Soviet system, with its belief in the priority of public interests 
above individual ones and a strong state authority capable of rousing patriotism and 
mobilizing all members of society to rise above personal interests. 
In the years preceding the war, Soviet people had a very broad take on patriotism 
that ranged from the imperial (rossiyskii) and the ethnic (russkii) versions to the Soviet 
(neo-rossiiskii) one – statist and supranational – that amalgamated both the emperial and 
ethnic forms, where the USSR as a motherland was the home for all ethnic groups and 
nationalities.156 In this “embryonic compound nation,” Russianness remained “markedly 
internationalist in flavor.”157 War, as a crisis, reinforced or polarized convictions and 
loyalties. The siege diaries reveal that, in addition to the state-sponsored and often 
internalized pride in the country, the meaning of ‘patriotic’ also had a distinctly “private” 
aspect: dedication to work, love for the city, community, and family.158 Moreover, the 
diaries speak of the struggles and sacrifices that people made despite personal likes or 
dislikes of the authorities. In fact, political slogans of patriotism found in personal 
records during the first few months of the siege almost disappear in the “mortal time,” 
and spirited entries with a more pronounced appreciation for people, culture, or home 
appear. The radical nature of the blockade experience allows a closer look at the political 
culture at work, the dynamic between the authorities and the people, as well as the 
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replacing the class element with a new primacy placed on Russia’s past.” Ronald Grigor Suny, “The 
contradictions of identity: Being Soviet and National in the USSR and after,” in Mark Bassin and Catriona 
Kelly, eds., Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 27. 
 
157 Geoffrey Hosking, “The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness” (Past and 
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158 On the sources of local patriotism and pride see Lisa Kirschenbaum’s “Our City, Our Hearths, 
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internalization of Soviet core perspectives, attitudes, and values. Extreme conditions 
coupled with the authorities’ initial shortsightedness could not ensure a smooth 
fulfillment of all tasks. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand that all of the objectives 
required the active participation of the work force, and it was up to the state to 
coordinate, consolidate, and direct them. While it is true that the authorities made brutal 
decisions – some were punitive and some compensatory159 – that stirred people up and 
pushed them into action,160 but so is true that the government relied on people’s 
understanding of their patriotic duty en masse. What ultimately mattered was action, and 
historical documents supported by actual events show that in overcoming adversities 
Leningraders collaborated successfully.161 
The magnitude of the threat to society became apparent only in late August 1941, 
and while the majority of Leningraders remained hopeful, the scarcity of the news 
adversely impacted some residents, and the initial boost of state-instilled patriotism gave 
way to confusion, anxiety, and pessimism. Demoralized, teacher V.M. Ivleva wrote on 
October 16, 1941: 
Anguish weighs heavy on the heart when I listen to the morning radio. We are 
relinquishing one city after another. Now Moscow is in danger. We won’t be able 
to endure. People are losing their lives, and everything is in vain: it seems that we 
are powerless to halt the aggression. Where is our might we so boasted about? 
Where are our guns and our ammunition? We have nothing. We are asking for 
                                                 
159 In addition to legal recourse, both punitive and compensatory measures were implemented 
through ration cards. The failure to comply with administrative orders could result in the withdrawal of a 
ration card. The ration card of category I was given as a compensation for additional effort and initiative 
(see Appendix III for ration Categories breakdown). Some deeds (blood donation, collecting dead bodies, 
burials, etc.) were encouraged and became a source of additional food and monetary awards. 
 
160 The logic of prioritizing collective objective over personal needs in the extremes of the war 
time is hardly the Soviet system’s invention. 
 
161 Gennadii Sobolev, Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade. Kniga pervaia: iun’ 1941 – 





help from England and America. But these are not good allies – their help is more 
words than action. A bitter fate awaits us, indeed. Leningrad will not withstand, 
and we, like ants, shall all perish underfoot of a victor.162   
 
Ivleva’s words here are but one of the examples of hopelessness and bewilderment felt 
after almost four months of war. 
Considering the tough situations on the Soviet-German front, near the capital, and 
within Leningrad, the need for a traditional authority able to bring people together that 
symbolized the people’s will and ideas about firm actions during times of crises was 
more crucial than ever. Joseph Stalin’s speech on November 7, 1941 satisfied that need. 
His address gave an extraordinary boost to the people’s determination and spirit.163 
Historian Georgii Kniazev wrote in his diary that day: “It has been a while since Stalin 
spoke publicly and suddenly there were two of his speeches. There is some kind of 
change in the military situation. Germans are using all their might and all their reserves 
but we are no longer retreating. There is nowhere to retreat! The choice is either to die or 
to defend Moscow and Leningrad. There are no other options!”164    
 Additionally, Stalin’s common address to “comrades and citizens” was enhanced 
by more personal “brothers and sisters,” thereby inducing the feeling of belonging to a 
large family.165 It was a “meticulously calculated and successful propaganda move. Even 
                                                 
162 David, ed., Budni podviga, p. 31. 
 
163 “Stalin’s speech made a great impression on everyone and inspired new victories.” A.P. 
Zagorskaia, entry for November 7, 1941. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 33. L. 7. “The overall glum 
mood somewhat dissipated under the influence of Stalin’s upbeat speech and announcements made by 
Beaverbrook and Harriman.” Konoplёva, entry for November 12, 1941. RNB OR, F. 368, ed. hr. 1, l. 163. 
 
164 Georgii Alekseevich Kniazev, entry for November 7, 1941, in Dni velikikh ispytanii. Dnevniki 
1941-1945 (Sankt-Peterburg: Nauka, 2009), p. 279. 
 
165 The view of the Soviet society as a “fraternal family of nations” (with the state authorities in 
the role of a “father” to the people, obedient children of the state) stemmed from the “traditional Russian 
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those Leningraders who harbored anti-Stalin attitudes felt it.”166 Intensified further by 
propaganda and state media, the pronounced emotional emphasis on the “homeland-in-
mortal-danger” idea (as opposed to the “larger-than-life-socialist-achievements” party 
ideology) narrowed the gap between the fears experienced by people and government, 
overlapping them. Whatever the reasons may have been for such a shift, it resulted in a 
heightened sense of community, striking the right chord with people. Now, Soviet 
patriotism’s essential elements were tied to family, home, and native place (rodina).167 
Leningrad’s reputation as a city of intellectuals, culture, and the Russian 
aristocracy contributed to the people’s determination to persevere. Remembering all the 
wartime hardships, Daniil Granin, who fought at Leningrad’s front line in Shushary, said 
that if the Red Army soldiers had defended some other newly built city or another urban 
area, they would not have withstood: “The awareness of fighting for, perhaps, the most 
European city of Russia, erected by Peter the Great, for the city that embodied the 
Russian culture had a colossal effect on us.”168  
For those who could not imagine their lives outside of their beloved Leningrad – 
“flesh of [their] flesh, blood of [their] blood”169 – this emotional attachment made the 
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choice of whether to leave or stay more agonizing. Some panicked to the point of 
considering leaving and some were full of determination to stay. For many, the decision 
depended on the course of action taken by relatives, friends, and loved ones. N. 
Bulgakova recalled: “Confidence in our victory was unwavering. Relatives refused to 
evacuate. Father said that he was here during the revolution and would not leave 
Leningrad now.”170 In either case, nobody believed that the war would last long. 
Even with the initiation of a new wave of mass evacuation in the spring, there 
were those who wanted to remain in the city despite the hardships. Among them was 
artist Anna Petrovna Ostroumova-Lebedeva, who had numerous opportunities and offers 
to evacuate but always refused. In the summer of 1942 she wrote: “I think that leaving 
[Leningrad] would be the most unfortunate thing for me. My very skin has been fused 
with its walls!”171 Were those who wanted to stay better off than the majority, having 
additional sources of food or extra rationing? Hardly so. The residents who made such a 
resolute decision in the winter-spring period of 1942 were for the most part single by then 
and had entirely different motivations – love and attachment to their native land. 
Reflecting on the events of winter 1941‒42, Raia Podraiskaia also rejected the possibility 
of evacuation: “Having experienced all this, I do not want to leave Leningrad. On the 
contrary, despite frequent air raids, shelling, and hunger, there is a huge longing to be 
right here, to wait for victory and the enemy’s decisive destruction precisely here.”172 
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As the situation in Leningrad grew grimmer, people exchanged news, opinions, 
and gossips, counter-balancing extreme psychological stress. Public moods were not 
linear or consistent. Some residents did not notice “defeatist” talks, such as Arkadiy 
Lepkovich who wrote on December 12, 1941: “People bear it. I have not heard a single 
complaint or displeasure with the order or authorities.”173 Those who lost hope blamed 
the city administration: “Someone made a sarcastic remark that soon all of Leningrad will 
die out save the superiors.”174 And a small percentage expressed clearly pro-German 
sentiments. On the first day of the war, Olimpiada Poliakova, who later became a 
German collaborator and wrote under the name of Lidiia Osipova, declared: “I am not a 
foe to my nation, to my homeland. I am not a monster. But the truth is that we all, the 
entirety Russia, avidly wish our enemy to emerge victorious, whoever the enemy might 
be. This damned regime robbed us of everything, including the feeling of patriotism.”175 
As noted by Harrison Salisbury, not everybody was like Ol’ga Berggol’ts, ready to 
forgive the cruelty suffered at the hands of the state; “not all were able to feel in this 
fateful hour that patriotism and the Motherland came first.”176 Fortunately, people like 
Poliakova were in the minority. 
 Although there were no surveys or opinion polls conducted at the time, military 
censorship records indicate that negative, anti-Soviet attitudes changed from 3-4% in the 
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first third of December 1941177 to 6% at the beginning of January 1942178, to 20% by the 
end of January 1942.179 Evidently, the emotional resilience of people tried by hunger 
during the most difficult months decreased, escalating oppositional views. As fine art 
expert Mariia Konoplёva asserted, this “mob psychology” could be regulated by giving 
the disillusioned “half a kilo of bread a day,” and they would “easily put up with all other 
privations.”180 Indeed, as the rations increased at the ends of February and March 1942, 
negative moods declined. How representative were these figures of the entire population, 
and not of just those who sent post cards and letters? It is hard to tell, and while 
unfavorable attitudes towards those in power are present in the diaries, there were no 
protests in Leningrad, and on February 18, 1942, German intelligence reports dismissed 
any possibility of “the organized revolt which might enable the change. The city is under 
the complete control of the Soviets.”181  
Although political control was an important element in the maintenance of order, 
the residents’ understanding of the stakes was just as imperative. The accumulation of 
official news and hearsay painted a distinct picture of the “exterminatory” nature of the 
war, making the majority realize that survival was feasible only by resisting. This 
awareness reversed Leningraders’ initial regard of Germans as a “cultural nation”182 and 
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the war rhetoric, which was once internationalist and ideological, became national 
(otechestvennaia).183 Now, the meaning of homeland acquired a new value, and 
Leningraders deemed the expression of protest of any kind when the enemy was at the 
gate as sacrilegious.184 Sustaining and promoting this sense of patriotism was a priority 
for the city authorities.  
Communicated through various channels and aimed at strengthening the morale 
and spirit of the people, the scope of patriotic propaganda was indeed colossal: all levels 
of society from the cultural elite to peasants actively participated in it.185 Conducting 
informational meetings at work and home associations and speaking with people at the 
canteens, lines, and bomb shelters, Leningrad’s party organizations used various forms 
and methods of political work to mobilize people.186 Wartime posters, historical lectures 
and publications, stories from the front, music, and numerous addresses from party 
members and prominent residents promoted mutual cooperation, boosted morale, and 
urged action. With “home and hearth” validating the war, and vice versa, even free-
thinking intellectuals welcomed collective work and structure.187 Many young 
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Leningraders, members of the Komsomol, attempted to enlist and go to the front or serve 
in opolchenie. Some moved their date of birth backward because those born in “1924-
1925 were not accepted.”188 Brilliantly amalgamating Russian historical patriotism, 
Orthodox commandments, and political awareness, the Soviet government successfully 
utilized diverse means to instill devotion to the homeland and the righteousness of the 
fight. The Red Army officers received extraordinary privileges; “everyone was given 
epaulettes. The Communist revolutionary song, the famous Internationale,” was replaced 
in 1943 with the new Soviet anthem that started with the words “Great Rus’. The imperial 
past was honored again. And the “Church was asked to pray for victory.”189 Paul 
Linebarger asserted that these efforts “were not characterized by blind reliance on past 
experiences. They showed a very real inventiveness, and the political policies behind 
them were both far-sighted and far-reaching.”190 The population viewed their fighting the 
enemy as righteous, regarded the mobilization of all forces as essential, and believed in 
ultimate victory, demonstrating the effectiveness of the party propaganda campaign. 
While relying on the residents’ sense of patriotic duty, the authorities made 
attempts to provide them with at least a bare minimum necessary to sustain life and work. 
The magnitude of their decisions and endeavors – planning and realizing delivery routes, 
evacuation, food distribution, orders to research and manufacture food substitutes, 
medication, and vitamins, opening public and work cafeterias, hospitals, orphanages, 
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boiling water stations, paying wages, organizing spring cleaning of the city streets – 
speaks for itself. The administration’s motivation was an entirely different matter: 
decisions made by the power agencies were not based on empathy. After all, any wartime 
economy pursues very practical goals diverting resources to the war effort. Fostering 
feelings of solidarity and collective citizenship, the authorities demonstrated surprising 
flexibility in adjusting some of the rigid rules of social and economic regulations. Thus, 
by implicitly allowing tolkuchka’s (improvised public barter market) black marketing and 
public gardening that permitted Leningraders use municipal property for growing 
vegetables, the state partially forfeited its exclusive role to provision, delegating some of 
it to the residents. Lack of firm, yet adaptable actions would have advanced the city’s 
take over, its inevitable destruction, the execution of its residents, and a total (most likely, 
fatal) change in the theater of war.191 As David Glantz pointed out, despite the 
authorities’ preoccupation with the “desperate situation at the front, they mobilized all of 
the city’s resources to save it and its population.”192  
On November 20, 1941, the daily ration for residents fell to its lowest: 510 tons of 
flour was used daily – as opposed to 2,100 tons before the siege – to sustain the city’s 
population of 2.5 million, where only one-third of it received the blue-color worker 
ration.193 However, this reduction needed further revision as the “Road of Life” was not 
going to satisfy Leningrad’s needs in its first days of work. Andreenko, Chief of 
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Leningrad trade, met with Aleksei Kuznetsov, the Party’s First Secretary, trying to 
recalculate the rationing of the provisions available. They both knew that “additional 
reduction of the bread norm was not possible: people were already dying... After a long 
discussion, [they] finally decided to reduce the ration, although, not for residents but for 
the military, navy, and soldiers. Things were looking very grim in December...”194 Thus, 
at the end of November, front line soldiers received 300 grams of bread, and 100 grams 
of soldier biscuits daily. Additionally, they received flour soup for breakfast, dinner, and 
thin porridge for lunch. Despite these small portions, soldiers of the 54th Army and sailors 
of the Baltic fleet decided to give part of their ration to the Leningraders. At the end of 
1941, the Military Council ordered delivery of over 300 tons of foodstuffs stored in 
Kronstadt, forts, and islands to the city’s residents.195 
Leningraders’ sense of patriotic duty was not restricted just to the male 
population, it extended to the women of Leningrad as well. The unexpected and notable 
consequence of the majority of men leaving for the front and opolchenie or evacuating 
with the industrial plants as specialists was the extreme shortage of workers and qualified 
personnel in the engineering and technological fields who had disproportionately been 
male. While trade schools and specialty colleges accelerated their preparation of new 
workers, the gap between supply and demand was too great. Women closed this gap.196 
They came to industrial organizations and facilities looking for jobs or asking to master 
new trades, replacing their husbands, fathers, and brothers on the home front. Not only 
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did women perform hard physical labor (clearing the streets of debris after the bombings, 
moving the dead, loading and unloading delivered materials and goods), but they also 
ended up becoming turners, milling machine operators, steelworkers, blacksmiths, 
smelters, rollers, and adjusters.197 Compared to 47% of female industrial workers in 1940, 
the percentage of women who worked at the besieged Leningrad’s plants rose to 75-
80%.198 L. Sisiukina shared her childhood memories of how her “mama became a 
carpenter, a woodworker. We often dropped by her workplace and saw what hard work it 
was. Exhausted and hungry women moved and sawed logs, made doors and window 
frames by hand.”199 
Mobilizing every possible resource for the war effort, the authorities encouraged 
women to shoulder industrial labor tasks or become nurses and caretakers. As the female 
population of Leningrad started taking over the traditionally male roles in the city, press 
accounts, public talks, and visual media stressed its contribution as a way to promote 
greater participation and spur an increased sense of patriotism, duty, and solidarity among 
residents as well as the soldiers fighting at the Leningrad front. But even if we trim down 
the ‘heroic propaganda stories’ of the females fighting for the ‘future of the Soviet 
people,’ this fighting remains one of the largest historic accounts of the women 
participating in combat. And willingly or not, this participation added to the level of 
collaboration and mutual assistance.     
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Collaboration and mutual assistance 
As part of the Soviet upbringing that emphasized the necessity to behave in the 
interests of the group within which the individual lived and worked,200 this collective 
spirit crystallized during the “mortal time,” when it became clear that surviving the siege 
was possible only by helping and holding on to each other: “Things have been re-
evaluated, particularly the nature of team work. If it was not for our collaborative daily 
living and the moral support of friends, [we] would have most likely perished.”201 At a 
time when life was at stake, personal interests and responsibility to others fused, ensuring 
survival. The head of a communal kitchen remembered: “In order to supply the kitchen 
with water, we had to drag up to 300 buckets on sleds from the Neva River daily. Most of 
our women did not leave for home at all because they needed to start collecting water at 
5-6 a.m. so that they could cook soup for Leningraders.”202 These cooks made thin soup 
that fed not only residents but also their relatives and themselves. In a city dying of 
hunger such solidarity was common: “Never before had I heard of or seen such keen 
unity as there was then! All of us – twelve-year-olds and old workers – were like one 
family… There was no bread but it seemed that there was some kind of energy exchange 
between us.”203  
This figurative expression that may seem to be a propagandistic party line was a 
result of the successful efforts the state took to instill the new ideology. The revolution of 
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1917, with its objective to forge a “new ‘improved edition’ of man,”204 encouraged 
personal chronicling. By 1925, a state-wide educational campaign targeting illiteracy and 
emphasizing the relationship between cognition and language achieved a nearly 100 % 
literacy rate in some cases (compared to 28.4% in the Russian Empire).205 And while 
self-observation, self-improvement, and analytical reasoning were typical of the Russian 
intelligentsiia206 journaling, now it was the “new Soviet man” (including peasants and 
workers) who began to formulate and define his understanding of how to live his 
extraordinary new life by mapping daily activities and thoughts in a new revolutionary 
language and practicing “correct and precise thinking.”207 This patois was used in public 
speeches, lectures, and literary writings and professed love and devotion to the country 
and its common goal. Taking into consideration the time (people were very zealous about 
socialist ideas), instilled values (in particular, self-sacrificial notion of the benefit to 
others and the country), and circumstances (fighting to stay alive in the war of 
annihilation), it is reasonable to conclude that these kinds of comments were sincere208 
and in tune with the expectations of the authorities. 
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Similar attitudes are evident from the diaries of the younger generation. Naturally, 
children’s social conduct, norms, and values are “programmed” by adults. As the second 
most influential factor in this development (after the family), the state educational 
institutions had an immense impact on shaping children’s points of view. While at the 
end of December 1941 only 39 schools maintained their full functions, most school 
buildings remained open and children received hot breakfast or lunch there.209 Children 
and teens noted that an additional cup of soup, being with friends instead of staying at 
home alone, getting moral support, and having something to do saved many young lives. 
Actually, “a school became something akin to an orphanage. The teachers heated and 
cleaned classrooms, did laundry, and washed boys and girls who had lost their parents. 
[They] read them books and told stories about the valor of Red Army soldiers and 
marines.”210  
Naturally, youths spoke very fondly of their teachers, many of whom they 
witnessed dying of starvation.211 A student of the 32nd school, M. Shagalova, remembered 
how her emaciated math teacher Vasilii Matveevich Osipov (who urged his students to 
think spatially by using tangents and cotangents) stopped going home but continued 
teaching until his last day. Her physics teacher Kul’chitskii, who also succumbed to 
distrofiia, often joked by saying that none of his pupils would become Ampères or 
Newtons because “unlike Newton, you would have eaten the apple before it had a chance 
                                                 
209 Usually it consisted of thin lentil soup without bread. 
 
210 Sobolev, Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie, p. 456. 
 
211 Misha Tikhomirov, entry for December 24, 1941, in Blokadnyi dnevnik Mishi Tikhomirova 





to fall.” But Shagalova’s warmest words were spoken about her favorite teacher Pёtr 
Aleksandrovich Raiskii, who was among the first to die: 
Quiet and romantic, he was infinitely in love with Russian literature… During the 
blockade, he told us about things that were not part of our school curriculum. He 
spoke of literary protagonists who fought courageously and steadfastly. Teaching 
us kindness and sympathy, he enlightened us about Danko212 and hoped that our 
burning hearts would light the path for others… We listened to him and forgot 
about the war, bread, and cold. We were strong and fearless.213 
 
Students’ diaries are not purely descriptive in nature. They articulate and 
elaborate on ideas and concepts not typical of children but something they had learned 
from adults. Young diarists saw self-improvement and studying as their contribution to 
the collective effort.214 Many schoolchildren were part of the fire brigades, delivered draft 
notices to volunteers, brought sand that was used to put out fires to the roof space,215 and 
did other things that were commonly done by adults. “We did it all: at night we had to 
unload freight cars with logs for the factory, cleaned the snow off the Lanskaia station, 
were on duty at the school hospital, performed the messengers’ duty in the people’s 
druzhina, watched for blackouts, guarded buildings’ attics, put out incendiary bombs, 
checked on people, and located the dead,” recalled Nina Kostromina.216 Fifteen-year-old 
Sof’ia Gutshabash wrote in her diary that it was hard work but they did the best they 
could because they knew that their help “was indispensable to Leningrad and the 
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Motherland.”217 Such language, full of stereotypical formulations, naïve spirited slogans, 
and a degree of artificiality is characteristic of the diaries written by children and teens.218 
Given the commonness of this rhetorical style, there is no reason to presume its 
intentional use or premeditated calculation. It points to the fact that common notions (in 
the ways they were spoken about) were internalized by the diarists.  
“Taking action” is a part of every single piece of Leningraders’ personal writing 
in addition to physical and emotional anguish. The blokadniki concurred that “being in a 
kollektiv made the toleration of misfortunes easier and silenced the inexorable thoughts 
about food.”219 People not only responded to the authorities’ various calls and orders, 
they also came up with constructive public initiatives that pre-empted the actions of the 
Municipal Committee. Descriptions of voluntary donations and help to the military and 
the community disclose a consistent trend in collective decision-making and taking action 
that became increasingly autonomous after the onset of the “mortal time” at the end of 
November and through December 1941. Rather than being espoused by the city 
authorities, many of these initiatives emanated from the residents. And even though the 
city-wide implementation of such residential proposals depended on the administration, 
the symbiosis between the two was as apparent as it was essential, because without those 
who “appealed to us to stick together, who did not allow the last connections to break 
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down, and who pushed us to work to survive,” it would have been impossible to “resist 
the apathy, hopelessness, and death.”220 
An example of such independent initiative was the organization of Komsomol221 
and youth communal units in February 1942. Initially established in the Primorskii 
district by the members of its Komsomol bureau, these units very quickly became the 
source of a citywide renaissance.222 Teenagers and young people – mainly women – took 
responsibility for the blokadniki’s daily needs, such as firewood or water delivery, 
helping with the sick and emaciated who were unable to move, seeking out orphaned 
children, removing the dead from empty apartments, washing floors, doing laundry, 
fetching rations, and more. These altruistic deeds gave the despairing a sense of hope and 
made them feel that someone cared, that they were not alone in their misery: “This brutal 
time will pass. But I shall never forget that it was komsomol’tsy223 who came to my aid in 
the hardest moments of the siege.”224  
On January 25, 1942, when the main hydraulic water pump was damaged, the 
city’s baking factories faced crisis: without reliable water supply, they could not make 
bread. The regional union committee ordered mobilization of Komsomol members and 
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all available employees in the city organizations for manual water and firewood 
delivery.225 The secretary of the Leningrad Komsomol organization recalled:  
Late at night came a phone call: a bakery plant needs 4,000 pails226 of water. If 
there were water, tomorrow there would be no bread. We need at least 2,000 
Komsomol members because each one would have enough strength to bring no 
more than two pails. And they came and helped; moaned and groaned but 
helped.227  
 
People formed a living conveyor, passing containers with water to each other or dragging 
sleds with full pails to the bakeries. Leningraders knew that by helping others they also 
helped themselves. Recognizing the significance of this initiative, the Lengorsovet vested 
the Komsomol and youth communal units with broad powers.228 Volunteer members of 
the People’s Guard (druzhina)229 had the same impact on Leningraders’ lives.230 
In the winter of 1941‒42, people who could walk checked on their neighbors 
making sure they were still alive. And despite the sharp increase of private property theft 
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from abandoned apartments,231 many of the communal flats and apartments were left 
open to enable unrestricted entry for someone who could possibly help.232 People stated 
that “this habit of leaving the doors unlocked stuck around in Leningrad for a long while” 
after the war.233 Leningraders gave their food (!) to others,234 took care of orphaned 
children and neighbors, checked on the sick, and offered shelter and clothes. Those who 
were too weak to move had others – neighbors, relatives, sanitary units, even strangers – 
get their bread ration from the stores, bring water, or clean. Investigating cases of lost 
ration cards, inspector Berman found eight family members in one of the apartments on 
her list. Their cards were lost and the inhabitants were dying of hunger. She wrote:  
I went to the canteen and managed to exchange my coupons for the second 
decade235 for three bowls of soup and took it to them in a glass jar. I had no bread 
because it is not distributed in advance and I’ve already eaten my portion. Early in 
the morning I’ll bring them my 125 grams. But it is nothing for the family of 
eight.236  
 
The charity of blokadniki who were in dire straits themselves but attempted to 
help others can be explained by a number of factors (all of which were necessitated by 
the desire to live): having experienced the horrors, they could easily commiserate; there 
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was hope to get some food (e.g., when volunteering at the hospital or performing for the 
soldiers at the front); and they longed to avoid being alone. In any case, there was an 
understanding, a hope that by helping someone else a person could at least count on a 
reciprocal act of kindness. Vera Berkhman described how, after the death of all the 
people in her communal apartment, Vera’s neighbor Maria Aleksandrovna, who helped 
her on daily basis, described this “co-dependency” and cooperation: “There are no 
feelings!... Now there are only life and death. Both of us are struggling, and whoever is 
meant to be next will perish. I am helping you, and you are helping me. And there are no 
feelings.”237  
According to many, “the work, discipline, daily routine, and scheduling that 
[people] adhered to even during the harshest winter period of 1941‒42 uplifted the spirits 
and saved those who were starving.”238 Although most of the scientific institutions in the 
field of defense had been evacuated, some personnel remained and continued to conduct 
research.239 Terminally-ill professor of the Chemical-Technology Institute Maksimenko 
carried on his directorial duties even when he was no longer able to walk: he advised 
specialists from other defense plants and research facilities in his home.240 Working in 
close cooperation with engineers, designers, and other specialists, the scientists 
implemented new technologies, developed new methods of alloy production, modernized 
factory equipment, sought fuel substitutes and new raw materials, and manufactured 
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vitamins and new medications.241 Little by little, “people grew weaker and could barely 
walk… but their life still lingered,” and they continued their research and work.242 
Russian historian Vasilii Leonidovich Komarovich, who was close to death from 
starvation by February 1942, kept working on his dissertation and “those who read it did 
not believe that it was written by a man dying of hunger who hardly had enough strength 
to hold a pencil!”243 Still capable of contributing (either physically or intellectually) to 
the common good, people like Komarovich and Maksimenko made every effort possible 
to do all they could. 
Public opinion regulated and established moral standards and played a huge role 
in the Leningraders’ behavior. Motivated by the pre-war slogans, participants of 
“socialist construction” now revised them through the prism of subjective experiences 
(consciously or not), shaped their sense of self, strove to save their minds and mores, and 
attempted to find some solace in the internalized civic values and duties. Fёdor 
Isaakovich Mashanskii, director of the Trauma Institute, articulated another, “reversed” 
motivational formula – “survive to work” – which he thought was a “vital tenet in 
besieged Leningrad.”244 
This exact formula (survive to work) motivated a small group of the Vavilov 
Plant Industry Institute’s scientists when they guarded and preserved part of the world’s 
largest seed stock collection, which contained over 370,000 specimens including grains, 
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potato, rice, corn, and beans, thereby exhibiting exceptional willpower, dedication, and 
sense of duty. Protecting the live samples and seeds, scientists locked the stock in the 
vaults of the Experimental Station building on the St. Isaac Square and continued their 
research. And they starved to death doing it. In the course of the siege, not a single seed, 
grain, or tuber was touched out of the entire selective fund of several tons of rare cereal 
crops. Rice specialist Dmitrii Ivanov succumbed while surrounded by hundreds of packs 
of rice; Ol’ga Voskresenskaia died safeguarding her potato collection; peanut researcher 
Aleksandr Shchukin perished while working at his desk, as did medicinal plant curator 
Georgii Krier and oat specialist Lidiia Rodina. Chief of the city’s food supply Dmitrii 
Pavlov asserted that in the confusion of the blockade, the administration overlooked the 
Vavilov Institute, and the scientists, who were aware of this, could have done anything 
they wanted with the collection without any negative consequences.245 Perhaps, from 
today’s point of view, they had a choice – eat some grain and live or save the collection 
and die – but from their perspective they did not: “Walking presented a challenging 
task...It was unbearably hard to stand up, move your arms and legs... And it would have 
been easy to eat the collection. Not at all difficult! But eating it was impossible, because 
it would have meant disposing of my entire life’s work, the life’s work of my 
friends...”246 Twenty-eight scientists died of hunger in the vaults of the botanical Noah’s 
Ark because the moral obligation they felt overshadowed other more essential needs: 
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“saving those seeds for future generations and helping the world recover after the war 
was more important than a single person’s comfort.”247  
The concern with others’ judgment and the possibility of a transgression being 
publicly exposed curbed many socially condemned actions. Such concern is tangible in 
the diaries and more so in the recollections. An episode from December 1941 serves as an 
illustration. A box of soy candy, received at the food distribution center for the 
celebration of the New Year and dragged by a teacher and two fourteen-year-old boys to 
an orphanage, fell off the sled. One of the boys recalled:  
Candy spilled from the box onto the snow. Immediately, we were surrounded by 
the passers-by. The teacher gesticulated, moaned, and from her cries, it became 
clear that candy was being delivered to the orphanage. Two of us served as visual 
evidence. People formed a tight circle around us, grasped each other’s hands 
allowing us to arrange our load. Nobody from the crowd bent down. We gathered 
all the candy, picked up the plastic bags, readjusted the sled, and were on our 
way. People stood there for a while watching us go.248  
 
While people could have started picking up candy (and undoubtedly, there was urgency, 
desire, and need), taking away from children openly, in public, was unacceptable under 
any circumstances and the collective model overpowered individualistic impulses.249 
The siege, with its “mortal time,” gave plenty of opportunity to deal with daily 
crises by making right choices. Daniil Ivanovich Kiutinen worked as a baker. He died of 
hunger during his shift on February 3, 1942. A baker died from hunger in the midst of 
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plenty.250 He preferred dying to taking away from others. A synthesis of personal and 
civic responsibilities, a sense of duty, that was directly tied to such notions as fairness, 
altruism, and patriotism, and was fostered within the family and by society. When 
inspector Berman reported a number of misappropriation cases in one of the home 
associations, her superior charged her with “blowing things out of proportion.” Appalled 
by such explicit disregard for professional obligations and the wellbeing of others, 
Berman wrote in her diary: “I am fighting for every gram of bread, and when I discover 
even a crumb that was stolen from starving residents, I regard such actions as marauding 
at the front. I cannot and shall not perceive it any other way, even if it goes against 
someone else’s wish.”251 Forced to decide, a person had to make a decision that did not 
clash with his or her understanding of right and wrong. 
In general, professional obligations and responsibilities (whatever the job title 
was) remained intact as long as a person was able to move. Undeterred by the constant 
targeting of the defense facilities by German artillery and aviation, people continued to 
work. In a letter to the District Executive Committee dated February 12, 1942, a head of 
the Frunze Plant reported on the physical condition of the workers: “deceased – 14%, 
sick – 68%, coming to work – 28%. Most of those 28% who come to work are physically 
not capable of any labor… In the last ten days, half of them are so weak that they cannot 
get to the plant by foot.”252 Many factory workers tied themselves up to the equipment 
trying to stay up and not fall. Emaciated, they often were unable to endure physically 
                                                 
250 See Appendix V. Photo 2. 
 
251 A.G. Berman, entry for August 7, 1942, in Budni podviga, p. 178. 
 





demanding labor and died at their workstations. But other ailing and weak workers came 
to replace them because at that time “we could not permit ourselves to get sick.”253 After 
visiting the Kirov Plant, Professor of Medicine Fёdor Isaakovich Mashanskii later wrote:  
I was astonished to see the conditions in which people worked. The walls were 
studded with gaping holes left by artillery shells that could easily fit a person. The 
temperature inside was not higher than outside. Workers (mainly women and 
older men) wore thick layers of clothing that made them unwieldy to the point of 
stiffness. I saw many distrofiia patients with different stages of the illness and 
witnessed many deaths from starvation, but all those people were in the hospitals, 
the special clinics, or their own homes. Here, they worked. They worked intently 
and quietly…254 
 
At a time when Leningraders were especially in need of medical assistance, the 
situation and surroundings – lack of staff and medications, destroyed facilities, absence of 
basic living needs, transportation, and dying patients – disrupted the work of medical 
personnel, making it all the more difficult. Of course, emaciation and edema deterred 
many of them from fulfilling their duties in hospitals and people’s homes.255 Those 
doctors, who were still physically capable, attended to patients in the understaffed and 
overflowing medical facilities. In her notes, physician Sergeeva describes the extreme 
conditions under which their hospital was functioning: how all staff had to maintain a 
presentable appearance at times when there was no possibility to wash themselves or 
their scrubs (and yet they did it); how doctors had to choose between two patients, one of 
whom was definitely going to die and another one who could be saved; and how one of 
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the surgical rooms was turned into a storage room for dead bodies.256 Nevertheless, even 
then the sense of duty prevailed. And when the nearby factory began to manufacture 
molasses from sawdust and “doctors received 100 grams of it daily as a nutritional 
supplement, [they] redistributed it among the most disadvantaged patients by prescribing 
a five-day course of treatment of 50 or 100 grams every second day.” Sergeeva did not 
know whether this “remedy” saved anyone’s life, but notes that “it had a great impact on 
the moral state of the patients: they received what they needed the most – care and 
attention.”257  
A catastrophic shortage of fuel and electrical power coupled with hunger resulted 
in a disruption of the work of defense plants, electrical stations, and hospitals. In the 
period from September to December 1941, the daily generation of electricity fell to one-
seventh of its output and immobilized a number of factories. Deprived of electricity, 
factory workers and engineers operated machinery manually, cut out parts, repaired ships, 
tanks, and assembled guns for as long as they physically could.258 In December 1941, the 
Leningrad Military Council began equipping industrial facilities with gas generators, 
internal combustion engines, and individual docking stations.259 By the middle of March 
1942, there were 65 such mini-electric stations.260 By taking steps to improve working 
conditions, the authorities stimulated reciprocal actions from the residents who continued 
to fulfill their obligations. Mechanic Kulagin remarked the impact of the administrative 
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undertakings: “Life and work at the metal plant has not ceased even for a minute. It is 
hard to tell what would have become of it along with the thousands of hungry and 
freezing people if our power station had stopped.”261  
At the end of January 1942, the Defense Council held a meeting with medical 
specialists to improve Leningrad’s sanitary conditions. Undernourishment and massive 
spread of distrofiia resulted in a decrease of the body’s defense mechanisms. Coupled 
with thousands of corpses buried under the snow, consumption of water from rivers, the 
lack of laundry facilities, barbershops, bathhouses, and sewer, the city was facing a real 
threat of the increase and spread of various epidemics. On January 26, 1942, Ispolkom 
made a decision on the radical improvement of Leningrad’s sanitation.262 In order to 
clean city streets, it was necessary to mobilize everyone still capable of standing up. 
Beginning on March 8, 1942, every Sunday people came out for spring cleaning. Chief of 
engineering administration, B. Bychevskii remembered how “one by one, people with 
yellow, bloated faces and swelled up arms and legs” began to come out of “the frost-
bound buildings that seemed entirely lifeless […] Their weak hands could not keep hold 
of shovels, little to say crowbars. After making a few tottering steps, people sat down to 
rest.”263 
When by March 25 it was obvious that the clean-up work could not be done 
before the spring thaw, Lengorsovet ordered that all capable persons had to contribute to 
the clean-up every day from March 27 to April 8, 1942. It scheduled workloads by 
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people’s station in life: blue-collar workers – 2 hours outside of working shifts; workers 
of the conserved plants – 8 hours; and housewives and students – 6 hours.264 Around half 
a million Leningraders contributed to the spring cleaning. Chief Editor of the October 
Railway publishing house L. Muchnik recalled his participation “along with hundreds of 
others” in clearing the Vosstaniia Square, Ligovskii and Nevskii Prospects in April 1942. 
He recounted:  
Everybody who could still stand showed up. Every one – regardless of rank, 
position, social standing, age, or gender. Even those who could hardly move their 
legs came… Physically disabled, two (sometimes three) people had to lift a 
crowbar together. Chunks of ice, shovels with snow, and various rubbish was 
picked up and piled onto the iron sheets or plywood collectively. A few 
Leningraders harnessed themselves to pull the load while another few pushed it in 
order to deliver waste to the designated areas.265  
 
Recognizing the importance of the initiative, the blokadniki contributed to the city-wide 
effort and did everything in their power to ensure their own survival and protect their 
homes. 
To motivate people, the authorities used city-wide campaigning from putting up 
posters, slogans, and banners everywhere, to having the Musical Comedy Theater groups 
perform on the streets of Leningrad for those who removed ice, snow, waste, and dead 
bodies.266 Medical services provided immunizations for typhoid, dysentery, and other 
infectious diseases. The combination of the organization done by the authorities, the 
residents’ efforts, and the preventative and skilled work done by the medical 
professionals eliminated the possibility of epidemics in the city. 
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What made those people get up in the morning and drag their feet to factories, 
hospitals, and schools? Was it the love for their family, city, homeland, or sense of 
personal responsibility? Was it their belief in victory? Although Leningraders’ reasons 
differed, they all did what they had to do. Not all of them endured, many perished at 
home or on the way to work. What remains undisputable is the residents’ profound 
connection to the city. They regarded Leningrad with such a piety that the efforts they 
exerted in its defense truly came from the heart and were not compelled by intimidation 
or force. Daniil Al’shits, who served at the Leningrad front, affirmed that despite 
assertions to the contrary, 
Nobody coerced hundreds of thousands of Leningrad workers, clerks, and 
intelligentsiia to join opolchenie. Just like nobody coerced 60,000 Leningrad 
students to become part of opolchenie. There was no need to force us. Nobody 
forced hundreds of thousands of Leningraders – including women and children – 
to be on duty around buildings, put out German incendiary bombs on the roofs, 
and save the wounded during the shelling and air raids. The decision to get 
involved was entirely of each person’s own free will.267  
 
Moreover, it was not just a question of who made people defend the city; it was 
also a question of what made them do it. Ultimately, it was “archetypal national 
patriotism” and “territorial patriotism” that had more to do with defending native city, 
home, and family rather than the “achievements of socialism,”268 and was a matter of 
personal choice. Baltic fleet officer Pёtr Kapitsa saw Leningraders’ commitment in the 
amalgamation of their past and present experiences: 
Extraordinary and legendary people live in our city! Clearly, the character of 
Petersburg’s workers and intellectuals – their revolutionary organization, unity, 
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and steadfastness – was formed by the years of struggle against tsarism and White 
Guard elements, creating a distinctly different kind of people. There is a direct 
link between the solidarity of Petersburg residents who were storming the Winter 
Palace and the besieged brotherhood that was forged by the common struggle and 
agony. What forces a worker debilitated by hunger to stand behind his factory 
press in a freezing shop without ceasing his work even during time of shelling and 
refusing to hide in the shelter? It is just one thought, ‘We do it for us and for the 
front. Every shell, every mine brings our victory closer. It is our payback for the 
death of our mates.’ Will anyone understand the scientists of the Plant Institute 
who were saving the unique seed collection? Emaciated, they watched boxes and 
jars full of seeds day and night, protecting them from accidents and damage while 
dying from hunger themselves. And none of them had as much as a thought of 
eating even a single kernel!269  
 
W. Averill Harriman in his conversation with George Urban remembered how in 
September 1941 Stalin told him, “We are under no illusions that they [Soviet people] are 
fighting for us [the system]. They are fighting for Mother Russia.”270 Indeed, while the 
Soviet newspapers told the stories of soldiers going into battle with Stalin’s name on their 
lips, the diaries and recollections speak of devotion, patriotism (personally interpreted in 
the ways that made sense), and the need to persevere.  
The individual memories of the blockade along with the official accounts shaped 
those who survived it as well as the post-war generations of Leningraders. Born in St. 
Petersburg in 1901, Alexander Werth returned to his native city as a BBC war 
correspondent in 1943 and was the only Westerner who had a chance to witness some of 
the tragedy and talk to people ther. Having worked in the USSR during the war, he 
concluded that,  
Although living conditions were very hard almost everywhere throughout the war 
and truly frightening during some periods, people went on working as they had 
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never worked before, sometimes to the point of collapse and death. No doubt 
there were moments of panic and demoralization both in the Army and among 
civilians… Nevertheless, the spirit of genuine patriotic devotion and self-sacrifice 
shown by the Russian people during those four years has few parallels in human 
history, and the story of the siege of Leningrad is altogether unique.271 
 
While every person lived through his/her own history of the blockade, making it a part of 
an individual experience and identity, different intimate accounts assembled under an 
overarching concept of the collective or social experience provide a coherent narrative of 
historical events where “local” patriotism was the major underlying motivation for those 
who continued to work, create, and live.    
 
                                                 





Family, Friends, and Acquaintances 
Due to the change of the socio-political order in post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, 
traditional family – patriarchal in its structure for all peoples of the former Russian 
Empire – underwent significant changes. In an attempt to free women and erase gender 
inequality, Bolsheviks propagated the ideas of “communalization” (obobscshestvlenie) of 
the daily family routine, common-law marriages, and open relationships. However, by 
shifting the focus from the world revolution to building socialism in the USSR in the 
1930s, the Soviet government turned to Russian sociocultural traditions, attempting 
thereby to revive an archaic family type. This “conservative” rollback necessitated the 
adoption of protective policy towards the family structure: lasting family relations were 
considered to be a powerful politically stabilizing factor.272 As living conditions and 
social responsibilities changed, Soviet citizens “invited state involvement in family life, 
blurring the boundary between the personal and the political at the same time that they 
reaffirmed the boundaries of legitimacy, respectability, and propriety.”273 And the state 
regulated the society via non-economic labor, political repressions, and the establishment 
of strict control over reproductive social behavior. However, the repressions did not 
weaken but strengthened family ties (as its members felt that consolidation was vital to 
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survival), contrary to Hannah Arendt’s hypothesis of “atomization of the [Soviet] 
society.”274   
The pre-war family was a multifaceted and fluid unit that often had several 
generations either living in the same apartment (often communal) or fairly close to each 
other. Just like in the family structure of the imperial period, gender asymmetry was 
characteristic of the Soviet model. Only this asymmetry was not traditional: the nucleus 
of the Soviet family belonged to the mother. Women played the role of problem-solvers 
who were in control of a household budget and had to feed, clothes, comfort, and retained 
friendly relations with the neighbors. While family as a social structure has the flexibility 
to adapt and transition under the influence of external stressors, the internal connections 
within a unit depend on the emotional connection between its members (i.e. a maximal 
level of connection warrants deep emotional interconnection, whereas a minimal level 
creates autonomy and estrangement).  
Diaries and recollections single out the family as another major source of support 
and encouragement that helped them bear hardships during the siege. While war-time 
conditions in Leningrad did not always promote a strengthening of familial bonds, at 
times tearing families apart (vividly described in Peri’s The War Within), this thesis 
considers eye-witnesses’ views of the family as a stimulus for the determination to pull 
through. Orientalist Virineia Stefanovna Garbuzova said that during the winter of 1941‒
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42 Leningraders wanted “to live and help family and friends survive”275 more than 
anything. Even those with reputations of hatefulness helped others.276 Or when marriages 
broke down, “home, coziness, and compassion [were] the essence and the only light […] 
in the vastness of the gloom, remaining the only stimulus that incited the will to live and 
Survive!”277 
Diaries contain numerous stories about how family members, loved ones, friends, 
and strangers shared their frugal food reserves. They show how little children who 
received something to eat in kindergartens and schools without ration cards made an 
effort to bring it home for the family. They tell how grandparents secretly hid part of their 
portions for their grandchildren. The diaries depict how younger siblings took on the role 
of parent and even how ex-wives took care of their former in-laws. In contrast, there were 
also those who considered their relatives to be a burden, choosing to abandon or steal 
from them, and those who made a decision to keep physically stronger members of the 
family alive at the expense of the weaker ones. Although personal records contain various 
examples of both support and rejection, the majority found family essential to their 
survival. 
When her mother died, A. Mamleeva had a choice to either stay put and die or 
make a tough change: “I woke from a stupor and realized that we had nobody to rely on 
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anymore. As the oldest one [of five children] I had to become a mother to them.”278 A 
remarkable case of maternal self-sacrifice was described in Mediki i blokada (Medical 
Personnel and the Siege). In the winter of 1941‒42, pediatrician Alexander Fёdorovich 
Tur of Clinic #1, which specialized in extremely malnourished children, received another 
baby patient. A Komsomol unit found the baby in one of the city’s apartments: he was 
lying next to his emaciated mother, who had blood gushing out of her vein. Starvation 
had completely suppressed lactation, and in desperation, she opened a vein in her arm and 
pressed the baby’s mouth to the cut, letting him suck on her blood.279   
There were no “perfect” families. Even in peacetime, parents scolded children, 
children resented parents, wives argued with husbands, and in-laws were disapproving 
and condescending. The siege intensified feelings and interactions – exacerbating or 
softening them280 – forging family dynamics that determined how relatives regarded each 
other and the role they played within the unit. Teenager Galia Zimnitskaia wrote in her 
diary about her neighbor Sonia, the mother of two little girls, who gave Galia three ration 
cards and asked her to get the bread but hold on to it. As it turned out,  
Sonia’s husband would eat everything he could find in the house. Despite Sonia’s 
desperate attempts to hide bread from him, it always disappeared without a trace. 
Last night he shamelessly grabbed the skimpy ration from Sonia right at the 
doorstep in front of her children. Their girls are condemned to death.281  
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Galia remembered how before the war this young man used to take his daughters for 
walks in the park, how attentive and gentle he was with them, and how that love and care 
went completely against his current behavior. “He must have gone mad from hunger,” 
she concluded.282  
Accounts that speak of Leningraders’ dedication and sacrifice for family are 
prevalent. To save their children, mothers and fathers gave them their own meager 
portions of food. In her notes, physician Sergeeva told of engineer Rubtsov, who received 
a better ration as a specialist but died in the hospital because he was giving part of his 
ration to his wife and daughter.283 Doctor Ignatovich’s neighbors – a married couple with 
a long-awaited child – gave their entire rations to their toddler and perished from 
hunger.284 Vera Kostrovitskaia noted in her diary that her grandmother had died from 
hunger in February 1942, and in her room, “hanging from the nail by the bed there was a 
little pouch with a note ‘To Verusia.’285 Inside the pouch, there were a few small cookies 
and a bar of chocolate, all untouched. Mama brought them to her in the beginning of 
September.”286 Women often became blood donors in order to get additional rations so 
that they could save their children.287 Men, who at the final stage of distrofiia went to the 
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hospital and received a better ration, hid their portions and snuck home to bring food to 
their families.288 Adult children gave part of their allotments to parents289 and siblings. 
Svetlana Vasil’evna Magaeva was ten when the siege began. Her mother, a 
schoolteacher, walked around the city looking for children whose parents had passed 
away and took them to orphanages where they received basic care and nutrition. Without 
people like Svetlana’s mother, the children would have died from hunger and cold. One 
day she did not return home and Svetlana feared the worst. As it turned out, her mother 
fainted from hunger on the street but someone helped get her to the hospital. Svetlana 
“went to visit her there almost daily right after breakfast at the orphanage.” Part of the 
breakfast – balanda (thin flour soup) – the girl “saved in a toy teacup and brought it for 
mom to eat.” At that time, it seemed to her that if she did not do that, her mother would 
die. Although Svetlana’s effort was tangible, she still perceived her mother’s survival as 
“miraculous.”290   
Everyday routine, rituals, and role distribution became a common practice in 
many families, and Leningraders attempted to maintain a semblance of normal life: 
washing up, doing laundry, and cleaning the living quarters.291 Teenager M.S. 
Karetnikova remembered how much her mother wanted them to survive:  
[E]very morning she made us get up and live: fetch water, do our beds, and wash 
up. All of it took physical strength which we did not have. But this was not it. In 
order to survive, you had to take care of someone besides yourself. Doing it for 
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your mama and grandma goes without saying. But there were also our sick 
neighbor who swelled up from hunger beyond recognition and my orphaned 
friend Lena who only had her dying grandma…292  
 
In families where both parents worked, children were responsible for keeping the 
household (bringing water and firewood) and getting the bread ration, which entailed 
standing in lines for hours. Women distributed daily portions of food to family 
members.293 Some split it in half and made two “meals” out of it, some had breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner. Everybody developed his/her own “eating routine” which was a topic 
of discussion with relatives and strangers.  
L. Reikhert (later editor-in-chief of Science) was six when the siege began. As an 
adult, he tried to block the memories of it, often stopping his mother in mid-sentence 
when she attempted to reflect on those years. His curiosity was piqued upon the 
discovery of mother’s “household books,” two thick notebooks that contained her records 
of the events of 1941‒42. As it turned out, Reikhert’s mother used the example of 
swimmer Boris Deviatkin’s strict daily regimen as a way to egg on her children and 
herself.  
She managed to feed us thrice every day regardless of whether it was a bread-
crumb, a spoonful of skilly,294 or boiling water. She put us to sleep only in the 
evening. When leaving home, she always left us a list of chores: cut firewood, 
sweep the floors, or something else. She made us go to the children’s health clinic 
while we were still able to move. She never cried or sighed in our presence and 
always tried to save us from psychologically damaging experiences.295  
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The desire to live and save loved ones was demonstrated by children as well. 
Svetlana Magaeva spoke of a case she witnessed in the orphanage. Olia, a 12-year-old 
girl, was trying to keep her 5-year-old brother, Serёzha, from dying of starvation. The 
emaciated girl gave her entire scant portion of food to Serёzha, who ate it with 
indifference but continued to waste away. All the efforts made by the teacher and doctor 
to convince Olia of the need to eat fell on deaf ears. After Serёzha died, the girl refused to 
leave his side. When he was finally taken away, Olia lay down, sighed, and passed away. 
Magaeva spoke of it as “a mature death full of dignity and conscious awareness of a duty 
fulfilled. It is likely that Olia’s sudden passing was the result of losing the motivation to 
survive. The girl had nobody left in the whole world, and she ceased waging war against 
death.”296 Medical professionals who lived through the siege described a number of 
similar cases that could not be explained from a physiological perspective. Balancing 
between life and death and often no longer able to move, those, who had a reason to live 
(children begging not to die) resisted if only for a while.297  
Even though the majority of the city’s population was women, children, and the 
elderly, male deaths were higher in the first months of the siege and thrice as common as 
those of women in January 1942.298 Drawn into all spheres of public life and having 
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equal rights with men, women had to perform tasks they were not suited for.299 But as the 
number of men drastically decreased, women ended up constituting the “backbone” of 
the family and the city. Faced with numerous daily tasks – what to feed their families, 
how to heat and light the home, where to get water, what to do to ensure children’s 
survival, how to bury the dead – they constantly had to find ways to solve them. Both 
official and personal records note that women were more resilient to physical and 
emotional stress: “men turned out to be more fragile; they broke down faster.”300 This 
resilience had to do with “the strikingly apparent” differences in the physiology and 
development of male and female bodies and had been explained by medical scientists 
after the siege.301  
However, there might have been another reason why women held on longer: their 
nurturing and caregiving instincts. Librarian M. Gol’zblat recalled how “mothers and 
wives, straining themselves by pulling heavy sleds, dragged the dead to cemeteries... 
Women ended up being stronger, and now you often witness not the wife leaning on her 
husband’s arm, but a woman who is motherly and firmly leading a doomed head of the 
family.”302 Serving in the Baltic navy, Pёtr Kapitsa spent the first blockade winter in 
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Leningrad. He witnessed how the shipwrights who helped the sailors repair vessels were 
leaving work carrying  
the leftovers of thin soup to feed their families – wives and children. In order not 
to fall, some prop each other up. If someone falls, workers walk around him. They 
have no strength to take the trouble to assist the fallen. So, he silently waits, 
hoping that after getting some rest he’ll be able to make it to the control gate. 
There are quite a few workers’ wives with sleds waiting for their husbands by the 
gate. Women will drag the bread-winners home and will bring them back to the 
dock the next day. Those [workers] who have lost families try not to leave the 
dock: they stay here day and night.303  
 
But as the first tram re-launched on April 15, 1942, “not a single man was sitting down. 
Women did. And men, who were weaker at that time than women, were standing up, 
remembering that they are the stronger sex.”304  
The absence of public transit305 forced many people who worked far from home 
to stay at work overnight, sometimes living there indefinitely. Suslova recalled that 
archive personnel had a staff room that was “a center of the archive’s life” in the after-
work hours. People discussed “work issues, read (sometimes aloud), sewed, knitted, and 
listened to radio programs, music, and concerts.”306 Some working (or temporarily 
unemployed) families that could not provide adequate care for their children turned to 
childcare facilities, relying on their help. Though enhancing cooperation, remaining at 
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work had short-term and long-term ramifications like the disruption of family order or the 
estrangement from children.307  
Romantic love as a theme is rarely present in the diaries. But even the subtle 
entries that describe husbands’ or wives’ attempts to save their “better halves” 
(sometimes at the expense of their own lives) testify to deep emotional connections and 
show how durable some of them were. Sensing her husband’s nearing death, Ol’ga 
Berggol’ts’ wrote on January 14, 1942: 
I must persist and survive because I have to pull you through, because if you 
perish, I’ll cease to live. Even without physically dying I’ll cease to exist... I’ll be 
begging anyone and everyone for food, buying it from profiteers, and working 
like mad to earn money... Hold on a while longer, my one and only, my 
happiness, my amazing and best human being in the world!308  
 
Finding it unbearable to watch her husband starve, Nataliia Zavetnovskaia, who was also 
starving and whose legs were so swollen that she barely could walk, went to the black 
market to exchange valuables for bread so she could feed it to him.309 Revealing the 
details of intimate life was something that most people were embarrassed about and 
uncomfortable doing. And although there were some relatively healthy residents, most of 
Leningraders’ physical and mental states prevented them from forging romantic 
relationships.310 Descriptions of the emaciated, androgynous bodies that filled the bath 
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houses in the winter and spring months of 1942 penned by some diarists vividly explain 
why intimate relationships were atypical. 
Familial relations served as a behavior model for children, teaching them to 
sympathize with others. Parents molded children’s outlook on how to treat people outside 
of the family circle. At the final stage of distrofiia and suffering from diarrhea brought on 
by hunger, 11-year-old Dima Liakhovich guiltily apologized for the “accidents” to a 
teacher who took care of him. She gently urged him not to be embarrassed, and he kissed 
her hands. Although asked not to do it, Dima awkwardly insisted, repeating that this was 
what papa did when he was sick and mama was taking care of him.311 Historian Gennadii 
Sobolev, who survived the siege, shared an account of another child siege survivor, 
Liudmila Andreeva. Her mother received a package from Liudmila’s father that he 
managed to pass along with a soldier who arrived from the front. It contained army 
biscuits and a few briquettes of dried pea soup. In the morning, her mother told the 
children that she had decided to cook a large pot of soup from the two soup briquettes 
and to invite all the neighbors in their four-storied building capable of moving for lunch. 
They asked everyone who was able to open the door. Reflecting on that event, Liudmila 
wonders “…why [her] mama chose to throw neighbors a feast when she could have left 
all of the soup briquettes for her own starving family. And why did none of [them] ever 
                                                                                                                                                 
New Harbinger Publications, 2009), pp. 24-26. Some diarists recorded visits to the bath houses in the 
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question her decision, deeming it the only right one?”312 Acts like these taught children to 
help the disadvantaged and were presented to them as something ordinary and something 
that one would not even think about twice. 
Placed in an ethical and pragmatic dilemma, non-biological or distant relatives 
often chose to replace immediate families. Eleven-year-old Vera Fёdorovna Galaktionova 
saw her entire family – father, mother, and two brothers – starve to death by the end of 
December 1941. When Vera’s aunt Taisiia Efimovna dropped by to check on the family, 
the girl was still alive but so weak that she could not stand by herself. Taisiia Efimovna 
wrapped her in a blanket, tied her to a sled, and transported her to a close relative who 
lived on the other side of the city. Upon arrival, Taisiia herself died of hunger and 
exhaustion. The relative had four children of her own but took Vera in. Unfortunately, 
Taisiia Efimovna had forgotten to take Vera’s family ration cards, and nobody had 
enough strength to travel back to get them. Therefore, they had to survive on one 
worker’s card and the cards of four dependents: 750 grams of bread divided among six 
people.313  
Such sacrifice may seem extraordinary but, given the circumstances, it was quite 
common. As loved ones died, Leningraders sought support from those still alive in their 
immediate circle. During the first blockade winter, many chose to share their temporary 
homes with other people instead of living alone.314 Some people did it because of the fear 
of dying and having their corpses eaten by rats, for some it ensured their survival, and 
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some offered help precisely because they knew they could. After the death of all family 
members and neighbors, Vera Berkhman remained alone in a huge communal flat. Next-
door neighbor Boris Moiseevich asked her, “How do you live in the empty apartment?” 
and then added: “I’ve been meaning to ask you whether you would consider moving into 
our place? I have a spare room. I’ll be happy to help you… My wife and mother-in-law 
are very outgoing. You’ll be in a family.’”315 One of the authors of Blokadnaia Kniga (A 
Book of the Blockade) and a siege survivor, Daniil Granin formulated the reasoning 
behind mutual help: “People saved themselves by saving others. And even if they died, 
they picked someone up walking their final path. And if they survived, it was because 
somebody needed them more than a person needed himself.”316 Reflecting on the winter 
of 1941‒42, Vera Berkhman wrote in June 1942: 
What’s important to note is that all of those (almost all of those) who perished 
succeeded in raising the banner of the spirit over the flesh and were doing so until 
their very last breath. People buried their loved ones in exchange for their ration 
cards or whatever the cost might have been; people struggled through distances to 
get to their families; they buried mere acquaintances (fellowmen), not relatives, 
fought death, and cheered on those who gave up.317  
 
The accounts of helping those outside of the immediate family are numerous. In 
fact, one of the common themes that appear in the diaries is staying at or visiting friends, 
family, neighbors, co-workers, or acquaintances and sharing whatever little there was to 
eat. That does not mean that there were no people who preyed on one’s weakness and 
misery. Aware of the absence or sickness of a person, neighbors entered the apartments 
looking for things to eat or something they could sell. Family members took away entire 
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or parts of portions from others. But above all, it was strangers who received cruel and 
rude treatment from people in the bread or canteen lines, near the ice-holes when getting 
water, on the streets, or out of sight. Although every blokadnik mentioned both vicious 
and kind deeds, it was the ability to work together and share available resources that 
ensured the people’s survival. Revealing how hunger changed people’s habits, relations 
with others, and personalities, biology student T. Fadeeva affirmed that “a human 
remained a human as long as he realized that he had to do what he must. Without such 
realization, physical strength dissipated and so did humanitarian principles.”318 Individual 
interpretations of social norms and personal norms determined whether a person chose to 
fight on his/her own or to remain a part of a larger unit. In practice, cooperation provided 
advantages as opposed to the focus on self, which strained daily struggles and in the end 
proved ineffective as a strategy for staying alive.  
In addition to familial bonds, the support of friends played an enormous role in 
keeping up spirits. Just like in the case of other close relations, friendships changed for 
better and for worse in the course of the siege. Their breakdown was not always a result 
of intensifying hunger and had to do with the initial emotional attachment, individual 
dynamics, attitudes, and dispositions. In many cases, friendships grew stronger. Writing 
letters to her friend, Stasia Antonevich disclosed:  
My dear Raya, my one and only friend! During this dire time, we reassessed our 
friendship in a new way. I do not know how we would have made it without each 
other and without the moral support we rendered one another. In moments of 
danger, we literally covered each other with our bodies. At the most difficult 
times, we shared every bite and every breadcrumb.319  
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Some Leningraders were more reserved in their expression of personal affections, 
some described friendly deeds more emotionally, and some made kind-hearted comments 
in passing. But at a time when it would have been easy to rationalize and walk away, or 
dismiss the pleas, they all had a friend who at some point lent a helping hand. People 
assisted friends get home, placed them into hospitals, took care of their children or 
brought them to orphanages, moved in together, got their rations for them, fetched water 
and firewood, buried them, and of course shared what little they had to eat.320 
Some friendship ties were forged out of despair. Those who seemed to no longer 
care or love anyone, who grumpily uttered words of resentment often ended up being 
capable of selfless acts. Vera Berkhman fondly spoke of her apartment neighbor – “a 
complex individual” – who helped her stay alive and with whom they “took turns in 
dragging each other back into life.”321 Describing Mariia Aleksandrovna as a 
“wholesome person of the old times,” Vera questioned her motivations: “What was it that 
roused her hands, legs, head, and her trembling heart to slice off a piece of bread from her 
dependent’s portion every day and give it to me, someone who had no ration card, often 
with a grumble as if sentencing – ‘here, survive’?.. She was irritated by my condition 
[distrofiia], said vile things to my face, and yet pulled me back to life...”322 It seemed that 
Mariia Aleksandrovna was willing to do anything in order to avoid being left alone in a 
huge communal apartment. And Vera expressed her gratitude in any way she could.  One 
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morning. returning home from a night shift at the hospital, Vera found Mariia 
Aleksandrovna lying motionless in her room. She wrote: “her eyes were full of agonizing 
fear, and she was lying in malodorous puddles, everything was dripping or had already 
dripped onto the floor, her hands and legs were soiled.323 What a horror! And her gaze! 
And the worst thing is that there is no chance I’d have enough strength to get the sheet 
from underneath her, not a chance!”324 Hardly able to move from exhaustion and 
starvation, Vera got another starving neighbor to help roll Mariia Aleksandrovna on her 
side. Then she cleaned her, changed her clothes and linen, put a hot water bottle into 
Mariia Aleksandrovna’s hands and to her feet, and gave her some tea. Vera wrote about 
her efforts that day: “a hideous skeleton of a person got up at night to render feasible help 
to another skeleton-person whose leg was cramping up, whose heart was weakening, and 
whose scurvy joints were aching.”325 Why? Because Vera felt obligated and owed her 
own survival to her neighbor. 
Accounts that speak of care and the support of family, friends, and those outside 
of the family circle are plentiful and touching in their description of the things people 
were capable of doing to save loved ones. In many ways, Leningraders were compelled to 
help others out of duty, sometimes resenting them or feeling obligated, as there were no 
other viable survival options. But even then, a person had to have courage, moral 
strength, and the will to not despair, break down, or eat someone else’s piece of bread 
and share his own piece, think about somebody besides themselves, and act in defiance of 
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nature’s most fundamental self-preservation instinct. Inna Ivanovna Liubimenko noted 
that “while nasty scenes could be often witnessed in the ration queues (even at the House 
of Scientists’ cafeteria some men on occasion hawkishly snatched the plate that seemed 
fuller to them from a waitress), sacrificing oneself – not necessarily for one’s closest 
relatives – was a fairly common matter in family circles.”326 Engaged in constant self-
monitoring spurred on by a new, cruel reality, blokadniki struggled to determine what 
was right and what was wrong. They measured an essentially pragmatic desire to 
preserve themselves against an ingrained concept of the collective that impelled them to 
reach out to each other, often paying the highest price for remaining human in such 
inhumane conditions. 
Deeply interlaced with the notions of patriotism and devotion to the homeland, 
the nuclear family was regarded as a steadfast foundation of ethical norms and self-
sacrifice and was promoted as such by the media. The written accounts and recollections 
do not dispute this optimistic view of immediate and accidental families, but they add the 
description of how all families went through extreme privation. And while some families 
broke down, others grew stronger and closer. The period of “mortal time” became the 
determinant of a family’s stability and potency. It also revealed that some people’s 
motivations within the familial circle were not so altruistic, and that complete strangers 
were at times more capable of selfless acts than loved ones.  
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Art and Culture  
“Light doesn't shine in the light; it shines in the dark.” 
Erich Maria Remarque, Three Comrades 
 
Regardless of the name the city of Leningrad has had in any given historical 
period, it has come to be the largest center of visual and performing arts, literature and 
music, and culture and poetry in Russia. The members of the cultural elite, or 
intelligentsiia, who had not left the city – either by choice or otherwise – perceived art as 
a stimulus for survival. In the beginning of the siege, the city administration had doubts 
about the practicality of retaining performing arts and music life in the city, and the 
management of the Radio Committee considered music to be inappropriate to the 
situation. But with the growing patriotic trends, the demand for this work at the front and 
inside the city also increased, making the authorities recognize creative arts as one of the 
most powerful instruments in promoting the patriotic spirit. The Nazi siege added an 
external motivation to reinforce a sense of national unity and pride.327 As a reactionary 
force to harsh events, the city culture not only sustained the creators and the residents, 
inspiring hope and evoking pride, but also proved to be beneficial to the authorities as 
well. While keeping tabs on the expression of the negative (hardships and hunger), they 
encouraged any dissemination of information that had to do with art (as it was supposed 
to serve as evidence of the overall cheerful attitude in Leningrad). Thus, despite 
everything, cultural life in Leningrad continued to flourish, although this “flourishing” 
greatly differed from what it used to be like in peacetime. Daily worries and survival 
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dilemmas that consumed the residents’ time and energy overshadowed the desire for 
entertainment.  
While the city authorities provided additional sources of food for the artistic 
community, hunger plagued them no less than other blokadniki.328 Those who remained 
hopeful continued to live and work, trying to retain dignity in the circumstances that 
presupposed its breakdown. Theater director Aleksandr Dymov made a sarcastic entry in 
his diary on January 25, 1942:  
Dearest fellow editor, Mr. Stomach! I am weak and frail. I have to make great 
effort to move my legs, and my face has forgotten how to smile a long while 
back. I’ve been tormented by the inveterate and chronic – like rheumatism – 
hunger for a long time. But I am trying not to fall because once fallen I’ll very 
quickly be trampled over by death. I am still holding out and even writing Notes 
from The Dead City. This is the reality. But I have not yet forgotten how to think 
clearly and read books; I want to philosophize… I want to think about not only 
the grub but many other things that have nothing to do with food. I want to dream 
about the future, a wonderful future. But wonderful not because it is filled to the 
top with potatoes, bread, and sunflower oil. You see, I want to be a human being. 
Do not refuse me this pleasure. Trust me, you will be relieved as well. Otherwise, 
both you and I will be ashamed for these days.329 
 
Observations made by the scientists and medical specialists during the siege 
verified that “the primacy of intelligence and determination to work and create” greatly 
increased chances of survival because otherwise “despondency, anxiety, apathy, and self-
intimidation” only ensured the development of distrofiia.”330 Prominent linguist Dmitrii 
Sergeevich Likhachёv made a similar conclusion:  
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The human brain was the last to die. At the time when arms and legs ceased to 
function, when fingers no longer could fasten the buttons, when there was no 
strength left to close your mouth, when the skin blackened and tightly hugged the 
teeth, and the face revealed skull bones with denuded and laughing teeth, the 
brain continued working. People kept diaries, wrote philosophical opuses, 
conducted scientific research, deliberated sincerely, ‘from the heart,’ 
demonstrated unusual steadfastness, and did not give in to daily fuss and 
worthlessness. Painter Leonid Chupiatov and his wife died from hunger. Even as 
he was dying, he continued painting. When he ran out of canvas, he used plywood 
and cardboard…331  
 
Chupiatov was not the only one. Artist and architect Moisei Vakser passed away 
on February 4, 1942 at the in-patient hospital of the Fine Arts Academy. There were three 
things on his bedside table: Balzac’s Lost Illusions, a pencil, and a drawing pad. His last 
entry in the diary that he called “The Cave Man Notes”332 read: 
In the Academy that smells like life [...] I was drawing with one hand... almost 
with my nose, pastel crumbled; I was fatigued from the tension caused by 
hatching, but it raised my spirits, brought me up, and I felt like I was back in the 
saddle... Undoubtedly, we’ll survive! Art is a great thing that is worth living 
for.333  
 
But a desire to live could not sustain a physically depleted body by itself. Children’s 
writer and poet Daniil Kharms died on February 2, 1942. Folklore illustrator Ivan Bilibin 
lost his fight with hunger on February 7, 1942.334  
Actors and musicians who refused evacuation and stayed in the city continued 
performing. Working in the unheated building, actors remained true to the profession by 
wearing costumes (at times barely dressed) and applying full character make-up. On 
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December 7, 1941, violinist Lev Margulis wrote in his diary: “Around 14:00 I was at the 
Philharmonic Hall. We performed Beethoven’s 5th [Symphony] and 1812 wearing coats. 
The audience had coats on and was shivering with cold.”335 Vera Inber was among those 
who came to that concert and echoed Margulis: “It is hellish cold. The chandeliers are 
quarter-lit at best. Orchestra members are wearing quilted jackets or half-length fur 
coats… The concertmaster is heavily unshaven—perhaps, he had nothing to warm the 
water with or there was no light.”336 This concert, like many others, was broadcast over 
the radio. After the war, Karl Eliasberg remembered how on a few occasions he had 
Germans approach him after the Symphony’s performances saying that they fought at the 
Leningrad front and heard the Leningrad Orchestra’s concerts of Beethoven, Brahms, 
Mozart, and Haydn. What shook them the most was the fact that the Soviets were playing 
pieces written by the “enemies.” 
For those who were not artists themselves, books, theater, and music became a 
source of strength and distraction. Actor Nokolai Kondrat’ev noted, “The Musical 
Comedy Theater is the only theater that currently performs in Leningrad. Moreover, it is 
the only place where you can listen to music. Because of this and the desire to forget 
about the extent of our current reality’s strain, Musical Comedy gets a big audience.”337 
Powerful classical music gave an additional boost of vigor to many residents. Listening to 
pieces by Strauss, Liszt, and Mendelssohn, Maria Mashkova observed that “everything 
inside me is unthawing, seceding, and the feeling of hunger hides away… It turns out that 
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this world still contains music, books, poems, and friends and not just ration cards and 
black corpses.”338 Although, just like the ever-changing pulse of the city, the pulse of the 
performing arts was uneven. Hunger weakened and disabled many artists, and when on 
January 25, 1942, the Musical Comedy’s electricity was cut off, its troupe was sent closer 
to the Ice Road. The month-long silence was broken on March 4, 1942, with an operetta 
by Imre Kálmán, Silva.  
 When Vladimir Mayakovskii’s339 poems were published in the besieged city in 
1941, they were instantaneously sold out. “The war is raging. There is hunger; it is 
freezing cold. Is it even possible to think about books and poetry? Yes, it is! It is possible 
to not only think but also live through art, make it your life,” teenager Zina Savkova 
remembered. – “Theaters of the besieged city are open, volunteer acting troupes are 
performing, and independent companies of dancers, singers, and musicians are 
working.”340 Another diarist remarked that “instead of breakfast, I decided to go to the 
theater... Watched Musical Comedy’s operetta The Bat341... the theater is full.”342 The 
musicals staged did not aim at raising patriotic spirit;343 their significance was in 
maintaining a degree of sophistication and cultural development among the blokadniki. 
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The aspect of culture submerged them into a relatively civilized reality, detaching (even 
for an hour or two) from their otherwise primitive existence. Feeling the characters’ 
emotions, being around other people, and silencing the thoughts of food made people 
better and allowed them to retain (albeit not everyone and not always) sympathy.   
Volunteer performances helped both actors (by keeping them busy) and the 
audience (by shifting their focus onto something enjoyable). A professor of the Theater 
University recalled that a teacher from an orphanage on Mokhovaia Street that used the 
university’s shelter344 asked him if any of the acting students would mind performing for 
the children during the air raids to help them cope.345 And “Leonid Fёdorovich Makar’ev 
organized the first concert group for children. Throughout October we performed daily, 
sometimes twice a day.”346 These shows where children listened to fairytales and songs 
distracted them from their perplexing reality and created a semblance of normalcy.  
Considering performing as their contribution to “defense” and with the hope of 
getting something to eat, “workers of culture” (rabotniki kul’tury)347 played for soldiers 
at the front and in the hospitals to boost their morale. In December 1941, actor Feodosii 
Griaznov wrote: 
There is this realization that, despite everything we are going through, we give all 
our strength to the soldiers and officers by staging performances without getting 
paid and that we are doing something useful by allowing them to take a break and 
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rest. Although, it is a pity that we are not being fed for that… But it simply means 
that they cannot. The city’s food supply issue is imperative in its urgency.348 
 
These volunteer artist teams staged 24,000 concerts and 600 plays in the first year of the 
siege.349 
A group of composers was among those who did not evacuate or enlist in the 
army, remaining in Leningrad. Boris Vladimirovich Asaf’ev worked in a small room at 
the Pushkin Theater and without so much as a piano, he wrote the Fourth Symphony 
“Motherland.”  His letter dated February 25, 1942, said: “I am alive and in great spirits… 
I compose a lot of light, clear, and austere music that is stylistically very new to me.”350 
Prior to being flown out in October, Dmitrii Shostakovich was composing his famous 
Seventh Symphony dedicated to Leningrad, working on it with “inhuman intensity.”351 
The world of art, in contrast with the material one, sometimes seemed to have the power 
to postpone death. Coming back home on a February evening in 1942, 18-year-old artist 
Elena Martilla sensed that if she went to bed that night, she would not wake up. She 
decided to fight by painting. Completely engulfed by the project, Elena finished only 
once the sun came up.352 She lived to see the end of the siege.     
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Reading and books also helped people cope and survive. The Saltykov-Shchedrin 
State Public Library (SPL)353 remained open during the siege.354 Officials and library 
members requested books, related to issues at hand: books on wild edible plants, 
starvation, lighting, cooking, physiotherapy, military technology, field surgery, and 
military engineering.355 Besides thematic literature, library employees satisfied abundant 
requests placed by individuals and hospitals – “those who wanted to escape into the 
world of fantasy for a short while”356 – for fiction; for historical and archaeological works 
on Pushkin, Peterhof, Pavlovsk, Gatchina; for information on university enrolment; for 
synopses of plays, operas, shows, and their reviews. While the number of people who 
used the library was a fifth357 of the pre-war period, the SPL continued fulfilling the 
orders placed by its readers throughout the entire siege. 
For Leningraders, books equaled life as they ensured both physical and mental 
survival. After the death of her family, Irma Issi remained in her cold apartment alone. In 
her words, “the only thing that saved [me] was books, books, and books.”358 Books were 
burned warming people in the freezing cold of their apartments;359 they were sold or 
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exchanged for food;360 binding glue served as a source of nourishment.361 Reading belles-
lettres, novels, adventure literature, and poetry – just like keeping diaries – became a way 
to deal with unbearable daily pressures. People used reading as the means of keeping 
their sanity and postponing mental deterioration.  For some, this escapism allowed the 
perception of the “impossible actuality” as a “frightening dream filled with nightmarish 
visions.”362  
For others, reading had nothing to do with escapism. On the contrary, it was a 
form of confrontation. Yearning to get answers to or explanations of the terrible 
predicaments immediately at hand, the blokadniki turned to literature for clarification. 
Thus, Lidiia Ginzburg observed that Tolstoy’s War and Peace was one of the works that 
“people read avidly in order to verify the accuracy of their perceptions... And the reader 
told himself: well then, this means that my feeling of this is right. It means that this is 
how it is. Those who had enough strength to read, indeed avidly read War and Peace.”363 
Self-validation and comprehension of the situation by means of reading served as a 
healing method for people psychologically numbed by fear and grief. Ol’ga Berggol’ts 
saw her writing as the only way to survive: “I must write. I must do something in order to 
live and not go crazy... We must carry on, and I shall write and work because anything 
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else means death.”364 Having the same kind of therapeutic effect, diary writing eased 
emotional burdens and required discipline, giving some kind of structure to a daily 
routine. In addition to Ol’ga Berggol’ts and Vera Inber, there were many other scribes in 
the besieged city. They kept journals and diaries, wrote essays and poems to save their 
minds from madness and to make sense of the dreadfulness around them. Countering the 
atrocious atmosphere of the blockade, diary writing, book reading, drawing, performing 
arts, music, and other expressions of spiritual and intellectual life became a means of self-
defense, preservation of self, and, in many cases, ensured physical survival.  
With all the rumors circulating, radio became a source of vital information and 
motivation. It brought residents together, made it easier to withstand struggles and 
hunger, offered words of reassurance, and uplifted Leningraders’ spirits. “Music on the 
radio is a huge consolation. Particularly on the days of darkness and cold. You are lying 
under the blanket and listening to Borodin’s symphony, Tchaikovsky’s concert for piano 
and orchestra, or ‘Life for the tsar’… Splendid,” wrote Aleksandr Bardovskii on 
December 3, 1941.365 “Radio helped,” echoed Tat’iana Kononova in her January 1942 
notes.366 The city had 460,000 individual and over 1,700 public loudspeakers, and 
residents always gathered around them to hear the latest news and updates. 
Due to electricity shortages, some of the district substations had blackouts and 
radio broadcasting was frequently interrupted. Per poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts (who worked as 
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a broadcaster for the radio committee and whom Leningraders lovingly called “the muse 
of the besieged city”), people could withstand the absence of bread but not radio.  
Frightening people with cloth masks that covered up their faces began emanating 
from the snowbound depths of the city heading to the radio committee building… 
There were many of them, and they all came asking the same anxious question: 
why did the radio fall silent? How soon will it begin to speak again? Is it possible 
to make it happen now, immediately? Because otherwise, it is unbearable to go on 
like this.367  
 
Berggol’ts spent the entire siege in Leningrad. Various diaries speak of the broadcasts 
where she recited poems about death, fear, hunger, and daily suffering. Her soothing 
solemn voice entered blokadniki homes, giving them hope and the desire to fight.  
The Leningrad Radio Broadcast Network had twelve broadcasters and was on air 
24 hours a day, transmitting the latest news, music, book and poetry readings, words of 
encouragement, and air-raid warnings, thereby becoming a symbol of solidarity and 
social connection during the siege.368 Airtime between programs was filled with the 
sound of a ticking metronome. Its beat increased from continuously sounding 55-60 beats 
a minute to an alarming 120-150 beats a minute when the Luftwaffe planes approached, 
thus, warning people of air-raids. The sound of the metronome was associated with the 
beating heart of Leningrad. Psychologically it had an immensely soothing effect: as long 
as people heard it, they knew that the city was still alive and “its heart was beating.”369  
As a means of propaganda, the Radio Network targeted partisans and residents of 
the German-occupied territories, frontline soldiers, the Baltic navy, and children. It also 
                                                 
367 Berggol’ts, Dnevnye zvёzdy, p. 199. 
 
368 Radio broadcasting was unstable due to electrical issues in the city until February 1942. Once 
resolved, radio broadcasting functioned without interruption. 
 





broadcast in German, Finnish, Swedish, and Estonian.370 In many ways, besieged 
Leningrad’s life was regulated by radio announcements: air-raid alarms, shelling 
warnings, changes in rationing, instructions in case of night raids, fire protection, and 
communal vegetable gardens. Serving as a source of moral and cultural motivation, 
education, organization, and propaganda, the radio mobilized the residents and united 
them into a uniform and monolithic defense circuit.       
Devising the formula for the army’s effectiveness, Leo Tolstoy asserted that it 
was the product of the quantity (masses) and the factor unknown, with the latter being the 
spirit of the army. For Leningrad, where civilians turned into combatants, art and culture 
(for the majority by the way of radio) constituted a part of that unknown. The spirit 
triumphed on Sunday evening of August 9, 1942. Barely alive from starvation, the 
musicians – who due to weakness managed to play only parts of the piece after a week of 
rehearsals – premiered Shostakovich’s 7th Symphony. The music was broadcast through 
the loudspeakers across Leningrad and its frontline. The actual musical excellence of the 
piece is debatable, but as an expressive means of psychological warfare, the Leningrad 
Symphony became a remarkable symbol of defiance and resistance. Unbroken and proud, 
the residents listened. Silenced by a Soviet barrage, their tormentors also did. And it 
became crystal clear: those who survived in the absence of actual nutrition by nourishing 
their souls could not be subjugated.         
 
                                                 
370 The foreign department of Radio Committee employed Finnish poet Armas Äikiä and two 
Austrian brothers, Fritz and Ernst Fuchs. Ol’ga Berggol’ts wrote texts that brothers voiced in German. The 
records were later transmitted via broadcasting center for the Nazis to hear. Both Fritz and Ernst survived 






Self-Interest and Moral Decay 
“Wherever you turned, there was villainy and nobleness, self-sacrifice and 
extreme egoism, thievery and integrity.”371 
 
Homo homini lupus est. 
The onset of the “mortal time” drastically changed Leningraders’ lifestyles, daily 
patterns, social interactions, and personal behavior. Daily conditions that threatened 
survival necessitated the employment of either individual or collective strategies to 
preserve the self. The choice depended on a personal assessment of the risks and 
psychological makeup. Disrupting physical and social environments, the war morphed 
the rates and types of crime and delinquency.372 After the imposition of martial law on 
June 22, 1941, the militsiia373 was reorganized and governed by the Military Council of 
the Leningrad Front and the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Municipal Council 
until the end of the war. Duties of the militsiia and other NKVD units374 also changed, 
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and they were assigned such diverse tasks as internal city defense, participation in the 
MPVO (Local Anti-Air Raid Defense) system, detection of “moles,” deserters, and 
defeatists, countering threats, passport and curfew control, help with evacuation and 
orphan placement, organization and control of the housing defense groups,375 protection 
of civilians, industrial security, and direct cooperation with the NKVD and NKO 
(Natsional’nyi Komitet Oborony, National Defense Committee). The militsiia also had to 
accompany bread delivery trucks to the stores, be present during the ration card 
exchange, remove dead bodies from the streets, and issue death certificates.376 Timely 
mobilization, proper instructions, reinforcement, strict regulations, relocation of criminal 
elements, and proactive residential involvement ensured the maintenance of public order 
throughout the siege.377 Additionally, the NKVD had a large number of voluntary and 
involuntary informants in the city.378 Using a “carrot and stick” method, NKVD recruited 
from three main categories of residents: those who wanted to retain Category I ration, 
canteen or store employees, and medical personnel. The motivating factors for 
cooperation included increased rationing, the possibility of evacuating family members, 
improvement in living conditions, former arrests history, or availability of discrediting 
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information.379 The combination of strict repressive policies, public collaboration, and 
increased patriotism effectively promoted stability.380     
Due to the situation created by the siege, the delinquency rates and crime 
activities in Leningrad differed from the rest of the Soviet Union. While in all of the 
USSR the number of crimes heard in a civil criminal court remained the same or 
decreased (1943), the cases tried by military tribunals increased. Leningrad demonstrated 
the opposite correlation. The only index that remained analogous on the national and 
municipal level was the number of people who breached wartime decrees and regulations 
(on hours of employment, frivolous abandonment of workplace, mobilization and 
utilization of manpower).381 
 In Leningrad, the first period of the war was characterized by the emergence of 
anti-Soviet activism (actions/agitation that undermined the current order), the spreading 
of rumors, and political leaflets. The criminal activities of the second period from 
December 1941 to March 1942 were not political and were almost entirely instigated by 
hunger and had to do with the city’s food supply. As hunger raged, Leningraders’ 
feelings numbed and they regarded death with “dull indifference.”382 In some, such 
indifference slowly etched away kindness, readiness to defend the weak, and the ability 
to sympathize. Daily encounters with the dead on the streets, in buildings, and apartments 
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desensitized people further, at times leading to the distinct overstepping of ethical 
boundaries. Moral decay manifested itself through cheating, stealing, looting, and 
occasionally murder. Hunger-driven, these crimes were dictated by the desire to survive. 
“A person can get used to many things… But it is impossible to get used to hunger. To 
have a bite of just anything – this desire could not be suppressed by anything,” 
remembered I. Korolёv.383 However, there were also those who cited the rise of 
delinquency as a license for deviant behavior or enrichment opportunity. 
Introduced on July 18, 1941, ration “cards became the main objects of illegal and 
criminal activities during the siege.”384 Despite the fact that Lengorispolkom ratified the 
use of twelve different forms and four statutory documents in an attempt to regulate card 
distribution on July 26, 1941385, card fraud thrived. In addition to those who attempted to 
use fraudulent cards to feed the hungry, there were people driven by venal interests. One 
of the fraud investigation cases involved Z-va, a head of Home association #110, who 
used the cards to get food but also “sold them and profiteered.”386  
In their daily fight for life, the blokadniki resorted to various tricks for 
manipulating the rationing system and the bread lines in an attempt to get more food. 
During the winter of 1941‒42, waiting time in line could easily exceed 10-12 hours. 
Those at the queue’s end attempted to speed up the process by getting rid of people in 
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front of them, spreading the rumor that bread was just delivered to a neighboring store. 
People often left their spots in the line and went to the other shop. Among those who 
admitted the wrongdoings were the architect Esfir’ Levina and the musician Kseniia 
Matus. They both forged numbered tickets (the stores gave those out to keep the lines 
systematic) in order to get their rations faster.387  
Profiteering from others’ misery is another topic commonly touched upon in the 
diaries. Blokadniki regarded those who profiteered with open hatred and scorn. Excuses 
and justifications were dismissed. Taking advantage of the Leningraders’ semiconscious 
condition and the dim lighting, sales clerks cut out a greater number of coupons from the 
ration cards than necessary and provoked the ire of residents:  
How repulsive are these well-nourished, sonsy ‘coupon-cutters’ that removed 
coupons from the bread cards of starving people, stealing their food in canteens 
and stores. It was quite simple to do: ‘by mistake’ they cut out more than allowed, 
and a hungry person discovered the deception only after getting home when 
nothing could be proved.388   
 
Some diarists expressed strong opinions – “these predators in human form have to be 
destroyed”389 – and others merely recorded their observations. A.G. Berman, an inspector 
of one of the city’s accounting bureaus responsible for verifying the proper distribution of 
the ration cards, noted on May 4, 1942: “Nobody from our accounting bureau, none of 
the inspectors lost family members. None of them died from distrofiia, and none seem to 
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be debilitated by hunger like I am.”390 Her admission indicates that manipulation and card 
fraud at her organization (and most likely at other similar ones) was fairly common.   
Although not prevalent, cheating patients out of their rightful share of food also 
happened at the health facilities. Varvara Vraskaia, who picked her daughter up from the 
hospital on November 6, 1941, noticed that the November 7th coupon was already 
missing.391 The cases of food theft in the facilities for children (orphanages, placement 
centers, kindergartens) by the teaching staff were rare. Only one diarist mentioned that a 
newly-hired teacher was fired after the children complained that “while distributing food, 
she scooped some porridge from the tray with her hand and was eating it in the 
corner.”392 Although an adult could easily take advantage of a child by stealing his food, 
taking from children was a line not many dared to cross, despite dire hunger. 
The picture was quite different in public and institutional cafeterias. Having 
access to the means of survival – food – some personnel took advantage of it. Getting a 
“lucrative job” (khlebnoe mesto) was not easy, and people “dreamed of a job that had 
anything to do with a canteen or a food store. Those who worked there seemed 
privileged, but getting a foot in the door was impossible.”393 Both personal records and 
official reports provide ample examples of dishonorable behavior. Leningrad authorities 
were aware of the situation, but state inspections were conducted sporadically due to the 
lack of assessors and the problem could not be eradicated. Even those who advocated 
against embezzlement and otherwise behaved honestly had a hard time resisting the 
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possibility of getting a little bit of food when tempted. Poet Vera Inber made a note in her 
diary about “a mother [who] did not register the death of her infant. [She] keeps getting 
his ration of milk (condensed or soy)394 and sells it at 100 rubles per liter. With this 
money she buys bread and feeds her husband.”395 Accepting the “benefaction,” some 
rationalized that this food would be used to feed children and starving parents, and some 
did it because they could no longer bear the hunger. This basic need to survive or save 
someone else took precedence over honesty. 
While stores and cafeterias had the highest numbers of thefts,396 locales where 
provisions were delivered to also had a problem with thieving. Thus, Vladimir N., 
secretary of political organization at the Leningrad Front, whose battalion was sent to 
help with urgent loading and unloading work at the Borisova Griva station, witnessed 
“the most brazen pilfering.”397 Assuming that the superiors knew about the theft, he 
nevertheless justified people’s motives: “Emaciated workers are in no condition to do the 
job, and there is nothing to supplement their ration with legally…The supervisors turn a 
blind eye to stealing as it helps them achieve key performance objectives.”398 In attempts 
to minimize the cases of theft, the methods of lecturing, persuading, threatening, and 
disciplining were employed. For the most part, workers stole to feed themselves, and 
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those who embezzled for profit were in the minority.399 Undoubtedly, people’s decisions 
to steer clear of profiteering/theft or not varied. The major reason was hunger itself: 
under the circumstances, people had to do with what little they could get to stay alive. 
(As the Russian saying goes – “ne do zhiru, byt’ by zhivu” – “it is not about thriving, it is 
about surviving,” or, “beggars cannot be choosers.”) Severe punishment and active 
agitprop also impacted such decisions. And some simply did not deem stealing morally 
acceptable. 
As hunger raged, bread (or any other food for that matter) became the local 
currency. In December 1941, the price of bread went up from the state-levied 1 ruble 70 
kopeks per kilogram to 400 rubles on the market, and in January-February 1942 the 
barter system prevailed.400 While the kolkhoznyi rynok (collective farm market), where 
people sold products for the face value, was state-regulated, the tolkuchki were prohibited 
because the items were sold or re-sold for more than face value, which was illegal. In 
addition, the quality-control agencies401 were unable to inspect all unregistered products 
and confiscate those that endangered public health. In her recollections, Zinaida 
Ignatovich talks of Maria Petrovna K. who got some salt at the tolkuchka and made soup 
to feed her daughters and sons-in-law. The ambulance that arrived after receiving the call 
for food poisoning could not help: everyone who ate the soup was pronounced dead. 
Chemical analysis of the remaining salt acquired at the tolkuchka revealed that Maria 
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Petrovna was sold poisonous nitrates that physically resembled crystals of salt and had a 
slightly salty taste.402  
The chance of being cheated at the tolkuchka was very high.403 In the attempt to 
regulate the products for sale, the head of the Municipal Market Administration 
(Gorupravlenie rynkami) Kirillov suggested legalizing tolkuchki temporarily.404 He 
reasoned that  
because the barter system is stimulated by the population’s basic need for food 
and essential goods, we must state that repressive measures are not going to 
prevent this trend from happening. Efforts to eradicate tolkuchki altogether from 
the market squares proved equally useless as they re-emerged in the neighboring 
alleys.405  
 
While there was no official legalization of the barter markets, the militsiia kept them 
under tight control to prevent open exploiting, manipulating, and profiteering. At the 
beginning of 1942 when the first cases of cannibalism were reported, the militsiia paid 
very close attention to those who had meat or meat products to sell.  
People were ready to exchange any valuables they had for something to eat. 
Anything could have been traded “for a piece of bread: a bicycle, samovar, sewing 
machine, and even a bed or furniture.”406 From October 1, 1941, onwards, the authorities 
recovered a total of 192 tons of foodstuffs and arrested 1,524 people for its embezzlement 
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406 Depending on the locale, the rules of trade varied: some places one could buy food for money, 
in other places people swapped valuables for bread. Prices for food also fluctuated. Thus, Misha 
Tikhomirov mentioned that “bread is 300 rubles per kilo, rice – 500, butter – 750,” in the entry for 
December 27, 1941, (Zvezda, 2010, #2). Khodorkov recorded the price of bread at 350 rubles, entry for 
January 14, 1942, in Budni podviga, p. 127. Avgustyniuk notes that a kilo of bread costs 500 rubles, a kilo 





as a result of searches.407 Another report demonstrates how desperate the situation in 
Leningrad had become: trade school students were selling “sweet earth” – dirt collected 
from the location where one of the Badaev warehouses with sugar and confectionaries 
burned down – for 10 rubles a glass.408 What may seem to be a case of preying on 
people’s misery was another example of the frantic attempt to survive: trade school 
students were among the most disadvantaged groups in the besieged city (along with 
refugees).  
Plunder, burglary, and marodёrstvo409 served as vehicles for both enrichment and 
survival. Apartment theft reached “horrifying magnitude”410 and was facilitated by the 
fact that many homes were abandoned because of the owners’ evacuation or death.411 It 
was not only strangers that committed the crimes: “Even your own neighbors force the 
locks open, steal firewood, break into apartments, shamelessly take all things valuable, 
appropriate and sell them, thus, profiteering... Markets are full of people with things of 
their own and stolen.”412 Quite often Leningraders suspected building superintendents 
(upravdom) in the embezzlement of others’ property as they were responsible for sealing 
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408 From January 4, 1942, information report addressed to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov by a head of 
Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)’s organization and information department (orginstruktorskii 
otdel) Antiufeev. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5760. L. 3. Also in Ol’ga Berggol’ts, Dnevnye zvёzdy, p. 
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409 Marodёrstvo or marauding was classified as a military crime that had to do with stealing things 
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410 Z.S. Livshits, entry for March 22, 1942, in Budni podviga, p. 54. 
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412 Ibid. Evdokimov speaks of a neighbor’s 14-year-old son who stole food from people in his 
building. He called the boy a “fake thief” because he was not a stranger. A.F. Evdokimov, entries for April 





the empty apartments.413 Sometimes superintendents resorted to bribing those building 
residents, who were likely to report their theft and appropriation to the authorities. 
Concealing or failing to report evacuees and the deceased allowed caretakers and 
upravdom an additional source of personal gain – extra ration cards. Those whose life 
could be prolonged by the cards also practiced this concealment of the dead; ration cards, 
issued for a period of ten days, permitted supplementing a miniscule portion of the 
rationed food for at least those ten days.414 However, the intent (non-disclosure of the 
dead) was not always a part of regular residents’ motivations to survive (unlike in cases 
where the main incentive was profiteering).415 When in January 1942 the city authorities 
authorized families to keep the ration cards of the perished, frozen corpses still remained 
in the apartments: the blokadniki were too emaciated and weak to remove them.  
By the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, cases of organized robberies 
peaked.416 Dated January 4, 1942, an information report addressed to Zhdanov and 
Kuznetsov by Antiufeev, the head of the Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)’s 
organization and information department (orginstruktorskii otdel), stated that “theft and 
profiteering increased,” and “in the last few days there were six break-in robberies in the 
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Lenin district.”417 Indeed, many of these robberies occurred at night and were perpetrated 
by groups, who often carefully planned and staged them. It is also clear from the reports 
that many robberies were committed in the “heat of the moment,” spontaneously, 
instigated by a sudden change in the surroundings, and not premeditated. Thus, on 
January 10, 1942 unknown individuals stole “25 kilograms of candy and 17 jars of jam” 
from a food truck abandoned during the shelling because assistant manager Fillipova was 
wounded and taken to the hospital, leaving it unguarded.418 On January 12, 1942, the 
report states that a store was looted by a crowd (24 were arrested), “50 kilograms of 
bread were stolen and part of it was trampled underfoot.”419 Considering that food was 
the most precious thing in the besieged city, the fact that the bread ended up on the floor 
and was crushed and that 24 people were detained speak to the impulsiveness of their 
actions as opposed to those actions being part of an operation that was well-planned. 
Unlike robberies or other crimes committed for personal gain, stealing rations 
exchanged for coupons was hunger-driven and often served as a final cry for help. It 
occurred in crowded places like stores, markets, or bakeries and was frequently discussed 
by the diarists.420 Those who delayed when putting away the bread and cards or did not 
hide them right away were the main targets of such assaults. Nina Andreeva, who was 11 
when the war started, remembered that to prevent theft her mother had sewn a special 
pocket into the lining of Nina’s fur coat at chest level so that she could quickly put away 
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ration cards returned by a sales clerk.421 Because it was easier to take things away from 
the weak, the hungry went after children.422 Thus, engineer Livshits witnessed two 
incidents in one day: a teen attempted to grab a piece of bread from a woman near the 
bakery, and later in the canteen “a woman snatched bread from a scared child, turned 
away, and stuffed it in her mouth.”423 When taking a closer look at the records of this 
particular kind of theft, it becomes clear that the majority of those who committed 
wrongdoing were children and adolescents. In most cases, they were orphans, whose 
parents died from hunger or bombings. Left without any means and destined to die, they 
resorted to stealing. Antiufeev’s report to Zhdanov reads: “14- to 15-year-old orphaned 
teens are the most desperate. Orphanages do not take them. Children crowd by the stores 
and bakeries and often snatch bread and other food from customers’ hands.”424   
Once an offender got his hands on the lusted after piece of bread, he immediately 
began eating it, often without even attempting to flee. It was as if the flight-or-fight 
response was extinguished by the more powerful survival instinct: hunger. Having 
snatched a tarrying man’s bread off the counter, a “puny and gaunt” 11- or 12-year-old 
girl ran outside and began taking large bites, swallowing them without chewing. A few 
people from the line ran outside and began “hitting her with frenzy. Blood trickled from 
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her nose, soiling her hands and bread. The girl did not pay any attention to the crowd and 
continued shoving pieces of food in her mouth. It seemed that it was easier to tear off her 
arms than to unclasp her fingers.”425 The hunger was so overwhelming that everything 
else faded in comparison. Nevertheless, when the physical craving briefly waned, a 
feeling of shame arose: “coiling into a small lump, the girl fell onto the wet pavement and 
wept inconsolably.”426  
Those who described such incidents regarded them differently than instances of 
personal enrichment that were harshly judged and moralized. People correlated their 
circumstances with those of little thieves and, while able to sympathize, could not justify 
such deeds. Beatings did not serve as methods of revenge, rather, those whose bread was 
stolen were attempting to get at least some part of their ration back. After all, life itself 
was at stake and depended on the meager portion received. Despite the frequency of such 
acts of mobbing, cases that resulted in fatalities are yet to be discovered.427 As a rule, 
order was restored quickly, and some noted that people from the crowd often stopped the 
beatings. Thus, 11-year-old Irma Issi witnessed how a man who snatched bread from her 
mother at the store was beaten by the crowd. When it finally became clear that all hope to 
get the ration back was lost, Irma’s mother shouted: “Let him go! Can’t you see that he is 
no longer a human being?” When Irma asked what she meant by that, her mother 
explained that, 
distrofiia has three stages. The third final stage results in a complete exhaustion of 
the nervous system. A person is incapable of controlling his own actions and no 
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longer comprehends what he is doing; he leads a life of the most primitive animal. 
His main concerns are centered on food: what and where he can get something to 
eat. It means that a human being ceases to remain human. The most dreadful thing 
about it is that now he is capable of eating another human being. Therefore, I am 
begging you to be very cautious and never enter buildings with strangers.428   
  
The first official record describing the cases of cannibalism is dated January 12, 
1942.429 According to the special NKVD report № 10042, the number of people arrested 
for “the consumption of human meat” was 4 in November 1941, 43 in December 1941, 
366 in January 1942, 612 in February 1942, 399 in March 1942, and 75 in April 1942.430 
Military procurator Anton Ivanovich Panfilenko’s memorandum contains information 
that allows a closer look at the details and statistical data of these gruesome acts. His 
analytical report stated that “the predominant majority of such crimes involved the 
consumption of the dead,” and were instigated by famine, and that the cases of selling 
human meat (or dishes made from it) were few in number.431 Russian Medievalist and 
linguist Dmitri Likhachёv asserted that,  
cannibalism cannot be indiscriminately judged. It was not conscious for the most 
part. Those who carved out parts of a corpse’s flesh rarely ate the meat 
themselves. They either sold it, tricking a buyer or fed their families with it to 
save their lives… When your child is dying and you know that the only thing that 
can save him is protein, you’ll carve a corpse.432  
 
While there is no discord regarding the motives, there is a discrepancy between personal 
observations and official reports on the primary use of the meat acquired: Panfilenko 
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indicated that the meat was predominantly consumed, and Likhachёv opined that it was 
intended for sale. 
Descriptions of gruesome sights are contained in many diaries. After burying her 
husband, former nobility Tat’iana Velikotnaia recorded in the diary she kept for her son: 
 Sasha, if you could only see what goes on at the Shuvalov cemetery! The coffins 
are not closed! Some have been pried open with the departed lying there in a 
semi-nude condition because they have been stripped of their clothes. There are 
naked, beheaded, or partially dismembered corpses. I was horrified at the sight of 
an emaciated body that had a part of its upper leg carved out. What for? To try to 
melt out some non-existent fat to sell?433   
   
While some people indeed went insane from hunger, there were those who were able to 
reason and rationalize their actions. During questioning Igor’ Vladimirovich Sh-ko, who 
was arrested for trupoedstvo (corpse-eating), explained:  
Of course, I know that I did a despicable thing, but my actions were influenced by 
the unbearable desire to live, the aspiration to preserve myself at any cost. And 
ever increasing weakness, the feeling of hunger, and fear of my own death 
numbed all other emotions, and at that time it seemed that nothing could stop 
me.434  
 
Another category of people who resorted to cannibalism was refugees and 
deserters/criminals (although these were few in numbers). Their situation was hopeless: 
the former often were unable to find work and the latter did not want to get caught. In 
either case, receiving ration cards was not feasible. In some ways, thousands of unearthed 
corpses all over the city provoked those, whose mental state was weakened as a result of 
constant hunger.   
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The emergence of cannibalism cases perplexed the authorities since punitive 
measures for this type of crime were not proscribed in the Soviet criminal code. After a 
joint council of civil and military attorneys, the decision to classify it as a violent crime 
with the most severe penalty – Article 16-59-3, a “special category” – was made.435 The 
breakdown of the offenders’ demographic data revealed the following: 63.5% of these 
crimes were committed by women and 36.5% by men, with no significant variations 
within the four age groups; occupation-wise, the largest group belonged to blue collar 
workers at 41%, with those without regular occupation at 31.4%, the unemployed at 
22.4%, white collar workers at 4.5%, and peasants at 0.7%.436 Given the higher 
percentage of women and the number of dependents in the city, it is possible to presume 
that women committed the crime to save the lives of their children (or other relatives) and 
not just their own. The most interesting is the percentage of native Leningraders437 who 
violated the law: 14.7%. The other 85.3% were “individuals with limited education” and 
had arrived in the city at various points.438 The fact that only 2% of all those arrested had 
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previous convictions speaks to the scope of the shift of the mass psyche triggered by 
hunger.   
Clearly, hunger pushed socially acceptable limits, and the diaries illustrate how 
these boundaries were overstepped and perceived by the residents. In the perception of 
the besieged, thieves were not those who got something to eat via a tortuous way. To 
them, theft meant using a piece of bread as a means of preying on the unfortunate and, 
thus, trampling on mercifulness and compassion by humiliating and stealing from the 
hungry. Thieves used people’s suffering to their advantage: taking bribes to advance 
one’s evacuation, trading a loaf of bread for valuables, stealing and marauding to make a 
profit at a time when the city was overflowing with corpses and abandoned apartments 
were left unsupervised. Those lucky ones who got the “crumbs” off someone’s feast on a 
rare occasion were not considered thieves. In the same vein, people recognized the 
hardships, frequently excusing or forgiving a perpetrator: 
I discovered that all my work in the garden has been in vain. Someone stole the 
entire cabbage crop. What a pity! On the other hand, if they stole the cabbage, it 
means they ate it, and if they ate it, they stayed alive! To hell with them. Even 
though they are thieves, after all, they are Leningraders like me.439 
 
Although the validity of the diarists’ judgments can be disputed, the fact that the logic 
and morale of those stuck in the blockade ring diverged from the norm cannot be.  
In passing judgments about the “arrogant and shameless”440 deeds (often 
condemning but at times justifying), the diarists’ rhetoric amalgamated tenets of their 
Soviet upbringing and their own moral standards. Day by day, Leningraders pondered 
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and contextualized the concepts of “legitimacy and entitlement”441 within the “enclosed” 
social stratum where “a colossal reformulation of values [was] taking place.”442 While the 
state reports and figures inform on the types of crime, their scope, demographics, and 
prevention, the records left by eyewitnesses illustrate the residents’ perception and 
interpretation of morality tried by tragedy.  
Besides shelling and bombing, Leningraders faced an arsenal of adversities 
foreign to a normal city dweller. Becoming a “norm”443 in the course of daily practices, 
dehumanization of death444 was a result of Leningraders’ physiological changes due to 
starvation and psychological defense mechanisms that impacted residents’ social 
behavior patterns.445 Physician Ol’ga Sergeeva affirmed that “if it was not for the 
decreased sensitivity and reaction time because of emaciation and cold, I am sure that 
people would have been unable to psychologically handle the conditions.”446 Frequent 
remarks and thoughts on the topic of internal “change” in the diaries allow us to conclude 
that Leningraders were aware of it and often reflected on it.447 Regarding these 
transformations as involuntary and disturbing, people found them outside of the norm.     
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Undeniably, there were cases of theft, marauding, trupoedstvo, and ration card 
fraud. Forensic psychology holds that the expression of criminal behavior depends on 
three main factors – social, psychological, biological – and tends to spike in extreme 
conditions.448 The situation in Leningrad was precisely that. And yet given the 
circumstances, the crime rate in the first year of the siege in the city of almost 3 million 
people was minuscule (1.04%): 31,100 convictions for felonies, infractions, and 
misdemeanors, and 21,605 people found guilty of breaching the “employment obligation” 
decree449 issued on June 26, 1940.450 These figures, coupled with individual records, 
permit the conclusion that despite the rise of crime, people acted honorably, worked, and 
maintained reasonably civil practices and attitudes for the most part.  
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Religion and Faith 
Let me tell you a secret. Not all of us will die, but all of us will be changed.                        
1 Corinthians 15:51 
 
The turn to religiosity was colossal in scope during the siege: at times of 
imminent death many blokadniki prayed, asking God for protection and salvation. 
However, unlike those in imperial Russia, the generation raised after the Socialist 
Revolution of 1917 in an officially atheist society never received religious education.451 
Yet, many people turned to God for help without even knowing or understanding how to 
address Him. During shelling, orphans who listened to the explosions clasped their hands 
and fervently pleaded, “Shells, shells, do not fall onto our Leningrad, onto our 
children.”452 Historically, religion has always had the potential to be a unifying (dividing) 
force that brings people, groups, and societies together. Documentary evidence – reports, 
diaries, criminal investigation documents, photographic material – demonstrating that 
people debilitated by hunger filled the churches of the besieged city testifies to the fact 
that religious faith was a vitally important part of people’s lives, and that religiosity 
played an important role in the city’s defense and Leningraders’ survival.   
Unbearable hardships created the necessity for additional support, a source of 
strength and encouragement, and for many, this void was filled by faith. Before the 
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beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church 
(ROC) and the state seemed to be “on the eve of disintegration.”453 However, the 
invasion by Nazi Germany put the ROC on the verge of demise. Supporting schismatic 
groups, the German forces permitted the work of various sects loyal to the new regime in 
the occupied territories.454 It is true that some church hierarchs, who suffered under the 
Soviet rule, hoped for the Germans to overturn the “godless authorities.” The 
collaboration of some Orthodox priests under Nazis is a also fact, but German religious 
policies (one of many elements of the greater occupational policy) adhered to the 
principle of divide et impera, aiming at the disintegration of the ROC without the 
slightest intention to mend religious life in the USSR.455 On the other hand, the Orthodox 
clergy who supported the ROC consolidated their efforts and often helped or joined 
partisan units.   
As a multi-confessional and multiethnic city, St. Petersburg (renamed to 
Leningrad in 1924) had 80 non-Orthodox and Old-Believer churches, chapels, and houses 
of worship in 1917. By 1941, only three of them – the Choral Synagogue, St. Maria of 
Lourde Roman Catholic Church, and The Leningrad Mosque456 – remained. However, 
the synagogue was the only non-orthodox place of worship that functioned during the 
                                                 
453 Gerhard Simon, Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R. (Berkley-Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1974), p. 66. 
 
454 I.e. Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Methodists, Adventists, Molokans, Dukhobors, Skoptsy, 
Khlysty, Apokalypsists, and others. 
 
455 Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, Churches and Religion in the Second World War, translated by 
Brian Doyle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 232. Although, what was true for the occupied 
territories did not apply to Leningrad that was encircled. 
 
456 The mosque patterned after Gur-e Amir, the tomb of Tamerlan in Samarkand, was turned into 
medical equipment storage and remained closed from 1940 to 1956. St. Maria of Lourde Roman Catholic 





siege in addition to the Baptist community (officially registered in 1945) that gathered in 
the apartments of its members.457 According to the records of the Choral Synagogue, 
there were over 180,000 Jews in the city before the siege.458 Nevertheless, the city’s 
predominantly Russian population adhered generally to the Russian Orthodox faith. The 
diarists do not mention any religion or religious holidays other than Orthodox. 
Because of Bolshevik anti-religious policy, by 1941 the Leningrad Orthodox 
eparchy had only “21 churches; there were no monasteries, theological academies, 
religious publishers, and so on… The total number of ordained priests, including 
catacombal,459 in Leningrad was around 55.”460 Ten of these churches were inside the 
blockade ring, and daily liturgical prayer and worship were held in all of them except for 
the Serafimovskaia cemetery church. The latter was closed for the period from January to 
April 1942 to store dead bodies.461 The basements of some temples had been transformed 
into bomb shelters; many were used to store cultural treasures.462 Kazanskii Cathedral’s 
cellar housed a kindergarten.  
                                                 
457 There is very little information about the synagogue community – only that it donated money to 
the Defense Fund and the city administration allotted flour for the baking of matzah. I also did not find any 
information on the Baptist community. 
 
458 Vladimir Tsypin, Evrei v blokadnom Leningrade (St.Peterburg: Tsentr i Fond Kholokost, 
2016), p. 75.  
 
459 Underground priests to underground church groups. 
  
460 Mikhail Shkarovskii, “Religioznaia zhizn’ blokadnogo Leningrada po novym dokumental’nym 
istochnikam.”  
 
461 TsGA SPb. F. 8557. Op. 9. D. 213. L. 107. 
 
462 St. Isaac and Sampsonievskii Cathedrals stored masterpieces from the Hermitage and other 
museums, Vladimir Cathedral – volumes from Public Library, and Krestovozdvizhenskaia church was used 





On June 22, 1941, the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne Metropolitan 
Sergii (Stragorodskii) of Moscow addressed pastors and parishioners and blessed people 
in their fight to liberate the native land.463 Four days later, he pronounced a prayer of 
supplication for Russian and Soviet victory, and in his patriotic rhetoric, the war was 
described as an assault on Russia, not the Soviet Union. On July 26, the head of the 
Leningrad eparchy Metropolitan Aleksii (Simanskii)464 wrote his speech “The Church 
calls for the defense of the Motherland,” directing it to the clergy and congregation. But it 
was his words about patriotism and the religiosity of the Russian spirit spoken at the 
liturgy on August 10 that had a profound effect on Leningraders:  
Just like at the times of Dmitrii Donskoi and St. Aleksandr Nevskii,465 like at the 
times of struggle against Napoleon, the Russian people’s victory can be attributed 
not only to the Russian nation’s patriotism but also to its deep faith in God’s help 
and a just cause…We shall have the unwavering faith in our final triumph over 
falsehood and vice, in the ultimate victory over the enemy.466    
 
Starting on June 23, 1941, Leningrad parishes initiated voluntary contributions for 
war needs – money, clothing, food – through the Soviet Red Cross467 and National 
Defense468 Funds. According to the state report, by the end of the year 1941, local 
                                                 
463 Ol’ga Vasil’eva ed., Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 
1941-1945 gg. Sbornik dokumentov (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo podvor’ia; Obschestvo liubitelei 
tserkovni istorii, 2009). pp. 38-40. 
 
464 In 1945, Metropolitan Aleksii succeeded to the position of Patriarch of Moscow and all of 
Russia after Metropolitan Sergii passed away on May 5, 1944.  
 
465 Aleksandr Nevskii and Dmitrii Donskoi were princes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
revered in Russian history for leading Russian forces to victory over foreign invaders. 
 
466 Pravda o religii v Rossii (Мoskva, 1942), p. 104.  
 
467 Red Cross Fund accepted food, clothes, medication, and financial donations and was 
established by the Soviet Red Cross Society that partook in medical personnel training, hospital work, 
blood donations, etc. 
 
468 National Defense Fund (Red Army Fund) was a public initiative for voluntary contributions 
(moneys, valuables, jewelry, etc.) to the needs of the front. It received generous donations and a nation-




parishes collected 2,144,000 rubles (the average salary of a blue-collar worker in 1940 
was 375 rubles).469 Moreover, as stated in a January 12, 1943, telegram sent by 
Metropolitan Aleksii to Joseph Stalin, the Leningrad diocese raised and transferred to the 
national Defense Fund 3,182,143 rubles to that date.470 In a letter to Lensovet dated June 
24, 1941, the clergy of Prince Vladimir Cathedral expressed their desire to open up a 
“lazaret” (infirmary) for the wounded and sick soldiers subsidizing it with the cathedral’s 
entire fund of over 700,000 rubles.471 Younger priests enlisted in the army and 
opolchenie, and helped with the construction of the defense fortifications around the city, 
MPVO (Local Air Raid Defense), and with camouflaging the golden domes against air 
raids.472  
Aware of the Church’s active participation in the financial and spiritual 
mobilization of the population, the city authorities not only welcomed the help, but also 
encouraged the initiatives espoused by Leningrad clergy and supported it by regularly 
supplying parishes with lamp oil, candles, flour, and wine for lay communion.473 The 
Soviet government saw religion as a potent source of patriotism and an important factor 
in the country’s defense capable of promoting compliance under a secular authority.  The 
use of the religious aspect by Nazi Germany as an instrument in the ideological war 
against communism and the incessant queries of the allies on issues of “religious 
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freedom” also impacted the decision to reverse anti-religious policies on local and 
national levels. Likewise, the ROC had to make a choice whether it was going to support 
the Soviet government or oppose it. Despite the overall antipathy towards the new power 
due to numerous grievances suffered at its hand, the Church was aware that acting 
independently from the state was out of the question. The understanding that Nazi 
suppression pertained not only to classes but nations impacted the ROC’s choice to side 
with the USSR.474 Although both the Soviet authorities and the Church were later 
accused of opportunism, many overlook that “politics is the art of the possible, the 
attainable – the art of the next best.”475 Both needed each other’s cooperation given the 
urgency of the collective war effort, and their internal disputes had to be set aside.476 This 
“policy of compromise” allowed the restoration of religious life and church in the Soviet 
Union. 
Protoierei Glebov recalled that “during the war, many began to pray openly 
without any secrecy. The fear of state authorities vanished: the war erased it. The need 
for faith and the Church overpowered the fear.”477 Archpriest Valentin Biriukov 
remembered that in the army they quickly learned to pray. Before the bombing, one of 
the officers told him and other young soldiers: “It’s time to pray to God! All of you pray 
                                                 
474 This “deliberation” on the part of the ROC is arguable. Almost immediate response to the news 
of the Nazi Germany’s invasion by Metropolitan Segrii, who called for the defense of native land, rules out 
any sort of collective discussion within the Church on the course of action. His attitude was sincerely pro-
Soviet, which in many ways pre-determined the possibility of the “policy of compromise.”   
 
475 The phrase is attributed to Otto von Bosmarck and  is often used as a Realpolitik’s slogan with 
pragmatic goals overweighing ideological ones. 
 
476 Roger Reese, “The Russian Orthodox Church and ‘Patriotic’ Support for the Stalinist Regime 
during the Great Patriotic” (War & Society Vol. 33, Iss. 2, 2014). Gerhard Simon, Church, State and 
Opposition in the U.S.S.R. (Berkley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 67. 
 






in any way you know or can. If we all do it now, we’ll be all right.”478 Dmitrii Likhachёv 
admitted, “we prayed in the morning. The children also did.”479 In such ominous 
moments, “there was no middle ground. Everything was real. The sky opened up and in 
the sky, one could see God. Good people clearly saw him. Miracles happened.”480 Many 
turned to faith and were baptized. The terminally ill, the hungry, and those with a 
distrofiia III diagnosis (the final and often terminal stage of starvation) remembered 
words from the Gospels and called on God for help.481  
Things unimaginable in the anti-religious atmosphere even a month before the 
invasion were taking place. State publishers printed church leaflets with appeals to join 
the partisan movement and stay strong in the “holy struggle against invaders.” Orthodox 
priests spoke in front of Red Army soldiers (many of whom wore crosses), raising their 
spirits. Churches and cathedrals opened and operated without any restrictions from the 
government. The Church also played a role – although somewhat indirectly – in the 
construction of the ice road across Lake Ladoga: records that contained seasonal 
observations of the river’s ice-thickness kept for centuries by the Valaam monks, allowed 
hydrologist Churov’s team to chart and plan the commencement of vital deliveries along 
                                                 
478 Valentin Biriukov, “Molites’, vrag pod oknom” (Tikhonovskii blagovest. – 2011. #2(86)). 
 
479 Likhachёv. Vospomonaniia, p. 340. 
 
480 Id., p. 342. 
 
481 Tat’iana Velikotnaia recorded in her diary on March 30, 1942, “It is the Passion Week, I should 






the route.482 The rebirth of the Russian Orthodox Church was spawned at the most 
dreadful time the country had experienced.483  
By July 1941, “the churches were full, two liturgies were served daily: the early 
and the late.”484 Although the statement about the full churches might be an exaggeration, 
it has a simple explanation: prior to the war, the churches were often empty and when 
attendance increased after June 22, 1941, the change seemed drastic. Every church had 
fire and air defense brigades comprised of parishioners. Special prayers for the Red Army 
soldiers’ victory and their deliverance from the enemy’s captivity were pronounced 
during the Divine Liturgies. The moleben, a traditional liturgy of thanksgiving and 
supplication, of 1812 for those who fought against foreign invaders in the Patriotic War 
was also served.485 
By the end of September 1941 when the Germans had ceased their attempts to 
take the city, the legend of Leningrad’s miraculous safeguarding by divine forces was 
born. The Metropolitan Iliia Salib (or Karam of Mount Lebanon) prayed fervently for the 
protection of Russia for three days without sleep, food, or water. He had a vision of the 
Virgin Mary who told him God’s will:  
                                                 
482 Iurii Bakhnykin, “Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v blokadnom Leningrade” (History 
magazine, #09, 2005). Also in Reid, Leningrad, p. 202. 
 
483 “At first glance, it seems paradoxical that World War II, the most tragic even in the history of 
our country, became the salvation of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Tat’iana Chumachenko, Church and 
State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002), p. 3. 
 
484 Services were adjusted to the wartime conditions: morning liturgy began at 8:00 and the 
evening ran from 16:00 to 18:00. From the interview with Protoierei Boris Glebov, Spaso-Preobrazhenskii 
Cathedral of St. Petersburg. 
 
485 Mikhail Shkarovskii, “Religioznaia zhizn’ blokadnogo Leningrada po novym dokumental’nym 





There will be no military success until all closed places of worship, monasteries, 
theological academies, and seminaries are re-opened; until the priests are released 
from prisons to perform their spiritual duties in the temples. The city of Saint 
Peter486 is not to be forsaken. While my image remains within its walls, not a 
single enemy will enter. The miracle-working icon of Our Lady of Kazan’487 is to 
be taken around the city in a cross procession. 488  
 
When Metropolitan Iliia visited the Soviet Union in November 1947 and came to Prince 
Vladimir Cathedral, he relayed the vision and confirmed his getting in touch with the 
representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government to deliver 
God’s message.489 Unfortunately, the procession with the Kazan’ Icon along the city’s 
borders where the Germans later halted cannot be verified.490  
Tales of amazing visions, omens, and God’s help that circulated in the besieged 
city clearly demonstrate that many residents believed in and sincerely hoped for a miracle 
and that perhaps some of them got them. Describing the siege, Archpriest Valentin 
Biriukov who served at the Leningrad front defending the Ice Road, said that “there were 
all the conditions for death and none for life. None, except for the faith in God.”491 His 
                                                 
486 St. Petersburg/Leningrad. 
 
487 Revered as the “liberator and protector of Holy Mother Russia,” Kazanskaia Icon of Mary and 
baby Christ came to Russia from Constantinople in the thirteenth century. Its miraculous qualities of 
helping achieve military victories stem from the year 1612 when Princes Minin and Pozharskii (who prayed 
in front of the icon, took it in front of their regiments, and carried it into battles) freed Moscow from Polish 
invaders. Later, it was successfully used in the Battle of Poltava of 1709 against Swedish aggressors and 
again in 1812 against Napoleon’s army. In 1710, Peter I moved the icon from Moscow to St. Petersburg. 
 
488 Mikhail Shkarovskii, “Religioznaia zhizn’ blokadnogo Leningrada,” in D. Shkaev ed., 
Iazycheskie verovaniia i khristianstvo Russkogo Severa (Moskva: RAN, 2012), pp. 78-79. 
 
489 GARF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 66. L. 152-153. 
 
490 Ibid. Curiously, the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan’ was later taken to Moscow and Stalingrad. 
During the battle for Stalingrad, it stayed on the right bank of the Volga River which the Nazis did not 
cross. It is rumored that Zhukov transported the icon to various fronts during the Patriotic War. This fact 
was confirmed by Zhukov’s daughter Maria in her book Marshal Zhukov: Sokrovennaia zhizn’ dushi 
published in 1999.   
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own survival experience after being wounded Archpriest Valentin attributes to Blessed 
Kseniia,492 who came to help nurses with all the ill and injured during the siege.493 
Besides all the lore, there were plenty of miraculous stories of survival when help came 
out of nowhere. Siege survivor Nina Mikhailovna Fёdorova revealed how in the late fall 
of 1941 in the absence of food her mother Nataliia boiled old newspapers until they 
turned into a homogenous mixture and fed it to the 7-year-old Nina and her 3-year-old 
brother Anatolii. One day when Nataliia went to get their rations, an air raid started and a 
marine who was trying to save her pushed her down. Getting up, she saw three icons on 
the snow: of St. Nicholas, St. John, and the Mother of God. The reverse of the latter said, 
“Baker’s Holy Mother of God.” The next day a soldier gave Nataliia a kilogram of oats 
on the street. This gift saved their lives that winter.494 While the exaggeration and 
possible fabrication of such stories cannot be ruled out, they testify to the growing 
religiosity (or the need to believe in something that offers consolation and hope) and 
desire to uplift the spirit and brighten up the days of strife. 
In times of fear, hunger, and suffering, Orthodox priests led the tired-out 
congregation by their own example of stamina, patience, and endurance. Keeping up 
people’s spirits, they instilled faith and hope that God would not abandon the Russian 
nation in its struggle.495 It was this faith that became a source of physical and emotional 
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strength for those who lived in and defended the city. Without any interference from the 
city authorities, the assembly of Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral organized a bomb 
shelter in the cathedral’s basement that accommodated 500 people. It had some water and 
medical supplies, and people could spend the night there in case of emergency. The 
congregation helped neighboring residents by giving money, firewood, and candles, by 
allotting plywood to replace shattered window glass, providing wooden planks for 
constructing coffins, and by making traditional furnaces (burzhuiki) out of iron sheets.496     
The number of diaries belonging to the religiously devout – or at least those who 
can be easily identified as believers – is limited. Some writings contain brief mentioning 
of religiosity or awkward prayers. Thus, pondering about the current situation, school 
student Valeria wrote in her diary:  
Mama definitely believes in God. She thinks that papa prays for us, perhaps, aunt 
Sofa does, and, most certainly, gran Zhenia with aunt Liuba do [all died in 
December 1941]… Who knows? I don’t understand much about it. After all, I am 
not a believer. Although considering all fortunate things that have been happening 
to us lately, I am ready to believe in Providence.497  
 
Of course, the lack of direct statements and declarations of faith in personal records do 
not prove the absence of such. Thus, the famous blockade poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts – who 
not only kept records during the siege but also collected siege diaries sent to her by 
residents after the war – was a religious person just like Anna Akhmatova, another 
Leningrad poet evacuated at the end of 1941, but neither spoke of their faith. The diaries 
of Dmitrii Likhachёv, Tat’iana Velikotnaia, and Vera Berkhman remark on visiting the 
church, reciting prayers, and observing religious holidays. They also speak of people 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
496 TsGA SPb. F. 4769. Op. 3. D. 147. L. 11-20, 57-58. 
 





whose fight for survival directly or indirectly was influenced by faith.498 Most Soviet 
citizens who were religiously devout – the census of 1937 indicates that 57% of the 
population “confessed allegiance to one or another form of religion”499 – belonged to the 
older generation raised in the pre-Soviet period500 and, generally, consisted of women and 
the elderly. But, even writing the word “God” – perhaps involuntarily – that is frequently 
encountered on the pages of various diaries speaks to the fact that people were hoping for 
some kind of miracle or the protection of a higher force despite their atheistic upbringing.   
Information on the scope of Leningrad’s Orthodox congregation is primarily 
drawn from the wartime notes and recollections of the clergy, their correspondence with 
parishioners, communications, and reports to the authorities, as well as the NKVD 
records. According to the reports submitted by the housing political educators,501 the rise 
of religiosity began in August 1941.502 Testifying at the Nuremberg Trials, Archpriest 
Nikolai Lomakin stated that on the Holy Saturday of 1942 “there was an enormous line 
of people waiting outside of Prince Vladimir Cathedral to fulfill their Christian devotion” 
                                                 
498 Thus, Likhachiov recorded how historian Vasiliy Komarovich sensing his death dated each 
page of his dissertation. “He counted days. And he saw God: his notes not only bear the dates but also 
Christian holidays.” In Dmitrii Likhachёv, Vospominaniia, p. 343.  
 
499 Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, Churches and Religion in the Second World War, translated by 
Brian Doyle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 29. In 1913, almost the entire population of the 
Russian Empire considered itself religious. It took the state a little over 20 years to cut the number of 
believers almost in half and raise a new generation of “godless atheists.” 
 
500 This fact is confirmed in the Order #20 issued by the Reich Main Security Office “On the 
church issue in the occupied territories” dated October 31, 1941. It states that the young generation is 
indifferent towards religiosity “in the result of communistic and atheist education.” In Russkaia 
Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg., p. 531. 
 
501 Housing political educators – during the siege each apartment building had a superintendent 
whose duties entailed dealing with rumors, enemy’s propaganda, and information update. They organized 
lectures on political, military, and historical topics, spoke with people during air raids in bomb shelters and 
other crowded places. They also helped building managers with injured residents, setting up water boiling 
and heating stations, etc. 
 





and touch the Holy Shroud.503 An additional source of data is also available from the 
photo- and cinematographic material archived.504 For example, the state archive and the 
Museum of Leningrad Defense contain numerous photos taken by V.G. Kulikov and 
A.A. Shabanov during Easter 1942 and Christmas 1943 as per orders of the city 
authorities.505 The 17,423,100 rubles donated during the siege506 by the Leningrad 
Orthodox diocese and parishioners is also a strong indicator that the level of religiosity in 
the besieged city was very high. 
The patriotic devotion507 of the Orthodox Church to its native land was not 
limited to its declared support of the Soviet government or to blessing people in their 
fight with the aggressors. Its contributions to the national funds for “military needs and 
presents” to the soldiers, the wounded, and the sick testify to “inexhaustible love and 
devoutness to the matter of saving the Otechestvo508 and a firm belief that God’s 
wondrous help will not be lacking.”509 In changing the international focus to a national-
patriotic one, the state’s ideological work conducted through the masses incorporated all 
aspects of life from cultural and historical to theological and personal. The Orthodox 
                                                 
503 Nurnbergskii protsess. Sbornik maretialov v 2-kh tomakh (Moskva: Gosiurizdat, 1954), Vol. 1, 
p. 774. 
 
504 See Appendix V. 
 
505 TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op.33. D. 76. L. 153. 
 
506 For the period from July 1, 1941 to December 31, 1944, the contributions made by the city 
residents amounted to 14,982,395 rubles and 65 kopeks. TsGA SPb. F. 9324. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 10, 22, 24. 
 
507 Still eliciting debate, the concept of the ROC’s “patriotic devotion” is being questioned for its 
sincerity. The diametrically opposed ideological rivals, the Church and the atheist state, found themselves 
on “one side of the barricades.” Those who retained loyal regard for the imperial ways (“white” patriots) 
condemned the ROC for its unnecessary conformism in dealings with the Soviet authorities. 
 
508 Native land. 
 
509 From Metropolitan Aleksii’s words to Leningrad congregation. Russkaia Pravoslavnaia 





Church acted as a catalyst and a binding component, becoming the pillar of statehood and 
patriotism. Just like during the time of the tsars when the ROC was imperative to the 
“dissemination of Russian culture and of norms and values throughout the enormous 
empire,”510 in its address to the public, the clergy touched on the subject of the traditional 
piety Russian people felt towards their homeland, their heightened sense of duty, a strong 
belief in righteousness, and faith in God. Providing examples from the country’s 
historical past and remembering prominent military leaders and heroes – “just like during 
the times of Saint Aleksandr Nevskii and Saint Dmitrii Donskoi, on the ice of Lake 
Chudskoe, on the banks of the Don River, and at the Kulikovo Field, when the great 
battle between justice and injustice was fought, now ... the battle between the offensive 
German and the defensive Slavic worlds is being waged,”511 – the Church contributed to 
and promoted patriotic education. Thus, in the fall of 1941, Kazanskii Cathedral held an 
exhibition on the “Russian nation’s heroic past.” In 1942 it was replaced by the “Patriotic 
War of 1812.” The military uttered vows of honor and commitment in front of the statues 
of Mikhail Kutuzov and Michael Barclay de Tolly. As a resting place for such prominent 
Russian military leaders as St. Prince Aleksandr Nevskii and Alexander Suvorov, 
Aleksandr Nevskii Lavra’s monastery was also visited by soldiers who were leaving for 
the front.512  
Places of worship (like other densely populated areas) became the targets of Nazi 
shelling and bombings throughout the siege. They conducted particularly ruthless attacks 
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511 From Metropolitan Aleksii’s address to Leningrad congregation in March 1942. Russkaia 
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during religious holidays such as Easter and Christmas. Thus, the Luftwaffe’s mass air 
raids that began at 17:00 on April 4, 1942 and lasted all night until the morning of April 
5, 1942, which coincided with Orthodox Easter, targeted cathedrals and churches, the 
most crowded places in the city.513 Serving as a senior priest in Prince Vladimir 
Cathedral, Nikolai Lomakin remembered how those who were still alive tried to find a 
place to hide after two bombs fell on the temple. People ran to him asking why the 
Germans bombed the cathedral: “We thought that Germans believed in God, that they 
loved Christ, that they do not harm those who believe. Where and what is their faith if 
they are so vicious on the Saturday of Holy Week?”514  
Despite the bombings, services continued and with time, people remained for the 
entire duration of the liturgy. Fulfilling his priestly duties, Archimandrite Vladimir who 
attended to two parishes (Prince Vladimir Cathedral and St. Prince Vladimir Church) 
regularly risked his life. He testified:  
At the time of the shelling, I tried not to interrupt the liturgy and comforted 
sufferers who came to pray. Even with broken glass falling on our heads, I did not 
suspend the service. Quite often people brought me to the church on a sled 
because I could not walk. On Sundays and holidays I went to Lisii Nos, often 
walking 25 kilometers under fire and overcoming other obstacles, but I never 
refused the duty entrusted to me.515  
 
One of the parishioners who frequented Prince Vladimir Cathedral later recalled that 
services in December 1941 were held in the churches where  
temperatures [inside] fell to zero. Cantors sang dressed in their coats with collars 
lifted up, wrapped in shawls, wearing valenki516 and skouphos.517 Church 
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members who stood and prayed looked the same. Despite all fears, the cathedral's 
attendance did not diminish. On the contrary, it increased. Services were unrushed 
and held in full. There were many communicants and penitents, heaps of prayer 
notes for health and for peace of soul, endless general molebens and 
pannychidas.518 
 
Understanding the significance of their roles to the community, ecclesiastics of St. 
Nicholas Cathedral sent a petition to Lengorispolkom asking for “permits allowing free 
movement at the time of air raids for religious servants N.I. Lomakin, V.A. Dubrovitskii, 
P.F. Maslov, and N.D. Uspenskii.”519 
Many members of the clergy either lived at places of worship or moved close to 
them to save strength and be available to those in need. Metropolitan Aleksii who spent 
all 872 days of the siege in the city, visited local churches and talked to the clergy and the 
laity, doing everything in his power to continue services and spiritual guidance. He 
carried on daily services at Nikol’skii Cathedral where he moved to, and every evening 
after serving the moleben to St. Nikolas he walked around the cathedral praying that the 
saint would save the city and the cathedral from destruction.520 Another siege survivor 
remembered that Metropolitan Aleksii was  
so approachable and easy to talk to that even brave Leningrad teens who put out 
fires caused by incendiary bombs confided their simple matters in him. Anybody 
in grief or need could come to him. He was like a father and a comforter for the 
believers... Those who were not religious deeply respected the courageous 
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metropolitan for his refusal to evacuate and leave behind his children of God who 
were in mortal danger.521    
 
Like the laity, many priests refused to evacuate in the beginning of the war and 
faced extreme cold and hunger. During the second and third waves of evacuation522 when 
the authorities made a decision to leave in Leningrad only those who were vital to the 
fulfillment of the war front’s needs and the population’s essential demands, the parish 
clergy continued its services. Only two permanent and three catacomb priests were 
evacuated.523 This decision constituted the state’s unofficial recognition of the religious 
role in the defense of the city. Although this role had been recognized by the authorities 
much earlier – when the decision to provide parishes with flour, wine, candle wax, and 
firewood came in response to the November 1, 1941, letter from Nikol’skii Cathedral’s 
clergy.524 Another concession made to the Church was permission to conduct large 
religious processions (on Easter and Christmas) around the churches, which functionally 
lifted the ban on religious services outside of places of worship. 
While living in as equally inhumane conditions as their parishioners, the priests 
donated their own money to the flock. In the letter sent to Spaso-Preobrazhenskii 
Cathedral on January 18, 1942, singer Evgenii Radeev expressed gratitude for sending 
him “150 rubles and a piece of bread… You saved me from death. I am feeling much 
better. Your money bought me some firewood at the market.”525 The clergy often gave 
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their food rations away, which at times resulted in the priests dying of hunger themselves. 
Learning that Hieromonk Simon, who visited their abode before Holy Unction, died five 
days later, Vera Berkhman suffered pangs of conscience remembering how she did not 
want to add two cubes of sugar she received to the common table for sharing a meal with 
him.526 Mariia Dubovitskaia, ballerina at the Kirov Theater and daughter of Archpriest 
Vladimir Dubovitskii, said that  
[T]here has not been a single day during the war when my father missed work. He 
was a minister of St. Nicholas Naval Cathedral. Quite often watching him falter 
from hunger, I cried begging him to stay at home afraid that he was going to fall 
somewhere and freeze to death. But he replied, ‘I have no right to languish, 
darling. I must go, bring people’s spirits up, console them in their grief, 
strengthen, and reinforce their spirit.’ And he walked to his cathedral. Throughout 
the entire siege – whether there was shelling or bombing – he has not missed a 
single service. I remember walking him out, watching how the snow hit his back, 
wind blew up his frock, and wondering what force made him carry on if the last 
piece of anything he had to eat he gave to me... Father donated money that we had 
to the city’s defense fund just like many other priests did.527  
 
People found consolation in listening to prayers. “One night papa528 heard me 
reciting the ‘Our Father’ prayer. ‘Say it one more time,’ he said. I did, and he repeated 
after me. ‘Recite all the prayers,” he asked. I was lying in bed reciting them in order.”529 
A deeply religious person, Tat’iana Velikotnaia mentioned how a few days before her 
husband died he told her that they had to order thanksgiving moleben for their son 
Sasha’s survival, and urged her to take communion.530 In her diary, she wrote that 
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“before death, a person’s soul seeks closeness with God, the ideal of eternal truth and 
eternal life.”531  
Funeral services were also performed for the dead. Leningraders delivered dead 
relatives to the church cemeteries on sleds or pieces of plywood and ordered 
pannychidas. “We read the burial service for the father in Prince Vladimir Cathedral,” 
wrote Dmitrii Likhachёv.532 Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin witnessed many times how, 
“debilitated by hunger, people wanted to bring the dead to the cemetery to bury, but 
unable to do it themselves and drained of all strength, they fell right next to the remains 
and died.”533 Bodies could be encountered anywhere: streets, apartment buildings, 
hospitals, fields, cemeteries, and churches. After burying her husband, Tat’iana 
Velikotnaia went to the church to request a service. She was stunned by “how many 
deceased” there were: “I counted ten coffins to my right and eight to my left. And these 
are only the ones that are open for the burial service. By the entrance door near the front 
icons, there are closed coffins on the floor waiting for their turn.”534 Nikol’skaia 
Bol’sheokhtinskaia Church was “surrounded by piles of bodies that partially obstructed 
its entrance. Each pile contained anywhere from 30 to 100 people.”535 100 to 200 coffins 
were brought to the cathedral daily, and a priest walked around them performing the 
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funeral service.536 However, the great number of bodies brought to the churches can 
hardly serve as evidence of religious faith in itself. The reasons might have been more 
pragmatic: church cemeteries’ convenient proximity to some residents’ homes, or hope 
that the body would be actually buried and the location of the grave would be known.   
Due to the paucity of ordained clergy, quite often one priest or deacon ended up 
fulfilling a number of roles in the church or taking on all the responsibilities. Thus, 
protopresbyter Pavel Fruktovskii of Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral alone carried out 
liturgies, mass, confessions, unction, burials, etc. The parish petition for awarding 
Fruktovskii a medal “For the Defense of Leningrad” written in the fall of 1943 read: 
“During the winter of 1941‒42 in the absence of public transportation, swollen from 
hunger father Pavel who lived 15 kilometers away from the cathedral came to work on a 
daily basis, being the only priest in our community.”537 He “sometimes came on duty 
absolutely ill and had to spend the night in the freezing cathedral because he had no 
strength to walk back home.”538 Out of 55 ecclesiastics, over one-third – 20 clergy in 
total – perished by the end of the siege. Twenty-one of those who survived were awarded 
medals “For the Defense of Leningrad.” Upon comparison, the casualty ratio among the 
clergy (2.75) is comparable to that of the civilians (2.5).539        
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Many of those who lived through the siege came to believe in God because they 
had witnessed the inexplicable – from a scientific perspective – miracle of survival.540 
The bitter experience gave rise to a desire to help others. Without mutual assistance, the 
besieged would not have survived. With the passing years, many realized that the salutary 
principle of collective aid during the blockade coincided with a Christian 
commandment.541 After the war, Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin summed up the Church’s 
dedication to his fellow man and the role it played during the siege:  
Russian people, Leningraders fulfilled their patriotic duties to the very end. 
Despite the cruelest bombardments and raids by the German aviation, exceptional 
order and organization prevailed in the city. And the Orthodox Church has drunk 
from the cup of all sufferings together with the nation. Its prayers and sermons 
instilled courage and solace in the hearts of believers, and it laid a plentiful 
sacrifice on the altar of the native land.542 
 
Given the circumstances and extreme conditions, the population’s psychological 
crisis was predictable. It is reasonable to believe that some of those who sought help from 
and refuge in the Church were not religious in the sense that they embraced the spiritual 
belief system of the Russian Orthodox Church as practiced before the Revolution. Not 
being able to find rational explanations or ways to deal with grim prospects, some 
Leningraders attempted to find a universal solution, and religion channeled it. The fear of 
death (so irrational in peaceful times but so definite during the siege) played a crucial role 
in revising the personal belief systems (for some) and in the spike in overall church 
attendance. The idea of God’s will and patronage provided an emotional outlet for the 
faithful congregation, the clergy’s practical help and willingness to listen satisfied those 
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with more pragmatic motives, and praying in public created the impression of spiritual 
and psychological communion and assisted in overcoming the inescapable disintegration 
of daily routine. 





Nazi Germany’s siege of Leningrad from 1941 to 1944 is of particular importance 
in military, political, and social history. Here, the focus on soldiers is shifted to the 
civilians who became combatants under extreme circumstances. The tragic events that 
took place in Leningrad have been described in hundreds of personal records, but this 
chronicle of the “mortal time” – as it was for Leningraders during the siege – was altered 
by the official Soviet historiography’s presentation of the defense of Leningrad as an 
optimistic 900-day heroic tale. While the emotional anguish and physical suffering were 
omitted in the descriptions of daily life and beyond the fact that the city withstood and 
did not surrender, the question of what the blokadniki went through and how the majority 
managed to survive and remain sane have yet to be thoroughly explored and incorporated 
into the historical narrative. Personal records do not dispute the “beautified” version of 
the siege, but they add another dimension to it. Occasionally ugly and shocking, this 
dimension brings closer the understanding of what people experienced when they 
realized that hunger was capable of damaging ethical norms, and that there was nothing 
more dreadful than the weakening of self-control that could happen despite one’s will.  
Each story of the siege had an individual identity and own history that often did not 
conform to the politicized one. And yet, these two histories fused; both used personal 
experiences to create meaningful chronicles of the tumuluous events and the shaping the 
collective memory. The center of one chronicle was the drama and at the center of 
another was heroism. Reaching beyond state-proclaimed patriotism, the diarists sought 
motivations for the reasons to live in their city with their families, and their “collective” 




 While not all of the factors were equally important to all Leningraders, choosing 
a survival strategy (individual or collective) took time. One of the things that the Soviet 
scholarship has accurately pinpointed (which gave it the basis for further manipulation of 
the “hero saga”) was the original impetus for the struggle: patriotism. Although this work 
looks at other sources of strength, all of them intricately tie to the notion of patriotism 
and individual interpretations of it. Its politicized pre-war version was replaced by the 
national and civil one with the focus on the personal aspect of it. The idea that, in case of 
defeat, the USSR not only faced demise but the enslavement and extermination of its 
population, made an enormous impact. It underscored the importance of homeland (as in 
family, city, country) and the justness of their struggle. The extermination aspect of the 
war (never before declared by any invader)543 determined the resolve of the people to 
endure exceptional privations.  
Initially high, the patriotic mood started to wane with the losses suffered by the 
Red Army, encirclement, and understanding that the war would last longer than 
anticipated. It received a major boost by the way of Stalin’s speech on November 7, 
1941. During the “mortal time,” when the feelings of despondency reached their highest 
in January 1942, the patriotic language in the diaries began to decrease. However, belief 
and hope in a final victory was unwavering save for a few turncoats. As rationing 
increased, the second wave of evacuation began and survival strategies were refined, the 
sense of national patriotism climbed and remained high until the end of the war. 
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Remarkably, collective behavior remained almost constant throughout the siege with a 
minor setback at the beginning of the winter of 1941‒42.  
Leningraders were tested by unbearable conditions in the winter of 1941‒42. It 
took a while for the residents to grasp the scale of the tragedy. The imposed information 
vacuum, the limited social circles, and the numerous rumors contributed to the intense re-
evaluation of reality and the observation of self and others. Due to physical weakness and 
absence of public transport, many blokadniki had a very restricted traveling range, which 
hindered their ability to witness and analyze the bigger picture. As the communal 
environments shrunk, the factor of family – both immediate and accidental – became 
increasingly important. As in other cases, the winter period tested the stability of 
relationships and the dependability of partners. Some families withstood the test by 
privations, some deteriorated little by little, and a few collapsed right away. As 
Leningraders lost their loved ones, the need for help and support pushed them to seek out 
other close relations. 
The besieged person’s weakening of will happened with either a stark speed, at 
times unexpectedly, or gradually, which pushed people to seek out defense strategies. 
However, it was this gradual reassessment of ethical norms that made the concurrent 
breakdown of all of them impossible. The shift in conduct depended on the upbringing, 
support level, adaptability of life style, and an individual’s ability to endure. Although, 
none of these factors alone guaranteed moral steadfastness. Some behaved decently and 
conscientiously and some reprehensibly and callously. There were those who took their 
civil and work duties selflessly, those who were broken emotionally, and those who 




others do the same, and some wanted to survive at somebody else’s expense. Tragically, 
the same person, under different circumstances, could behave as a hero or a crook. In 
addition, based on the behavior of a few people, some made resolute conclusions that 
such behavior (good or bad) was a norm. The interruption of social/familial connections, 
the chaotic atmosphere, and the desire to survive by any means possible escalated 
criminal behavior. While the emergence of different types of crime and the time it took to 
curb them varied, the steady rise began in November‒December 1941 and decreased in 
the summer of 1942. 
The principle of the kollektiv greatly impacted people’s decisions to act in certain 
ways. It was hard to forsake the norms and do something abysmal in the face of 
condemnation. On the other hand, some people who witnessed stealing, cheating, or 
marauding deemed such actions acceptable under the circumstances. However, the 
complete breakdown of the system of values and principles of conduct was not possible; 
surviving alone was not feasible in Leningrad, and, to receive help, one had to adhere to 
socially acceptable rules. Those who belittled or openly despised others could not expect 
to be treated with respect. Those who did not share could not count on others being 
merciful to them. Those who exhibited hostility, advanced at another’s expense, or 
enriched themselves by taking from others were shut out. What is more, the exact things 
that were supposed to ensure the collapse of moral norms reaffirmed and strengthened 
them. Reproaching themselves for certain actions or criticizing others, the blokadniki 
involuntarily re-confirmed traditional values. By suspiciously asking a sales clerk to 
double check the weight of bread or yelling at someone who was trying to cut in line, 




As the days stretched into weeks and weeks stretched into months, Leningraders 
found new ways to cooperate. In addition to “internally triggered” motivating factors, 
there were two “external” ones: religion and art. Serving as consolation, clarification, and 
inspiration, both uplifted people and gave them hope. The upsurge in the demand of 
various forms of art (books, theater) was immediate at the onset of the war. It gradually 
increased changing only in the type and expression (radio concerts, diary writing) making 
it crucially important during the “mortal time.” Just like art, religiosity as a motivational 
factor peaked during the deadliest stage of the siege (when hope in a miracle was high), 
decreasing somewhat in the spring (not in the spirituality but the numbers – death, 
evacuation, and public works greatly reduced those who attended churches), and steadily 
rose again after 1943.  
 Although not everybody was ready to make sacrifices for the sake of others, there 
were always people who helped loved ones and the strangers by dragging a loaded sled, 
seeking out orphans or the sick, or offering someone in need a place to stay. Analyzing 
Leningraders’ behavior through their diaries, Sergei Iarov summed it up:  
While understanding that it was easier to survive without sharing, people shared. 
While knowing that they could not be compensated, people gave what they could. 
While starving themselves, people found strength to feed others. There was 
something absolute and immutable in the price paid to let someone live. It was the 
life itself, and giving more than life was not possible.544  
 
The final outcome affirmed that, while survival strategies varied, the readiness to fight 
until the end was held by the majority.545 Although between 800,000 and 1.2 million 
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people starved to death during the siege, the Nazis did not succeed in forcing them to 
relinquish the city.  
The siege of Leningrad also tested the Soviet system’s confidence in the priority 
of public interests above individual ones and proved the efficacy of collective survival 
tactics and the government’s ability to organize and mobilize. Diaries and other 
documents disclose that the consolidation of the efforts made by both authorities and 
residents (their mobilization and regulation coupled with effective propaganda and the 
people’s readiness to defend their loved ones, homeland, and very right to live) were all 
at play during the winter of 1941‒42.  
For the siege survivors who lived through a very particular war-time experience 
that drastically differed from everybody else’s, the memory of the Leningrad Blockade 
became a part of Leningraders-Peterburgers’ unique self-consciousness and mentality. In 
conditions when “physiological survival seems impossible to us today, the vast majority 
of the blokadniki did not turn into a mad, downtrodden mob, ready to gnaw each other’s 
throats for bread crumbs; they did not lose dignity, or ability to work, to creatively think, 
to learn, and to evolve.”546 And this pride of retaining human face in the inhumane 
conditions is passed from the generation of the survivors to their descendants. In his 
recollections, Dmitrii Likhachёv classified them: “Were Leningraders heroes? Not just 
heroes, they were martyrs.”547 Daniil Granin thought of Leningrad “as a symbol of 
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innocent people’s suffering.”548 And although both opinions are valid, Leningraders’ 
actions illustrate how their understanding of the common tragedy roused the sense of a 
shared destiny and “welded people together.”549 And while such unity was not constant 
for everyone all the time, the sense of achievement and the increasing awareness 
generally helped residents carry through.  
This work was written not to downplay the suffering experienced by the 
blokadniki or to deny the cases of “moral distrofiia” that undoubtedly occurred and have 
become the focal point of recent publications. My goal was to identify factors that served 
as sources of strength and motivation to carry on and endure based on the personal 
records. Most people whose diaries, memoirs, and recollections are used in this thesis are 
no longer alive. But they left behind piercing testimonies of everyday life, emotional, and 
physical struggle that they witnessed and were part of during the siege of 1941‒44. 
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balanda thin flour soup 
blokadnik/ 
blokadniki 









sing. (pl.) small, metal stoves with flues that had to be affixed 
to the ventilation outlet as it produced a lot of soot. Because the 
apartments had no such outlets Leningraders’ faces have been 
tarnished by burzhuika’s smut. These little stoves were used to 
heat water for tea and prepare food and were stoked with 
whatever fuel was at hand: books, furniture, parquet flooring. 
 




person affected by distrofiia 
 
Voluntary People’s Druzhina (also translated as Voluntary 
People’s Guard, People’s Volunteer Militia/Squad) were 
detachments for maintaining public order and helping those in 
need. 
GKO State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony) 
Gorkom VKP(b) Municipal Committee of Soviet Union (or All-union) 
Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) 
kollektiv group, team, crew, personnel, association, staff, body, or unit 
kollektivizm collective/collaborative effort, collectivism 
Komsomol abbreviation of Communist (Kom-) Union (so-) of Youth 
(mol). 




Leningrad Municipal Executive Committee 
Lengorsovet or 
Lensovet 
Leningrad Municipal Council 





militsiia agency – within the NKVD structure – authorized by the state 
to ensure civil order and public safety, protect citizens and 
property, enforce the law, prevent, and investigate criminal 
activities. Similar in its duties to police. 
moleben liturgical service of supplication or thanksgiving. 
“mortal time” the most extreme period from November 1941 to May 1942. 
MPVO Local Air Raid Defense (Mestnaia Protivovozdushnaia 
Oborona) 
opolchenie People’s Militia; national irregular troops formed from the 
population at the times of national emergencies. 
pannychida service for the commemoration of a deceased person. 
PVO Air Raid Defense (Protivovozdushnaia Oborona) 
Doroga Zhizni 
  
ice and water route across Lake Ladoga. Road of Life/Ice Road 
skouphos also skufiya, skoufos, monastic cap worn by Orthodox Christian 
clergy. 
Sovnarkom Council of People’s Commissars 
Stavka   General Headquarters for the Soviet Armed Forces 
stolovaia/stolovye communal buffet, canteen, cafeteria (singular/plural) 
trupoedstvo corpse-eating 
upravdom building manager 

























Germany invades the USSR without warning. 
 
Finland declares war on the USSR. 
 
By the decision of the city commission bureau and All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) 
(VKP(b)) Municipal Committee, the Leningrad City Evacuation Committee was established. First 
evacuation of the treasures from the Hermitage and the State Russian Museum commences. 
Camouflaging of the buildings begins. 
 
Narodnoe opolchenie (People's Volunteer Militia divisions) starts to form. 
 










Evacuation of museum treasures launches. 
 
Politbureau of VKP(b) Central Committee ordered evacuation of 500,000 workers’ family members.551 
 
GKO (State Defense Committee) issues a decision to evacuate 80 Leningrad plants and 13 TsKB (Central 
Construction Bureau). 
 
Food rationing is introduced by the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom). 800 
grams of bread for workers,  
                                                 
550 TsGA SPb. F.7179. Op.53. D.58. L.30-32 
 









600 grams for office personnel, and 400 grams for nonworking adults and children. 
 













All higher learning institutions (universities) commence entrance exams. 
 
 Mandatory order to evacuate all mothers and children under the age of 14 is issued. 
 
 Kirov Theater troupe, choreographic college, and conservatoire are evacuated. Soviet troops leave 
Novgorod. 
 
Last train arrives in Leningrad. 
 













First decrease in bread ration. 
 
First artillery bombardment of the city by Germans. 
 
First aerial bombing of the city by Germans. 
 
Germans take Shlissel’burg encircling Leningrad. The siege begins. First massive aerial bombing of the 
city by Germans: 200 high-explosive and 6,327 incendiary bombs dropped. The Badaev warehouse burns 
down as a result of the bombing raid.552 
 
Second decrease in bread ration (500 grams for workers and 300 grams for office personnel and children) 
                                                 
552 Later, a lasting legend that the fire was the reason for the prolonged mass hunger was created. In reality, the warehouse lost 3,000 tons of flour and 
around 2500 tons of sugar in the fire. In the first days of the siege, the city used 2,100 tons of flour daily. So, the burnt down products would have sustained the 



















as well as meat, grains, fats, sweets.553 
 
First food barges arrive in Osinovets. Second reduction in food rations. 
 
The longest-lasting shelling of Leningrad (18 hours and 33 minutes). 
 
First attempt by the Red Army to break the siege. Formation of the Neva Bridgehead (Nevskii 
Piatachok). Heaviest bombardment of the city: 528 high-explosive and 2,870 incendiary bombs dropped. 
 







Third reduction of the bread ration (400 grams for workers and 200 grams for office personnel and 
children). 
 
10 air raids within one day. 
 











New school year begins for the students of the 7-10th grades. 
 
Fourth reduction of bread ration. General Kirill Meretskov and 4th, 52nd, and 54th Soviet Armies launch 
offensive. 
 
Delivery of food to the city by air cargo begins. 
 
Checking the ice thickness of Lake Ladoga. 
 
Reporting of ice thickness of 10 cm which enabled travelling of loads under 1 ton across the lake. 
                                                 




























Fifth and final reduction of the bread ration (125-250 g). First horse-drawn sleighs across frozen Ladoga 
Lake commence the opening of the Ice Road/Road of Life (road #101). 
 
Damaged by German bombings the city’s electricity is shut off. 
 
As ice thickness reaches 20 cm, auto transport begins to use the ice road across the Ladoga Lake. 
 
60 trucks brought 33 tons of flour and 2.5 tons of sugars and fats into besieged Leningrad across the 
frozen Lake Ladoga; this was the first of many over-ice truck runs that would ramp up to bring in 100 
tons of supplies each day. The population of Leningrad, however, required about 600 tons of supplies for 
survival. 
 
One of the heaviest raids of the city: 940 shells fired. 
 
Thawing decreased the ice thickness of Lake Ladoga and led to limiting the supply deliveries; only 61 
tons of food made its way into the city on this date. 





















City’s plumbing and electrical systems fail due to damage. Heating of the buildings ceases. Public 
transport stops functioning. City’s authorities issue a decision to supply population with boiling water.   
 
Traffic across Lake Ladoga halts. Lengorispolkom issues an order to manufacture burzhuiki.  
 
Red Army takes Tikhvin. 8 tram routes are discontinued servicing the city. 
 
Tanks move across the ice to reinforce the city. Trucks bring 687 tons of food over the lake in a single 
day, supplying the minimum daily requirement to feed the population. 
 
Another 786 tons of food transported into Leningrad. 
 













New Year celebrations for children are held at schools, theaters, culture centers, and clubs. Children 
received bread, cookies, and other food as presents. 
 
Tram service stops. 
 
Decision on increasing the establishment of the city orphanages is issued. 
 
Winter term finals at the Leningrad State University. 
 
The State Defense Committee (GKO) orders mass evacuation (over 500,000 people) across Lake 
Ladoga. 
                                                 

















Second increase in the bread ration (250 grams for dependents). Lowest winter temperatures record at - 
40°C. 
 
 Main Leningrad newspaper Leningradskaia Pravda and Radio Leningrad temporarily stop working due 
to lack of electricity.  
 
The lowest electrical production recorded. Bread baking is interrupted. 
January 7-April 30  Luban' Offensive – third attempt to break the blockade. 
 











Lengorispolkom made a decision to have orphanages operating on the 24-hour basis.  
 
Military Council of Leningrad Front issues an order to clean the city and take other measures (restore 
bathhouses, laundry facilities, sanitary control brigades and posts) in order to prevent pandemics.556 
 
Third increase in food rationing (300 grams for dependents). 
 
First Komsomol youth brigades tending to the needs of community created. 
 
Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 108,029 deaths in the month of February.557 
                                                 
555 TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21. 
 
556 TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 36. D. 79. L. 116–119. 
 



















Partisan region sends 222 horse sleds with food to Leningrad. City’s Musical Comedy Theater launches 
new season. 
 
Cargo tram operation is restored.  
 
First all-city voluntary Sunday work to clean the city. 
 
Leningrad Executive Committee decision on allowing individual vegetable gardening. 
 
Fourth increase in bread ration (400 grams for dependents). 
 
Order to clean the city from snow, waste matter, filth, ice, and corpses558 
March 15-April 15 Volunteer work to clean the city’s streets from dirt, filth, ice, ruins, and corpses. 
 












Air raid defense units (PVO) and Soviet aviation repulsed a massive Luftwaffe attack on the city and 
Baltic fleet. Pushkin Academic Theater stages a concert celebrating the 700-year anniversary of the 
victory in the Battle on the Ice. 
 
Red Army opened a railway connection between the northern Russia and Leningrad. 
 
Functioning of the public tram is restored. 
 
Ladoga’s ice road shuts down. Nazi troops exterminate the last defenders of the Nevskii Piatachok 
(around 200,000 soldiers). 
                                                 
558 TsGA SPb. F. 7384 Op. 18 D. 1442. L. 163-164. 
 
















Reopening of schools. 
 
Inspection of “house books” to calculate the actual number of residents is launched. 
 
City zoo opened its doors to the Leningraders. 
 
The Pioneer Palace561 re-opened. 
 
Lake Ladoga’s summer navigation resumes. 







Laying of the fuel pipe-line at the bottom of Lake Ladoga is complete. 
 
Art exhibition of local artists opens at the Artists Union’s Large Hall.  
 
6-10th grade students mobilized into communal units for weeding and watering vegetables. 
Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 33,785 deaths in the month of June.563 
July 3 
 
Pioneer Palace held graduation ceremony for city’s high-school students. 
 
                                                 
560 TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21. 
 
561 Pioneer Palaces were centers of extra-curricular activities that housed various workshops, study and hobby groups (chess, music, woodworking, 
choir, art, dance, math, computers, engineering, plane modeling, etc.). 
 
562 TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21. 
 











Soviet 2nd Shock Army encircled by Nazis. 
 
Movie theaters show “Leningrad’s struggle.” 
 
2nd Shock Army is destroyed, General Vlasov defects to Germany. 





Leningrad premier of Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 7 by the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra (cond. 
Karl Eliasberg). 
 





Launch of the final offensive that breaks the siege. 
 
Soviet forces lift the 872-day siege of Leningrad. Roughly 980,000 military and between 1,000,000 and 
1,200,000 civilians perished during the siege. Leningrad celebrates with fireworks. 
 
                                                 





Changes in bread ration (grams per day) 




I Blue-Collar Workers 800 600 500 400 300 250 350 400 500 
II White-Collar Workers 600 400 300 200 150 125 200 300 400 
III Dependents 400 300 250 200 150 125 200 250 300 













The ration of other foodstuffs rarely fluctuated. If they did, they were infrequent and insignificant (e.g. fish instead of meat) 
(grams per month) 
 Blue-Collar Worker White-Collar Worker Dependent Child (under 12) 
Meat   [Fish  also was rationed from July to September 1941] 
July-September 2200 1200 600 600 
September-January 1942 1500 800 400 400 
Grains/ cereal and Pasta 
July-September 2000 1500 1000 1200 
September- February 1942 1500 1000 600 1200 
Fats 
July-September 800 400 200 400 
September-November 950 500 300 500 
November- February 1942 600 250 200 500 
Sugar 
July-September 1500 1200 1000 1200 
September-November 2000 1700 1500 1700 








To avoid any confusion and further error, it must be noted that generally the meat (including horse meat) was replaced with powdered 
eggs, meat stew cans (containing 1/3 of meat in addition to stock, beans, and vegetables), and other foods in accordance with the 
following coefficient: 
  
1 kg of meat was replaced by 1 kg of fish or meat stew cans  
" 750 g of canned meat; 
" 2 kg of by-products of the 2nd and 3rd categories (head, leg, lung, spleen meat); 
" З kg of meat jelly or vegetarian-blood headcheese; 
" 170 g powdered eggs; 




It was permitted to substitute animal fats with vegetable ones, condensed milk, speck, or lard in the equal amount; or with cheese – 1.5 
kg, sour cream – 2 kg for 1 kg of animal butter. Although, in November and December of 1941, there was neither butter nor its 
substitutes, nor other foods to replace the fats, and nothing was allotted in those two months.  
 
GRAINS 
After the 20th of December, as a replacement of grains or cereals people received a mix of 50% rye flour and 50% cotton seed cake. 
 
SUGARS 
Sugar and confectionaries were distributed without delay and in the allotted portions. Interesting that from the beginning of the siege 
until January 1942, the sugar was not delivered to Leningrad. As of September 10, 1941, the sugar supply was to last 60 days, but with 






In November-December 1941 the ration cards were distributed to the following categories:  
 
Blue-collar worker (Category I) 34,4% of the city’s population 
White-collar worker (Category II) 17,5% " 
Dependent (Category III) 29,5% " 
Child (Category IV) 18,6% " 
From October 1to December 25, 1941, Categories II, III, and IV (two-thirds of residents) received the same minimal ration.  
 
All products for children have been distributed ply and in the amounts apportioned.  
However, beginning at the end of November 1941, the allocation depended on the availability of the provisions that were delivered 








D – diary N – notes R – recollections L – letters 
 
# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
1 Al’shits, Daniil Historian, member of Opolchenie D/R 
2 Andreeva, Nina Petrovna 13 y.o. R 
3 Argirovskii, Vasilii Pavlovich Linguist, son of a priest D 
4 Asknazii, Atta Abramovich Research Institute of Physical Training 
employee 
R 
5 Avgustyniuk, Aleksandr 
Ivanovich 
Railway employee D 
6 Bardovskii, Aleksandr 
Aleksandrovich 
Russian literature teacher of #156 school, 
Smol’ninskiy district and PhD student of the 
Leningrad Institute of education improvement 
D 
7 Bazanova, Valentina 14 y.o. D 
8 Berggol’ts, Ol’ga Poet D 
9 Berman, A.G. Inspector of one of the city’s accounting 
bureaus responsible for verifying the proper 
distribution of the ration cards 
D 
10 Berkhman, Vera Nurse D 
11 Bianki, Vitalii Valentinovich Writer L/N/R 
12 Bochaver, Mina Aronovna Textile factory worker R 
13 Bogdanov, Vladimir  Turner D 
14 Boldyrёv, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Professor of Middle-Eastern studies/in Apr. 
1942 served as a naval interpreter 
D 
15 Borovikova, Aleksandra 
Nikiforovna 
Woodworking engineer D 
16 Bubnova, Maia Aleksandrovna 8th grade student (15 y.o.) and komsorg of 
#221 school, Kuibyshevskii district 
D 
17 Buriakova, S.N.  D 
18 Cherkasova-Cherniavskaia, 
Nadezhda 
Nurse, Evacuation hospital # 88 D 
19 Daev, Vladimir Grigor’evich Writer R 
20 Davidson, A.B.  11 y.o. R 







# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
22 Dymov, Aleksandr Grigor’evich Theater Director D 
23 Eliseev, Nikolai Peasant/soldier D 
24 Evdokimov, Aleksei Fёdorovich Blue-color worker, forman at the military plant 
“Krasnoznamёnets” 
D 
25 Evgen’ev-Maksimov, Vladislav 
Evgen’evich 
History & Culture Lecturer D/R 
26 Fadeeva, T.S. Biology student R 
27 Fedulov, John 12 y.o. R 
28 Firsenkov, Ivan Blue-collar worker, Molotov Plant D 
29 Freidenberg, Ol’ga  Philologist D 
30 Galaktionova, Vera  11 y.o. R 
31 Garbuzova, Virineya Stefanovna Orientalist R 
32 Gel’fer, Gesel’ Aizikovich Foreman, engineer. The Stalin Plant  D 
33 Ginzburg, Lidiia Iakovlevna Writer D/R 
34 Glebov, Boris Protoierei of Spaso-Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral R 
35 Glinka, Vladislav PhD, Department of Russian Culture, 
Hermitage 
R 
36 Glinskaia, Ekaterina Prokof’evna Head of surgery department. Frunze district D 
37 Gol’zblat, M. Librarian R 
38 Gorbunova, Nina Georg’evna Head of orphanage #58 D 
39 Gotkhart, Sofia Izrailevna Univ. student worked at a hospital R 
40 Griaznov, Feodosii 
Aleksandrovich 
Actor D 
41 Grishkevich, Aleksandr 
Pavlovich 
Head of publication department of the 
Leningrad Municipal Committee of VKP(b) 
D 
42 Ignatovich, Zinaida 
Aleksandrovna 
MD, PhD of Medical sciences R 
43 Igosheva, Valeria Teen D 
44 Inber, Vera Mikhailovna Poet, writer D 
45 Issi, Irma 11 y.o. R 
46 Ivanova, Nina  R 
47 Ivanova, Valentina 
Aleksandrovna 
 R 
48 Kaganovich, Iulia Iakovlevna Chemical Technology PhD student R 







# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
50 Kapitsa, Pёtr Iosifovich Officer of the Baltic Fleet D 
51 Kapranov, Boris Peasant. Fire brigade member.  D 
52 Karetnikova, M.S. Teen R 
53 Kholmovskaia, Tat’iana 
Fёdorovna 
Singer of Kirov Theater (Mariinskii), worked 
in the hospital 
D 
54 Khodorkov, Lev Chief engineer of the 8th HES (Hydro-
Electrical Station). Transferred to the 5th HES 
during the siege 
D 
55 Khuze, Ol’ga Fёdorovna University lecturer, Library studies D 
56 Kniazev, Georgii Alekseevich Historian. Head of the Academy of Science 
Archives. 
D 
57 Kogan, Lev Rudol’fovich Dean of the History of Literature Department, 
Leningrad Library Institute 
D 
58 Kondrat’ev, Nikolai 
Aleksandrovich 
Actor D 
59 Kondrat’eva, Valentina Student of the Industrial Techinology Institute D 
60 Kononova, Tat’iana Alekseevna  D/N 
61 Konoplёva, Mariia Sergeevna Fine art expert/Archivist. Russian museum and 
Hermitage employee 
D 
62 Korneeva, Glafira Nikolaevna Head of School #3, Sverdlovskiy district D 
63 Korol'kevich, Anatolii Vital'evich Actor, Leningrad MuzComediya D/R 
64 Korshunov, A. Metal Plant’s welder R 
65 Kostromina, Nina 13 y.o. R 
66 Kostrovitskaia, Vera Sergeevna Ballet instructor.  D 
67 Kudrin, Ivan Stepanovich Neurosurgeon. Practiced and taught anatomy to 
medical students 
N/R 
68 Kulagin, Georgii Andreevich Metal plant mechanic D 
69 Kuliabko, Vladimir G. Engineer-consultant at the Leningrad 
Mechanic-Technological Institute 
D 
70 Leinov, Pёtr   R 
71 Leliukhina, Sofiia Architect R 
72 Lepkovich, Arkadii  Adjuster at the Broadcasting station D 
73 Levina, Esfir’ Gustavovna Architect. Architectural planning Management 
of Lensovet 
D 
74 Likhachёv, Dmitrii Sergeevich Scientist D/R 
75 Lisovskaia, Vera Teen R 





# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
77 Livshits, Z.S.   Engineer at the ship manufacturing plant D 
78 Lomakin, Nikolai Archpriest R 
79 Luknitskii, Pavel Military journalist D 
80 Magaeva, Svetlana Child R 
81 Malysheva, Vasilisa Petrovna Newspaper editor. The Molotov Factory, 
Sverdlovskiy district 
D 
82 Margulis, Lev Mikhailovich Leading violinist of the Symphony Orchestra D 
83 Martilla, Elena Oskarovna Artist D 
84 Mashkova, Maria Vasil’evna Bibliographic historian. The State Public 
Library employee 
D 
85 Matiushina, Ol’ga 
Konstantinovna 
Artist. Petrogradskiy district D 
86 Meerson, Sofiia Iakovlevna Lentorgreklama center employee D 
87 Michurina-Samoilova, Vera 
Arkad’evna 
Actor. Leningrad Pushkin Academic Theater D 
88 Miliutina, Zaria  School student R 
89 Mironova, Aleksandra 
Nikolaevna 
History teacher D 
90 Mironova, Evgeniia Ivanovna Agricultural worker unitl the spring of 1942. 
After that – active member of the military 
D 
91 Mukhina, Elena 16 y.o. School #30 D 
92 Murina-Pevtsova, Antonina 
Ivanovna 
Engineer at a factory R 
93 Nazimov, Izrail’ Veniaminovich Head physician of the 23rd hospital. Kirov 
district 
D 
94 Nikolaev, Vladimir 10 y.o. D 
95 Nikol’skii, Aleksandr Sergeevich Artist D 
96 Ots, Liudmila School student.  D 
97 Osipova, Nataliia Petrovna Factory planner. The Molotov Factory D 
98 Ostroumova-Lebedeva, Anna 
Petrovna 
Artist D 
99 Ostrovskaia, Sof’ia Kazimirovna Translator, editor D 
100 Pavlova, Anna Vasil’evna  R 
101 Pelevin, Mikhail Petrovich 15 y.o. R 
102 Peterson, Valia 14.y.o., school #239 D 





# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
104 Petrovskaia, Ol’ga Mikhailovna Librarian. Russian National Library R 
105 Podraiskaia, Raia 16 y.o. L 
106 Polzikova-Rubets, Kseniia 
Vladimirovna 
History teacher, Hermitage lecturer. School 
#239 School  
D 
107 Popel’, Roman 9 y.o. D 
108 Postnikova, Edit Petrovna  R 
109 Pozhedaeva, Liuda 7 y.o. R 
110 Reikhert, L. 6 y.o. R 
111 Riabinkin, Iura 16 y.o. D 
112 Savkova, Zinaida Teen  R 
113 Sel’tser, Ksaverii Naumovich Journalist D 
114 Sergeeva, Ol’ga Aleksandrovna MD D/R 
115 Shamshur, Vladlen Petrovich School student R 
116 Shaporina, Liubov’ Vasil’evna Translator. Artist D 
117 Sheliukhina, Nataliia 7 y.o. R 
118 Sheremet’eva, Galina 7 y.o. R 
119 Shilov, Aleksei Historian. Archivist D 
120 Shnitnikova-Lagarp, Zinaida Demographer, statistician D 
121 Shutkevich, Nataliia Sergeevna Dean of Elecric-thermal Dept of LCTI L 
122 Siasina, M.E. Artillery range worker R 
123 Sinakevich, Ol’ga Viktorovna Math teacher D 
124 Skriabina, Elena Russian literature professor D 
125 Smirnov, Leonid 16 y.o. Blue-collar/soldier D 
126 Smirnovskaia, Anastasiia 
Mikhailovna 
Teacher R 
127 Sokolova, Elizaveta 
Aleksandrovna 
Theater director. D 
128 Solov’ёva, Ol’ga Pavlovna 15 y.o. R 
129 Sudomina, Anna 15 y.o. R 
130 Suslova, E.N. Head of the GAORSS archives (now TsGA 
SPb) 
R 
131 Tikhomirov, Misha 16 y.o. D 
132 Tomigas, Vladlen Marine officer D/N 
133 Umanskaia (Kechek), Anna 
Stepanovna 





# NAME OCCUPATION D/R 
134 Trifonov, Vladimir 16 y.o. signalman D 
135 Vakser, Moisei Artist/ architect D 
136 Vasil’eva, Mariia Geologist D 
137 Vasiutina, Evgeniia 
Konstantinovna 
Technician/estimator (later – writer) D 
138 Veide, Elizaveta 13 y.o. D 
139 Velikotnaia, Tat’iana Nobility, nurse, Berkhman’s siter D 
140 Veller, Lazar’ Ivanovich Rector of Leningrad Chemical Technological 
Institute 
D 
141 Vinokurov, Aleksei Ivanovich Georgraphy teacher D 
142 Vladimirov, Ivan Alekseevich Artist D 
143 Vladimirova, Galina Child R 
144 V.N. Party official D 
145 Vop(t)intseva, Valentina 
Georgievna 
 R 
146 Voznesenskaia, Kapitolina 14 y.o. D 
147 Vraskaia, Varvara Borisovna Linguist, German language teacher. Leningrad 
State University 
R 
148 Yanovich, Tat’iana L’vovna Housewife D 
149 Zabelin, Anatolii Alekseevich Dean of the Engineering Univeristy, scientist D 
150 Zabolotskaia, Lidiia Karlovna School inspector of the Sverdlovskii district 
Department of Education 
D 
151 Zagorskaia, Aleksandra Pavlovna Head of the Krasnyi Futliarshchik cooperative 
association. 
D 
152 Zakhar’eva, Nina MD D 
153 Zavetnovskaia, Nataliia Petrovna Housewife D/L 
154 Zelenskaia, Irina Dmitrievna Head of planning department. 7th Hydro-
electical Station 
D 
155 Zhilinskii, Ivan Ivanovich Chief of the planning analytical department of 
Oktiabr’ railway 
D 
156 Zhitomirskii, Viktor Engineer D 
157 Zimnitskaia, Galia 14 y.o. D 






Photo 1.  
 
Nuremberg Document 221-L: OKW secret directive dated October 7, 1941 on 
the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad. Source: Niurnbergskii protsess nad 
glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi prestupnikami. Sbornik materialov (v semi tomakh) (M., 












Photo 2.  
Daniil Kiutinen, baker. 59 y.o. Date of death: February 4, 1942. Reason: distrofiia. 
 
 





Photo 3.  
 








Photo 4.  
 














Photo 6-9.  
 


























































Dec. 1941. Forged bread ration cards. TsGA SPb. F. 8134. Op. 3. D. 379. L. 199 
 
 





































































































Lunch delivery to one of the plants in May 1942 
 
 







1942. Medical care of a dystrophic. TsGA SPb. F. 8557. Op. 9. D. 13. L. 9. 
 
 








Photos of siege survivor S.I. Petrova in  












July 12, 1942. Orphanage #17, Smol’ninsk district.  
 
 




































May 1942. Veronika Opakhova and daughters Lora (13 y.o.) and Dolores (4 y.o). Photo 














15-year-old metal turner Vera Tikhova (often referred to as “La Giaconda of the 






Service at St. Nicholas Cathedral during the siege. The Metropolitan of Leningrad and 
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1992-1993 English Language Teacher, District School #32, Odessa, Ukraine.  
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